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This paper examines whether the chairmen of the board 
(COBs) impose their life-cycles on the firms over which they 
preside. Using a large sample of unlisted firms we find a 
robust negative relation between COB age and firm 
performance. COBs age much like ‘ordinary’ people. Their 
cognitive abilities deteriorate and they experience significant 
shifts in motivation. Deteriorating cognitive abilities are the 
main driver of the performance effect that we observe. The 
results imply that succession planning problems in unlisted 
firms are real. Mandatory retirement age clauses cannot solve 
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1. Introduction 
Extensive literature in economics, psychology, and sociology documents a negative relation 
between an individual’s age and job performance. On average, older individuals perform more 
poorly in a broad spectrum of cognitive tasks (see, for example, Verhaeghen and Salthouse, 
1997), experience a shift in motivation (see, for example, Ebner et al., 2006), and seem to prefer a 
quieter life (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; Li et al., 2011). These effects often emerge before 
the age of 50, evolving progressively as individuals grow older. This paper asks whether aging 
agents affect firm performance and why that could be the case. Because firms, in principle, can 
adjust their control structures, one would expect performance to be unrelated to the age of the 
company’s captain. 
 The data tell a different story. Using a unique dataset from a recent survey of more than 
1,500 chairmen of the board (COBs) of unlisted corporations in Switzerland, we document a 
strong and robust negative relation between COB age and various measures of firm performance. 
In a linear estimation, the numbers indicate that an increase in COB age of one standard deviation 
(9.6 years) is associated with a drop in return on assets of 0.8 percentage points. This corresponds 
to a performance decline of approximately 10 percent for the average firm. Non-parametric 
regressions reveal that the deleterious effect of COB aging starts at approximately age 50 and 
bottoms out at approximately age 65—Switzerland’s official retirement age. Therefore, it appears 
that underperforming COBs use the official retirement age as a face-saving exit option.  
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to document a COB age effect in unlisted 
firms. This finding should contribute to the literature that asks whether individual managers 
matter for firm performance (see, for example, Bertrand and Schoar, 2003). It also corroborates 
the view that COBs are among the most prominent players in a corporation (Parker, 1990; Mace, 
1986). It is their responsibility to establish and secure effective corporate governance (Florou, 
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2005) and to make sure that the board fulfills its central duties. According to the Swiss Code of 
Obligation (§716a), the board’s non-transferable and inalienable duties include, among other 
things, the overall management of the company, the appointment and dismissal of management, 
and the monitoring of management. A growing body of literature on CEO-COB duality argues 
that the COB has important monitoring functions (Yermack, 1996; Dahya et al., 2002). Such 
internal monitoring would seem particularly relevant for unlisted firms because they often lack 
external mechanisms that could act as substitutes (Booth et al., 2002; Kim and Lu, 2011) and 
have no liquid stock market that allows (minority) shareholders to walk away.  
The puzzling question is why COBs overstay. Several tests indicate that the answer to this 
question is related to the relatively weak corporate governance standards of unlisted firms (see 
also Loderer and Waelchli, 2010). When we replicate our analysis for a comparison sample of 
listed Swiss firms, we find profitability to be unrelated to the individual age of the COB (and 
other top managers). This finding is consistent with previous studies for listed firms in the U.S. 
(see, for example, Bhagat et al., 2010). Therefore, our results seem to apply to unlisted firms and 
not to firms at large. Corporate governance also plays an important role within the sample of 
unlisted firms. For example, we find the COB age effect to be stronger for firms with a more 
dispersed ownership structure, possibly because collective action problems among shareholders 
make it more difficult to monitor the monitor (Brickley et al., 1997). 
Previous literature shows that the more extensive experience of older individuals can at 
least partially counteract the deleterious effects of aging (see, among others Korniotis and Kumar, 
2011). This finding is also true for our sample. However, the combined effect of age and 
experience is still negative and significant.  
In addition to experience, a factor that we control for throughout the investigation, 
Salthouse (2012) argues that an individual’s cognitive abilities (‘can do’) and motivation (‘will 
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do’) are the two main age-related determinants of job performance. Our unique dataset allows us 
to construct various measures of these determinants of job performance and to inquire into their 
relevance. Consistent with the extant literature, we find that cognitive abilities decline with age: 
older COBs perform significantly worse on a simple speed measure—the time it takes to fill in 
the questionnaire (see, among others, Park and Reuter-Lorenz, 2009)—and they are more likely 
to concede that job complexity has increased. Also the ‘will do’ function seems to deteriorate 
with age. We find that 1) older COBs are less likely to focus on shareholder value maximization; 
2) older COBs prefer ‘bureaucratic’ activities over strategic tasks; and 3) older COBs are less 
appreciative of performance-sensitive compensation. This evidence is broadly consistent with the 
typical patterns of older individuals as documented in the extant literature.  
We ask whether the age-related changes in abilities and motivation that we observe explain 
why performance slows as COBs grow older. We show that the COB age effect is mainly driven 
by deteriorating cognitive abilities. In particular, profitability is significantly lower in firms with 
‘slow’ COBs (that is, COBs who perform poorly on our speed measure) than in firms with 
‘quick’ COBs. We also find motivational factors to be important, albeit to a lesser extent. 
Accordingly, COBs who state a commitment to shareholder value maximization are associated 
with slightly better firm profitability. Together, these two factors are able to fully explain the 
COB age effect.  
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to identify the channels through which 
COB age and firm performance are related. This finding should add to the literature in at least 
two ways. First, knowing that ‘age’ essentially reflects cognitive abilities at the corporate helm 
contributes to a better understanding of the existing findings in the literature, for example with 
respect to age-related differences in investment (Korniotis and Kumar, 2011) and acquisition 
(Yim, 2010) behavior. Second, it is important to understand the sources of the age effect before 
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trying to find a possible remedy. Stricter monitoring and more performance-sensitive 
compensation do not cure cognitive aging. A more promising way to prevent ossification at the 
helm could be the reallocation of tasks and responsibilities inside the firm and, of course, 
effective succession planning.  
In the last step of the investigation, we ask whether mandatory retirement age limits prevent 
directors from overstaying, as stipulated by various corporate governance standards, including the 
report of NACD’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Director Professionalism in 2005. Our data cast 
doubt on the effectiveness of mandatory retirement policies to induce a timely succession plan. 
We find that COB age is actually higher in firms with mandatory retirement age limits. 
Moreover, the presence of an age limit does not affect the relation between COB age and firm 
performance. This finding suggests that the ongoing debate about board retirement policies 
should be taken with a grain of salt. 
Problems such as small sample size, measurement error, insufficient control variables, and 
simultaneity concerns often plague studies based on surveys. While we are aware of these 
concerns, we believe that they do not significantly affect the interpretability of our results. First, 
our investigation is based on more than 1,500 usable questionnaires, more than three times the 
sample size of recent studies, such as Graham and Harvey (2001) and Brav et al. (2005). Second, 
the design of the survey should help us to limit the typical sources of measurement error, 
including satisficing, acquiescence, and social desirability bias (Weisberg, 2005). The following 
section addresses these issues in detail. We also run Heckman (1979) selection models and find 
no evidence of non-response bias. Third, the questionnaire itself was quite extensive, which 
allowed us to collect important control variables such as tenure, firm size, firm age, leverage, and 
industry, along with information about the firms’ ownership structure, board composition, and 
family affiliation. Finally, we conduct a series of additional tests to address possible concerns 
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about endogeneity. In particular, the results are maintained if we control for the possibility that 
poorly performing firms are more likely to hire older COBs. Moreover, the results do not seem to 
reflect the inability of poorly performing firms to attract competent successors because we find 
the same results in a subsample of relatively large and well-performing firms. We recognize, 
however, that such tests only provide a response to specific endogeneity concerns. Without a 
valid instrument for COB age, we are unable to address the problem of endogeneity in general. 
Therefore, a careful interpretation of our results treats them as correlations instead of causal 
relations.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our survey in more detail. Section 3 
studies the relation between COB age and firm performance. Section 4 asks how cognitive 
abilities and motivation change as COBs grow older. Section 5 asks whether changes in abilities 
and motivation help explain the COB age effect. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Survey methodology 
Our data come from a survey conducted in 2007. The questionnaire of 11 pages contained 38 
questions and was written in German and French—Switzerland’s two major languages. The 
survey was divided into five sections to collect information on the following: 1) board 
composition; 2) board compensation; 3) the COB’s demographics, preferences, tasks, and 
responsibilities; 4) ownership structure; and 5) other firm characteristics such as age, industry, 
and financial performance.1  The main advantage of surveys is that they can provide access to 
valuable information that is commonly unavailable in register data. At the same time, survey-
based research is also prone to several biases. According to Weisberg (2005), the three common 
pitfalls in survey-based research are non-representativeness, measurement error, and survey 
                                                 
1  A copy of the survey is available from the authors upon request. 
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administration issues. We briefly discuss these issues and describe the countermeasures taken 
when designing the questionnaire, conducting the survey, and analyzing the data.  
  
2.1. Representativeness: Sample selection, survey, and non-response bias 
To obtain a representative picture of corporate Switzerland, we begin the sample selection 
procedure with Dun & Bradstreet’s database, which relies on the official Swiss Commercial 
Register and covers the vast majority of Swiss corporations. Similar to Brounen et al. (2006), we 
select unlisted firms with more than 25 full-time equivalent employees, sales above CHF 3 
million, and at least two directors. This procedure leaves us with 11,875 firms. We eliminate the 
2,432 firms that do not have a unique COB to avoid multiple deliveries to the same individual.2  
The remaining 9,443 firms constitute the population of (relatively large) unlisted Swiss 
corporations with a unique chairman. We survey the population to avoid sampling error. 
A hard copy of the questionnaire was sent in February 2007, along with a pre-stamped 
envelope and a separate response form to order a free summary report. To increase the response 
rate, we established a telephone hotline to answer questions related to the survey and resent the 
questionnaire to all 9,443 COBs in March 2007. A total of 1,514 COBs returned the 
questionnaire, resulting in a comparatively high response rate of 16.2 percent.3 
Following Graham and Harvey (2001), among others, we test for non-response bias in 
several ways. We find the responding firms to be representative in terms of sales, geographic 
distribution, and general industry classification. This finding holds for the 9,443 firms we initially 
                                                 
2  If successful individuals are more likely to chair multiple companies, this restriction could exclude a 
disproportionately high fraction of well-performing firms. However, when we compare firms with and 
without a unique COB, we find no difference in sales, number of employees, and board size, suggesting that 
our sample is not tilted towards poorly performing firms. 
3  From the 9,443 mailed surveys, 98 were undeliverable and are therefore excluded from the calculation of the 
response rate. Typical response rates of surveys in North America are 16% in Brav et al. (2005), and 9% in 
Graham and Harvey (2001). In Europe, Brounen et al. (2006) obtained a response rate of 5%. In Loderer and 
Waelchli’s (2010) survey of Swiss COBs, 21% have participated. 
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targeted, as well as for the broader population of corporate Switzerland as described by the Swiss 
Federal Statistical Office (except for sales because we filter by sales). Moreover, we compare 
early and late respondents and find no significant difference in their answers. According to Filion 
(1975), late respondents are similar to non-respondents. Therefore, we conclude that neither 
sample selection nor non-response bias significantly affects our investigation and that our sample 
is representative for unlisted firms in Switzerland. 
 
2.2. Measurement error 
Another challenge for survey-based research is measurement error. In our investigation, such bias 
could arise if participants choose not to respond to specific questions or if their response differs 
from the actual true response, in particular because of satisficing, acquiescence, leading 
questions, or social desirability. This section focuses on measurement error in actual responses. 
Item non-response bias is discussed in more detail in the empirical section. 
Bias is often induced because wording is not understandable, not universal, or pushes 
answers one way or another (Weisberg, 2005). To ensure that the wording and survey design are 
free of such problems, we have developed the questionnaire in close cooperation with a survey 
expert and a communication specialist and we have pre-tested the survey extensively with a 
selected group of representatives from various industries. Furthermore, at the end of the survey, 
we have asked the participants to identify questions that are difficult to understand. Less than 20 
percent of the respondents indicate that there is such a question in the survey. Most of the 
statements refer to one specific question about the ownership structure, which we therefore 
exclude from the analysis. In untabulated tests, we also exclude all COBs who indicate that there 
is an incomprehensible question in the survey. The results do not change. Therefore, we believe 
that the wording and structure of the questionnaire do not induce systematic bias in responses. 
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To counteract satisficing, we enclosed a cover letter in which we introduce the survey team 
(with pictures and signatures), describe the relevance of the project, and explain how important it 
is to participate in the survey and how the results will be used (Krosnick et al., 2004). We also 
perform a series of tests on the actual data, none of which supports satisficing. First, as we will 
see in more detail below, the typical COB spends a considerable amount of time filling in the 
survey. This result is inconsistent with satisficing. Second, the results do not change if we drop 
the 25 percent of respondents with the shortest survey times. These individuals would seem to be 
particularly prone to satisficing. And third, we find no difference in the item response rate to 
open questions and choice questions. With satisficing, we would expect respondents to select the 
first best response from choice questions and to skip open questions.  
With respect to acquiescence, Krosnick (1999) argues that bias can be contained by 
avoiding agree-disagree questions. Therefore, most of our key data are collected with open 
questions. The exception is a statement about the ultimate target of the company, which we use as 
a proxy for the COBs’ financial orientation. Approximately 20 percent of the respondents declare 
a commitment to shareholder value maximization. Such a low approval rate is inconsistent with 
acquiescence. More importantly, the approval rate is in line with Loderer et al. (2010), who 
collect information about corporate targets from company websites and find that 25 percent of 
listed Swiss firms express a commitment to shareholder value. 
Finally, answers could be biased because of social desirability. This scenario is particularly 
true if questions address potentially sensitive issues. The literature suggests several procedures to 
reduce such bias. According to Presser and Stinson (1998), self-administered surveys are less 
prone to social desirability bias than interviews. Moreover, Ong and Weiss (2000) find that 
anonymity dramatically reduces the bias. Our survey is both self-administered and anonymous. 
Finally, as suggested by Presser and Stinson (1998) among others, we administer time-use 
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questions instead of direct questions when inquiring about the relevance of the various board 
tasks—a potentially sensitive issue. Taken together, these measures should help us reduce bias 
from social desirability.  
 
2.3. Survey administration issues 
The third source of error stems from survey administration and data processing. In particular, 
post-survey error could arise because we manually enter the data from the returned 
questionnaires. Therefore, we double check all data entries. Moreover, coding difference should 
not be an issue because there are no items with long text answers. Finally, because all data are 
from the same survey, we do not have to worry about potential mode effects, i.e., the 
phenomenon that a particular survey administration mode can affect the results that the 
respondents give.  
As in all survey-based research, we are unable to completely rule out survey error. We 
believe, however, that the careful design and execution of the survey, together with the additional 
measures described above, minimize potential sources of bias. 
     
3. COB age and firm performance 
3.1. Empirical strategy 
In what we refer to as our standard regression, we regress various measures of firm profitability 
on COB age and a broad range of variables, which should help us control for potential 
confounding effects: 
Profitability = f(COB age, COB tenure, CEO-COB duality, Board size,  (1) 
Board independence, Family status, Block ownership,  
Inside ownership, Firm age, Size, Leverage, Industry). 
 11 
It is well-documented that the adverse effects of cognitive aging operate jointly with learning 
processes. As noted by Korniotis and Kumar (2011), among others, it is important to control for 
experience when investigating potential age effects. Studying the portfolio positions and 
investment behavior of more than 60,000 private investors, the authors find that whereas 
investment skills deteriorate with age, older investors’ portfolio decisions reflect greater 
knowledge about investing. We use the COBs’ tenure as a proxy for experience and expect a 
positive relation with performance.  
Because longer tenure could also lead to higher entrenchment (see, among many others, 
Rose and Shepard, 1997; Yim, 2010), we include additional variables suggested by the literature 
to capture potential entrenchment effects. In particular, we control for board size (Yermack, 
1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998), board independence (Bhagat and Black, 2002), CEO-COB duality 
(Dalton and Rechner, 1991), family status (Anderson and Reeb, 2003), inside ownership (Morck 
et al., 1988; Himmelberg et al., 1999) as well as for the presence of blockholders (Holderness, 
2003). 
Finally, we control for firm age, size, and leverage to disentangle the life cycle of the COB 
from that of the firm. Loderer et al. (2012) document a strong negative relation between firm age 
and profitability, which they ascribe to the older firms’ inability to generate new growth 
opportunities. If older COBs are more likely to chair older firms, the negative relation between 
COB age and performance could in fact reflect more general geriatric problems in older 
organizations. Similar arguments can be made for firm size (Cooley and Quadrini, 2001) and 
financial leverage (Jensen, 1986). Together with the industry dummies, financial leverage should 
also help us control for risk.4 
                                                 
4  In later regressions, we will also include the COBs’ subjective risk assessment as a further control for risk. 
The inclusion of this variable does not alter the results, which is why we exclude it from the main 
investigation. 
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3.2. Descriptive statistics 
Let us now turn to the results of our investigation. Variable definitions are shown in Table 10. 
Table 1 describes the data and Table 2 shows Pearson correlation coefficients. As shown in Panel 
A of Table 1, the median (mean) sample firm has CHF 10 (28) million assets, sales of CHF 15 
(35) million, a net income of CHF 0.39 (1.36) million, and a debt ratio of 44 (43) percent. At the 
time of the survey, the CHF traded at an exchange rate of approximately 0.84 USD. Therefore, 
our firms are somewhat larger than those in other studies of unlisted firms. For example, 
Bennedsen et al., (2008) report an average book value of assets of approximately USD 3 million 
for Denmark, and Asker et al., (2011) find an average book value of USD 7 million in the U.S. 
Because we filter the population of firms by size, this difference is not particularly surprising. 
Still, when interpreting our results, we must keep in mind that we study relatively large unlisted 
firms. 
Our typical sample firm is also quite mature and has been in business for a median number 
of 43 years. This period is considerably longer than reported in other studies. For example, the 
median age in the sample of Asker et al., (2011) is 15 years. The difference in age can be 
ascribed to two factors. First, as we have just mentioned, we survey relatively large unlisted 
firms. Bartholdy and Mateus (2008) show that age is positively related to firm size, also in 
unlisted firms. Second, whereas most other studies of unlisted firms measure the age since 
incorporation, our proxy for age is the number of years since founding. The two proxies for age 
can differ for various reasons. For example, the incorporation age could be reset to one if a firm 
changes its legal form (e.g., from a limited liability company, LLC, to a corporation), re-
incorporates in a different state, or in the case of corporate restructuring (e.g., a statutory 
consolidation). The difference between the two age proxies can be sizable. A case in point is the 
Bechtel Corporation, one of the largest private firms in the U.S. According to the company 
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history published on the website, the firm was founded in 1898 and incorporated in the current 
form in 1945. Therefore, the difference between the founding age and the incorporation age is 47 
years. We also consult Worldscope, which contains both founding and incorporation years for 
931 listed firms outside the U.S. For Swiss firms, the reported difference between the two age 
measures is approximately 20 years. Similar numbers result for the full sample.  
The second panel of Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the age of the COBs as well as 
their tenure in office, our proxy for experience (Vafeas, 2003; Korniotis and Kumar, 2011). The 
median COB age is 57 years, which is the same as reported in Grinstein and Valles Arellano 
(2008) for a large sample of S&P 1500 firms. The median tenure is 14 years, which is slightly 
higher than what studies in other countries find. There is considerable cross-sectional variation in 
the two variables, as indicated by a standard deviation of 9.6 and 10.3 years for COB age and 
tenure, respectively. Taken together, the numbers imply that the typical sample firm has been in 
business for approximately 30 years before the COB took office. This should help us disentangle 
the life-cycle of the firm from that of its COB. 
The third panel summarizes the various performance measures. Our main metrics of firm 
profitability are return on assets (ROA; mean 7.7 percent; median 5.1 percent) and return on 
equity (ROE; mean 12.0 percent; median 7.2 percent). For robustness tests, we collect additional 
performance metrics, namely net profit margin, return per employee, and the sales-to-assets ratio. 
In terms of profitability, our sample firms are comparable to other studies of unlisted firms that 
were conducted at approximately the same time. For example, Asker et al. (2011) report an 
average ROA of 7.5 percent for the U.S., and Bartholdy and Mateus (2008) find an average ROA 
of 7.3 percent in a large sample of unlisted firms from 16 European countries.  
Finally, the fourth panel shows the various control variables. In slightly less than 50 percent 
of the cases, the COB is also the CEO of the firm (bCEO-COB duality). This fraction is much 
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higher than that for listed Swiss firms (20 percent, according to Loderer and Waelchli, 2010). The 
typical sample firm has four directors (Board size), of which one is independent (Board 
independence) and one or two are members of the founding family (Family directors). Overall, 
the board structures of our sample firms seem to be comparable to those in other studies of 
unlisted firms (e.g., Bennedsen et al., 2008). Our sample firms are also relatively closely held. 
Typically, the largest shareholder controls 53 percent of the voting rights (vr Largest) and is 
usually an insider (vr Executives; median 60 percent). The members of the founding family (vr 
Founders; median 42 percent) also play a key role in the ownership structure of unlisted firms. 
Loderer and Waelchli (2010) report similar ownership structures for larger unlisted Swiss firms.  
The table also allows us to assess the issue of item non-response and the potential bias it 
induces. As we have mentioned in the previous section, we have received a total of 1,514 usable 
questionnaires. However, not all of these questionnaires were filled out in full. The last column of 
Table 1 shows the item response rate, i.e., the number of usable answers per item divided by the 
number of returned questionnaires. While the scores for the COB and board characteristics are 
very high, respondents seem to be more reluctant to disclose financial data and information about 
the ownership structure, possibly because they believe this information is confidential. For 
example, 63.6 percent of the questionnaires contain information about return on assets (ROA) 
and 73 percent disclose net profit margin. 
In untabulated tests, we investigate whether firms that report financial information differ 
from those that withhold it. We find no differences in COB characteristics. Firm demographics 
such as age, board structure, and ownership structure are also the same. We find, however, than 
non-reporters tend to be larger in terms of sales and assets and have lower leverage. These firms 
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also seem to be slightly more successful.5  Therefore, the item non-response in our dependent 
variables could tilt our sample towards smaller, less successful firms. In the robustness tests, we 
will estimate Heckman selection models to address this issue. Moreover, to counteract bias from 
missing control variables, we add nondisclosure dummies (Himmelberg et al., 1999). The results 
do not change. 
 
3.3. Multivariate regressions 
This section studies the relation between COB age and firm performance by estimating the 
standard regression described in equation (1) above. To account for industry specific differences 
in firm performance, we include industry fixed effects based on the Industry Classification 
Benchmark (ICB) provided by Dow Jones and FTSE.6  Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-
consistent (Huber-White). Table 3 shows the results for our main performance measures ROA 
(regression 1) and ROE (regression 2), as well as the three additional performance metrics 
(regressions 3 to 5).  
Performance declines as COBs grow older. The coefficient of COB age is negative and 
significantly different from zero in four of the five regressions. An increase in COB age of one 
standard deviation (9.6 years) is associated with a decline in ROA of 0.79 percentage points. 
Given a sample mean ROA of 7.67 percent, this corresponds to a performance decline of 10.3 
percent.7  In the case of ROE, the decline is approximately 11.5 percent. Similarly, both NPM and 
ROEMP drop by approximately 9 percent if COB age increases by one standard deviation. 
Hence, the performance decline in COB age is not dramatic, but it adds up over time. These 
                                                 
5  For example, 163 firms that do not disclose ROA tell us their net profit margin. The average net profit margin 
of these 163 firms is higher than that of the 947 firms that disclose both net profit margin and ROA (not 
shown). 
6  Our investigation includes 61 firms from the financial industry. The results are qualitatively and quantitatively 
the same if we exclude these firms. 
7  To facilitate the interpretation of our results, the second argument in the parentheses below the regression 
coefficients reports such sensitivity measures for all significant coefficients. 
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sensitivities underline the fact that the COB is a focal player in the organization. Only in 
regression (5), where the dependent variable is the sales-to-asset ratio, do we find no significant 
association with COB age. One possible interpretation could be that firms headed by older COBs 
do not have lower output, as measured by sales, but rather, less efficient cost structures.  
To find out more about the functional form of the relation between COB age and firm 
performance, we estimate piecewise linear regressions that allow for changes in the COB age 
coefficient at ages 50 and 65. We choose age 50 as the lower turning point because, according to 
Verhaegen and Salthouse (1997), job performance begins to deteriorate after age 49. The upper 
turning point of 65 years denotes the official retirement age in Switzerland. Therefore, to 
implement the piecewise approach, we replace COB age with the following three variables in our 
regression: 
COB age<50 = 
= 
COB age if COB age <50 
49 if COB age ≥ 50 
 
50≤COB age<65 = 
= 
= 
0 if COB age <50 
(COB age–49) if 50 ≤ COB age <65 
15 if COB age ≥ 65 
 
65≤COB age = 0 if COB age <65 
(COB age–64) if COB age ≥ 65 
 
If, for instance, the COB age is 68, COB age<50 takes a value of 49, 50≤COB age<65 is 15, and 
65≤COB age is 4. The results of the piecewise linear regressions are shown in Table 4. 
Accordingly, COB age is unrelated to firm performance until age 50. Thereafter, and consistent 
with previous literature, performance slips as COBs grow older. ROA, for example, drops by 0.13 
percentage points for each additional year of COB age. Again, the effect is not dramatic, but it 
cumulates. If we measure the impact of a one standard deviation change of COB age around its 
mean (from age 49 to 65), ROA declines by 14.9 percent. After COB age 65, performance seems 
to bottom out (ROA and ROE) or even rebound slightly (NPM and ROEMP). Presumably, COBs 
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can step down without losing face when they reach the official retirement age. It looks as if 
underperforming COBs are more likely to exercise this exit option. However, because of the 
relatively few observations at the far end of the COB age distribution, the coefficient of 65≤COB 
age should be interpreted with caution. 
Finally, we also estimate non-parametric kernel regressions. To preserve space, Figure 1 
only reports the results for our two main performance measures, ROA and ROE. The graphical 
illustration confirms the functional form of the age-performance relation from the piecewise 
linear regressions. For reading convenience, we switch back to the linear age measure for the 
remaining investigation. To avoid clutter, we only report the results for ROA. The results for 
ROE, NPM, and ROEMP are qualitatively the same throughout the analysis.  
Before inquiring into the robustness of the results, let us briefly turn to the control variables 
in our standard regression. Contrary to our predictions, COB tenure is statistically zero in all 
regressions. Therefore, more extensive experience does not seem to increase performance, on 
average. Older firms generally exhibit poorer performance, which is consistent with Loderer et 
al.’s (2012) findings for the U.S. Board size, and Board independence have generally negative 
but insignificant coefficients.8  The same result is true of vr Founders and vr Executives. We find, 
however, that the ROA of firms with CEO-COB duality is approximately 1 percentage point (15.6 
percent) lower than for firms that split the role. In untabulated regressions, we interact bCEO-
COB duality with all control variables to find out to what extent the CEO-COB effect could be 
driven by differences in firm characteristics. In that regression, bCEO-COB duality is statistically 
zero, indicating that duality per se is not associated with lower profitability. More importantly, 
COB age maintains its negative and significant coefficient. 
                                                 
8  In untabulated tests, we follow Bennedsen et al. (2008) and identify boards with more than 6 members. In line 
with their results, we find that firms with board sizes larger than 6 are significantly less profitable, whereas 
board sizes below 6 are unrelated to profitability. The coefficient of COB age remains the same.  
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  With respect to the fraction of family directors on the board, we find a negative relation 
with profitability. Accordingly, an increase of Family directors by one standard deviation is 
associated with a drop in ROA of 8 percent. Along similar lines, Bennedsen et al. (2008) find that 
firms with large families that appoint many directors exhibit poorer performance. We find a 
positive association between vr Largest and profitability, suggesting that large shareholders are 
an important governance mechanism in unlisted firms. Finally, the coefficients of Size and 
Leverage are in line with previous literature. Large firms exhibit lower profitability (Cooley and 
Quadrini, 2001). More specifically, an increase in Size of one standard deviation is associated 
with a decline in ROA of 5.6 percent. ROE and the Sales-to-asset ratio behave similarly, whereas 
larger firms have higher NPM and ROEMP, possibly because of economies of scale. Higher 
leverage reduces overall profitability (ROA, ROEMP, Sales-to-asset), possibly because of 
frictions induced by financial constraints (see also Brav, 2009). Higher leverage is also associated 
with a lower profit margin but increases the shareholders’ required rate of return.  
 
3.4. Robustness tests 
3.4.1. Listing status 
Previous studies, most of which have been conducted for listed U.S. firms, document that the 
demographics of individual managers, typically the CEO, can affect corporate policy (see, for 
example, Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Yim, 2010; Li et al., 2011; however, see also Fee et al., 
2011). Individual age, however, seems to be unrelated to profitability in listed firms (Bhagat et 
al., 2010). This finding raises the question of how the negative relation between COB age and 
profitability documented in this paper can be interpreted. Is this relation a genuinely Swiss effect 
or could it be the result of much weaker formal governance rules in unlisted firms? 
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To shed some light on this question, we re-estimate our standard regression from Table 3 
for a control sample of 197 listed Swiss firms in 2006, the year to which the financial data in our 
survey refer.9  In untabulated regressions, we find no relation between COB age and firm 
performance, regardless of how we measure profitability. Neither is an extended panel that covers 
all listed Swiss firms over the period 1995 to 2009 able to produce a significant relation between 
COB age and firm performance. Possibly, the relatively strict rules that govern listed Swiss firms 
provide sufficient monitoring of the monitor and prevent COBs from overstaying, as seems to be 
the case in other countries. Therefore, the results of our investigation apply to unlisted firms. 
Studies of unlisted firms in other countries also report a negative correlation between individual 
age, typically that of the CEO, and profitability.10  
 
3.4.2. Owner-managed firms 
A firm that is fully controlled by insiders need not necessarily focus on financial profitability to 
foster shareholder value. Instead, the owner-managers could consume private benefits of control 
such as excessive salaries, quiet lives, or other perks, including company resources for private 
use.11  Therefore, declining profitability metrics do not necessarily imply that shareholders are 
worse off. If older COBs are more likely to be such owner-managers, what looks like a decline in 
performance could actually be a tax-efficient way to disseminate shareholder value. It is difficult 
to believe, however, that this tax argument can be extended to firms with a relatively dispersed 
ownership structure, because (external) minority shareholders typically have no direct access to 
the company’s resources. 
                                                 
9  Most board and ownership data are from Waelchli (2009). We update the information on director age, board 
composition, and ownership structure. Financial data are from Compustat Global. 
10  For example Bennedsen et al. (2008) for Denmark. 
11  Because of the double-taxation of dividend payments, such behavior could constitute a tax-efficient way to 
extract cash from the firm. 
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In regression (1) of Panel A of Table 5, we therefore extend our standard regression with an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if the minority shareholders together own less than 10 percent of 
the voting rights (bClosely held), as well as an interaction term of this indicator with COB age. 
The coefficients of both variables are statistically zero, indicating that the age-related decline in 
profitability is not restricted to very closely held firms. The same results obtain when we identify 
firms in which minority shareholders together control up to 50 percent of the shares (bMajority 
shareholder) and interact this indicator with COB age. In fact, the coefficient of that interaction 
term is positive and significant; suggesting that the age-related performance decline is actually 
stronger in firms with significant minority shareholders. This result is in line with the predictions 
from standard agency theory. The reduced monitoring function of minority shareholders seems to 
aggravate the detection and removal of underperforming managers. It could also be that a 
dispersed ownership structure invites COBs to consume more private benefits of control because 
they must bear a smaller fraction of the associated costs. In either case, overstaying COBs seem 
to posit a real agency problem in unlisted firms. 
 
3.4.3. The old guard and the superstars 
To the extent that CEOs retire to the chairmanship (Brickley et al., 1997; Brickley et al., 1999; 
Fahlenbrach et al., 2011), they might maintain a significant amount of control over the firm’s 
activities and thereby undermine the authority of the new CEO. Hence,  what looks like a 
negative relation between COB age and performance could actually be the result of governance 
voids caused by members of the old guard who are reluctant to hand over the reins. 
 Under this alternative hypothesis, we would expect firms with CEO-COB duality to 
outperform firms with a dual leadership structure. As we have seen in the discussion of the 
control variables in Tables 3 and 4, this does not seem to be the case. The effect of CEO-COB 
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duality on profitability is statistically zero once we add interaction terms to allow for differences 
in the control variables. In that regression, the interaction term of bCEO-COB duality and COB 
age is insignificant. This finding suggests that the COB age-performance relation is not driven by 
firms with a dual leadership structure (not shown). 
 Similar arguments could be made for founders who fail to relinquish full control to their 
successors. However, as we have mentioned above, our typical sample firm has been in business 
for approximately 30 years before the current COB took office. Hence, the typical COB is not the 
founder of the company. It turns out that only 22 percent of the COBs have been involved with 
the company from its inception and could, therefore, be classified as founders. To find out 
whether these founders drive our results, we identify them with a dummy variable and add an 
interaction term with COB age. The coefficients of the additional variables are insignificant. 
Therefore, it is difficult to believe that members of the old guard are the driving force behind the 
negative relation between COB age and performance. 
Finally, one could also argue that, because there is considerable cross-sectional variation in 
abilities, the age at which a COB takes office could be a proxy for talent. If particularly talented 
individuals are appointed COB at a relatively young age, the negative relation between COB age 
and performance could reflect such differences in talent. To test this alternative interpretation, we 
follow Korniotis and Kumar (2011) and sort our sample by the age at which the COB took office. 
We then re-estimate our standard regression for the sub-samples of firms with relatively low and 
relatively high COB appointment age, respectively. The COB age effect is statistically the same 
in the two sub-samples (not shown). Therefore, our results do not seem to be driven by superstar 
COBs who are appointed at young age. 
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3.4.4. Sample selection and non-disclosure 
We have seen in Table 1 that approximately one third of the returned questionnaires contain no 
information about our main performance measures. To assess whether this could bias our results, 
we estimate a two-step Heckman (1979) selection model. In the survey, we have asked the 
participants whether there are questions that touch on confidential issues (bConfidential). Of the 
1,350 answers we receive to this question, 43 percent are affirmative. Because confidentiality 
concerns would seem to reduce the willingness to disclose information, we use bConfidential as 
our selection variable.  
Panel B of Table 5 shows the results of the selection model. To preserve space, we only 
report the coefficients of the main variables. The first step regression shows that bConfidential is 
associated with significantly lower survey item participation. In the second step, COB age is still 
negative and significant, regardless of profitability measure. More importantly, for both the ROA 
and ROE regression, the inverse mills ratio is statistically zero, indicating that our selection 
model is unable to detect selection bias. 
In untabulated regressions, we also include nondisclosure dummies for control variables 
with low item response rates (in particular, the firm’s ownership structure). This increases the 
sample size of the ROA regression by more than 30 percent to 919 observations. The results do 
not change. Moreover, all nondisclosure dummies are statistically zero. 
Taken together, these results indicate that neither sample selection nor item non-response 
seem to add a severe bias to our investigation. In what follows, we will, therefore, continue to use 
our standard regression. 
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3.4.5. Endogeneity 
Obviously, endogeneity concerns resulting from omitted variables, simultaneity, and 
measurement error are difficult to rule out in our investigation. In particular, an open issue is 
whether we can interpret our results as simple correlations or as causal relations. 
Econometrically, there is little we can do to address these concerns. Economically, however, we 
find it difficult to believe that the physical age of the COB could be driven by the profitability of 
the firm in a way that could explain our results. For poor performance to increase COB age, one 
would have to posit that poor performance reduces the turnover probability, which is rejected by 
the extant evidence (see, for example, Brickley, 2003), also for Switzerland (Waelchli, 2009). 
Alternatively, one would have to assume that poorly performing firms are more likely to hire 
older COBs, whereas well-performing firms are more likely to attract younger COBs. If that were 
true, we would expect poorly performing firms to be chaired by older COBs with relatively short 
tenure.  
The data do not support this proposition. In a univariate analysis, COB age and tenure are 
positively correlated in a sub-sample of poorly performing firms (not shown). Moreover, we 
identify all COBs with tenure of less than 5 years (bTenure < 5) and interact this dummy variable 
with COB age in our standard regression. It is difficult to believe that the poor performance that 
could have led to the appointment of an older COB remains visible in the data five years after the 
COB took over. Therefore, under the alternative hypothesis that poorly performing firms attract 
older COBs, we would expect the interaction term to pick up the COB age effect, but that is not 
the case. As shown in regression (4) of Panel A of Table 5, the coefficients of the indicator 
variable and the interaction term are both insignificant, whereas COB age maintains its 
significantly negative coefficient. 
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An alternative hypothesis of reverse causality could be that relatively small and poorly 
performing family firms are unable to attract competent outside successors.12  Therefore, the 
incumbent team either stays in office or opts for a family succession, which could induce the 
owner-manager to stay longer. While this argument seems plausible, we believe that it does not 
fully explain our results. First, remember from the robustness tests that our results do not change 
if we control for the presence of founders. Therefore, the age effect per se does not seem to be 
driven by founders who fail to relinquish control. Second, in untabulated regressions, we 
constrain the sample to relatively large (Size above the sample median) and well-performing 
(ROA above the sample median) firms. Such firms would seem to be relatively attractive 
employers, also for outside successors. In this subsample, COB age still takes on a negative and 
significant coefficient, regardless of whether we control for the presence of founders. 
Such tests allow us to address the concerns about specific manifestations of endogeneity. In 
principle, instrumental variable regressions would offer a more general way to address this issue. 
However, to the best of our knowledge, the relevant literature has not identified a valid 
instrument for age. In fact, many finance papers that report age-induced differences in behavior 
do not directly address endogeneity. Without a valid instrument, we are unable to estimate 
instrumental variable regressions. Therefore, a careful interpretation of our results treats them as 
correlations instead of causal relations.  
 
4. Age-related changes in abilities and motivation 
Aging is a manifold collection of changes that render human beings progressively more likely to 
die (Medawar, 1952). Of the many physical, psychological, and social changes that are associated 
                                                 
12  We are grateful to the anonymous referee for pointing this out to us. 
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with aging, the declining cognitive abilities and shifting preferences of older individuals seem to 
be particularly relevant to our investigation.  
 
4.1. COB age and cognitive abilities 
According to Verhaeghen and Salthouse (1997), the cognitive abilities such as efficiency and 
effectiveness of information processing (e.g., speed, reasoning and memory) begin to decline 
before age 50, on average, and deteriorate progressively thereafter. Executive functions seem 
particularly prone to aging effects (see, for example, Rhodes, 2004). Consistent with that finding, 
Taylor (1975) documents that managerial decision-making performance declines with age.  
To measure the COBs’ cognitive abilities, we use a speed proxy as well as the self-reported 
perception of job complexity. The concept of speed is well established in the literature and 
considered the strongest predictor of age-related declines in cognitive abilities currently 
available, according to Verhaegen and Salthouse (1997) and Park and Reuter-Lorenz (2009), 
among others. Because slowing is task-independent (Birren and Fisher, 1995), a broad range of 
speed measures can proxy for cognitive abilities. Our speed measure is the (self-reported) time in 
minutes that the COBs took to fill in the questionnaire (Survey time). We have also asked the 
COBs to assess the complexity of their tasks (Complexity). We use this variable as an alternative 
proxy for cognitive abilities. It is indicated on a 5-point Likert scale with 1 being the lowest and 5 
the highest level of complexity. Descriptive statistics of the two variables are shown in Panel A 
of Table 6. Panel B reports the results of multivariate regressions of the two variables on COB 
age and the standard set of control variables.  
In line with the predictions from previous literature, speed significantly decreases as COBs 
grow older. According to regression (1), an increase in COB age of one standard deviation is 
associated with a Survey time that is 2.3 minutes longer. Given a sample mean of 21.6 minutes, 
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this corresponds to a time increase of approximately 11 percent. More importantly, the piecewise 
linear regression (2) reveals that the largest change in speed occurs between ages 50 and 65, 
which is consistent with the extant literature. The regressions for Complexity, our alternative 
proxy for cognitive abilities, corroborate these findings. Older COBs are significantly more likely 
to concede that job complexity has increased in recent years—and the main effect again takes 
place between ages 50 and 65 years. This finding is consistent with Rhodes (2004), who 
documents that individuals find it increasingly difficult to execute complex tasks as they grow 
older.13 Taken together, and consistent with the extant literature, we conclude that the cognitive 
abilities of our COBs decrease significantly as they grow older. 
 
4.2. COB age and motivation 
Aging also seems to affect an individual’s motivation. Ebner et al. (2006) report that younger 
individuals are more likely to strive for gains, whereas older individuals tend to maintain the 
status quo and aim at preventing loss. This pattern finds support in the finance literature, 
according to which younger CEOs pursue more acquisitions (Yim, 2010) and invest more 
aggressively than their older peers (Li et al., 2011). Moreover, Ferris et al. (2003) argue that older 
directors are prone to last-period problems such as the reluctance to update their skills and a 
reduced willingness to work hard (Jagannathan and Loon, 2011). Based on this literature, we 
hypothesize a negative relation between the age of the COB and her job performance. 
To assess whether the COBs’ motivation changes as they grow older, we use various 
proxies for business objectives, job activities, and compensation. 
 
                                                 
13  Note that, because the coefficient of COB tenure is negative and significant in these regressions, this result 
does not seem to be driven by the older COBs’ more extensive job experience or better ability to make 
intertemporal comparisons.  
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4.2.1. Business objectives 
We have asked the COBs to specify which ultimate goal they pursue with their activities. 
Specifically, they could indicate on a Likert scale from 1 to 5 whether they believed that the 
interests of the shareholders were more important than those of the other stakeholders. Previous 
studies find that older individuals are less driven by money (Ebner et al., 2006) and more strongly 
committed to organizational citizenship behavior (Ng and Feldman, 2008). Accordingly, we 
would expect older COBs to shift away from shareholder value to a broader corporate target that 
embraces all stakeholders.  
This prediction is supported by the data. The descriptive statistics in Panel A of Table 7 
show that, with a mean score of 1.8 out of 5, the typical COB only expresses a lukewarm 
commitment to shareholder value. In the multivariate framework reported in regression 1 of 
Panel C, COB age takes on a significantly negative coefficient, indicating that shareholder value 
maximization becomes less important as COBs grow older. 
 
4.2.2. Job activities 
Job activities also seem to shift with age. In particular, according to Ng and Feldman (2008) 
among others, older individuals prefer clearly defined tasks over less structured activities. 
Moreover, they seem to favor the status quo (Ebner et al., 2006), are more resistant to change 
(Cornelis et al., 2009), and have fewer career concerns (Li et al., 2011).  
To find out whether job activities change as COBs grow older, we have asked them to 
indicate the actual amount of time (in percent) as well as the subjective optimal amount of time 
(in percent) they spend on the following activities: 1) strategic tasks; 2) monitoring; 3) 
controlling, reporting, and auditing; 4) interaction with business partners; and 5) other activities, 
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which they could freely list. If older COBs prefer more structured activities, we would expect 
them to shift from strategic tasks to controlling, reporting, and auditing activities. 
Panel B of Table 7 describes the data. As one would expect, COBs spend most of their time on 
controlling, reporting, and auditing (28 percent), monitoring activities (28 percent), and strategic 
tasks (27 percent). Interestingly, according to the last column of the panel, there are some notable 
differences between the actual and the target time allocation. In particular, COBs, on average, 
would prefer to spend significantly more time on the firm’s strategy and significantly less time on 
monitoring and financial planning.  
To find out whether the activities and job preferences change as COBs grow older, we 
estimate a multivariate fractional logit model with a quasi-maximum likelihood estimator, as 
proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996).14  The results in Panel D of Table 7 are generally in 
line with our predictions. Each row of the panel reports the coefficients from a separate 
regression of the time allocated to a specific task on COB age, COB tenure, and our standard set 
of control variables (including industry fixed effects). For reading convenience, we only report 
the coefficients of COB age and COB tenure. The left (right) part of the panel refers to the actual 
(target) time allocation. 
    With respect to the COBs’ actual activities, we find that the time spent on controlling, 
reporting, and auditing increases significantly with age, which is consistent with the increased 
safety performance of older individuals. Moreover, older COBs spend more time on ‘other 
activities.’ Popular other activities are ‘alumni reunion’, ‘art and culture’, ‘colleagues and 
friends’, ‘use of fleet’, and ‘visit expositions’—most of which seem to be indicators of quiet life.  
                                                 
14  This is the method of choice if the dependent variables are continuous and bound between zero and one. The 
results remain qualitatively the same if we estimate a fractional multinomial logit model to account for the 
fact that, by construction, the time proportions allocated to the various tasks are negatively correlated.  
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It is important to note that the same age-related differences obtain if we look at the target 
time allocation. Hence, older COBs actually prefer to spend more time on ‘bureaucratic’ tasks 
and other activities. Moreover, the coefficient of COB age is borderline significant (p-value of 
0.102) in the regression involving the target time allocation to strategic tasks. Because strategic 
initiatives can be disruptive to the organization and its products and processes, this result could 
indicate the higher resistance to change of older COBs.  
 
4.2.3. COB age and compensation 
Finally, we take a brief look at the compensation packages of COBs. According to Adams et al. 
(2010), financial incentives are important in the board room. We have asked the COBs whether 
they participate in an incentive plan (bVariable compensation) and whether they would prefer a 
more performance-sensitive compensation (Higher incentives). Descriptive statistics are reported 
in Panel A of Table 7. Only 19 percent of the COBs receive variable compensation.15  Moreover, 
the typical COB does not seem to prefer a more performance-sensitive compensation plan.  
Panel C takes the COBs’ compensation packages to the multivariate framework and asks 
whether the actual and the desired structure of the compensation are related to the age of the 
COB. According to regression (2), older COBs are significantly less likely to receive variable 
compensation. At the mean, an increase in COB age of one standard deviation reduces the 
probability of receiving variable pay by approximately 5 percentage points (from 19 to 14 
percent). Hence, firms do not seem to increase the performance sensitivity of compensation to 
counteract potential last period problems of older COBs (see, among others, Ferris et al., 2003; 
Jagannathan and Loon, 2011). Moreover, as regression (3) shows, the desire for variable 
compensation also declines as COBs age. 
                                                 
15  For the average COB with an incentive plan, approximately 48 percent of total compensation depends on firm 
performance (not shown). 
 30 
An alternative interpretation could be that older COBs are more risk-averse and, therefore, 
request more stable compensation packages (Morin and Fernandez Suarez, 1983). To shed some 
light on the COBs’ risk assessment and whether it drives compensation preferences, we have 
asked the COBs whether they believed that being a director has become riskier in recent years 
(bRisk perception). 81 percent of the respondents agree with this statement. When we add bRisk 
perception to the regression, COB age remains negative and significant (regression 4). 
Interestingly, and contrary to the presumption of risk-averse COBs, the coefficient of bRisk 
perception is positive and significant with confidence 0.9, indicating that COBs actually want to 
participate financially in the risks they take. Adding an interaction term of bRisk perception and 
COB age does not alter this result (not shown). We conclude that risk affects the compensation 
that COBs desire, but cannot explain the negative relation between age and performance. 
Taken together, this section documents significant age-related shifts in cognitive abilities, 
business objectives, job activities, and compensation packages. Our COBs seem to age much like 
‘ordinary’ people. Because cognitive abilities and motivation are shown to drive job performance 
(Salthouse, 2012), the following section asks whether these channels are responsible for the COB 
age effect that we observe.  
5. What drives the relation between COB age and firm performance? 
5.1. Results 
To find out whether changes in cognitive abilities and motivation help explain the COB age 
effect, we extend our standard performance regression with the proxies presented in the previous 
section. The results are shown in Table 8. For reading convenience, regression (1) repeats the 
coefficients from our standard regression in Table 3. When we add Survey time, our main 
measure of cognitive abilities (regression 2), the coefficient of COB age declines in magnitude 
and significance. Instead, Survey time takes on a negative and highly significant coefficient, 
 31 
suggesting that much of the COB age effect we observe can be ascribed to a decline in cognitive 
abilities. 
The changes in motivation can also help explain parts of the COB age effect that we 
observe. We find that COBs, whose business objective is to foster shareholder value, are 
associated with higher profitability (regression 3). This result is in line with Loderer et al. (2010), 
who document that firms walk the talk in regard to commitments to shareholder value 
maximization. The time that COBs spend on the various tasks has no impact on performance, 
according to regression (4).16  In addition, the presence of a COB with a preference for more 
performance sensitivity in compensation leaves profitability unaffected (regression 5). Note that 
in all three regressions involving the proxies for motivation, the coefficient of COB age remains 
negative and significant. Finally, regression (6) includes all five proxies for cognitive abilities 
and motivation. The results are the same as in the individual regressions. The main change we 
observe is that the coefficient of COB age is still negative but no longer significant. This finding 
implies that when viewed together, changes in cognitive ability and motivation seem to fully 
explain the COB age effect. The coefficients and significance levels of various proxies are the 
same as in the individual regressions (2) to (5). Therefore, multicollinearity does not seem to be a 
major concern. 
 
5.2. Discussion 
The unique survey data allow us to open the black box of aging agents and their impact on 
performance. Of the various age-related changes we document for the COBs of unlisted firms, 
cognitive aging and, to a lesser extent, reduced focus on shareholder value are relevant for 
                                                 
16  The correlation coefficient between the time spent on strategic tasks and the time spent on controlling, 
reporting, and auditing is –0.22. Hence, multicollinearity does not seem to be a major concern when including 
these two variables in the same regression. 
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performance. This finding seems relevant for both academia and practice. First, there is a 
growing literature in finance that relates the individual characteristics of managers to firm policy 
and performance. Many of these studies control for individual age. Our results confirm that the 
age of the COB is an important dimension and that COB age is significantly related to firm 
performance in unlisted firms. Second, of the many things that age can represent, we show that, 
at the corporate helm, age essentially reflects cognitive abilities. This result contributes to a better 
understanding of existing findings in the literature, for example with respect to reported 
differences in investment (Korniotis and Kumar, 2011) and acquisition (Yim, 2010) behavior. 
Understanding the source of the age effect is also important when trying to find a possible 
remedy. Cognitive aging cannot be cured with compensation packages or stricter monitoring. A 
more promising approach could be the reallocation of tasks and responsibilities inside the firm 
and, of course, an effective succession plan. In this regard, our results suggest that unlisted firms 
may have a fundamental governance problem, when they do not prevent their COB from 
overstaying. In fact, inert retirement policies in corporate boards have attracted considerable 
attention from shareholder activists, policy makers, and the popular press. Various codes of best 
practice around the world require that firms enforce a mandatory retirement age to prevent 
directors from overstaying.17     
Our results cast doubt on the effectiveness of such policies. It is difficult to believe that 
enforcing a strict retirement age or limiting tenure can prevent the performance decline we 
observe. As we have seen, aging is a gradual process that sets in relatively early but also has 
considerable cross-sectional variation. Therefore, a general age limit appears to be an inefficient 
mechanism to prevent COBs from overstaying. A more promising approach could be to have key 
                                                 
17  The NACD’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Director Professionalism (2005), for example, states that “the 
board should establish procedures for the retirement or replacement of board members. These procedures 
may, for example, include a mandatory retirement age [...].” 
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agents undergo routine tests of their physical and mental fitness to fulfill their tasks—similar to 
the tests that pilots must undergo to maintain their rating.  
In fact, setting a mandatory retirement age could actually be counterproductive. As we have 
seen, the kink in the age-performance relation near age 65 suggests that the official retirement 
age of 65 offers aging COBs a face-saving exit option. In practice, firms often set the mandatory 
retirement age at 70 or older, which could dilute the attractiveness of the ‘official’ exit option and 
induce COBs to stay longer.  
Tentative evidence is unable to reject this conjecture. We have asked the COBs whether 
their position is subject to any age restrictions (bAge limit). As it turns out, only 19 percent of our 
sample firms set a maximum retirement age. According to Panel A of Table 9, COB age is 
slightly higher, on average (57.7 vs. 56.5 years), whereas Survey time, our proxy for cognitive 
abilities, is statistically the same in both sub-samples.18  In regression (1) of Panel B, we extend 
the standard performance model with bAge limit as well as an interaction term of bAge limit and 
COB age. The coefficients of both additional variables are statistically zero, whereas COB age 
maintains its sign and significance. When we add Survey time, the coefficient of COB age again 
declines in magnitude and significance (regression 2). More importantly, bAge limit and the 
interaction term are unaffected by the inclusion of this variable. Setting a mandatory retirement 
age, therefore, does not seem to help firms overcome the problems associated with aging COBs. 
A more thorough analysis of the unlisted firms’ apparent succession planning problem must be 
left open for future research. 
 
                                                 
18  We have also asked the COBs whether the firms restrict board tenure. Only 6 percent of the firms have such 
restrictions. 
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6. Conclusion 
Around the world, life expectancy has been increasing for decades and so has the median age of 
the working population. A large body of literature in economics, psychology, and sociology 
examines the challenges posed by this demographic change. Recently, the finance literature has 
jumped the bandwagon by investigating, among other things, how investment and financing 
decisions are related to the physical age of the CEO. This paper takes the issue to the board room 
of unlisted firms, the backbone of every economy. We want to know whether aging COBs affect 
firm performance, and if so, why that could be the case. The data come from a recent survey of 
almost 10,000 COBs of unlisted Swiss firms. The resulting sample is representative of corporate 
Switzerland in various ways. 
We find a statistically and economically significant negative relation between COB age and 
various measures of firm profitability. The deleterious effect of age begins at approximately 50 
years. COBs, on average, manage to impose their own life-cycle on the firms they lead. 
Moreover, and consistent with standard agency theory, the age effect is stronger in firms with 
significant minority shareholders. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to document 
such a COB age effect. The dataset allows us to take the analysis one step further and crack open 
the black box surrounding ‘aging.’ Previous literature finds that cognitive abilities and motivation 
are two of the main age-related determinants of job performance. Consistent with this literature, 
we show that older COBs are significantly slower and experience substantial shifts in motivation. 
COBs seem to age much like ‘ordinary’ people do.  
Finally, we ask whether the changes in abilities and motivation help explain the age effect 
we observe. The negative relation between COB age and firm performance is mainly driven by 
the deterioration of the captain’s cognitive abilities. Motivation also seems to play a role, but its 
effect is considerably smaller. 
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Taken together, our results suggest that unlisted firms could have a problem with 
succession planning. Various codes of best practice stipulate mandatory retirement age limits to 
prevent directors from overstaying. Tentative evidence casts doubts on the effectiveness of this 
simple remedy. If anything, the COB age is higher in firms with such clauses. Moreover, the 
presence of board age limits leaves the relation between COB age and firm performance 
unaffected. This result implies that the ongoing debate on board retirement policies should be 
taken with a grain of salt. 
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Figure 1: Non-parametric regressions 
The Figure shows the results of kernel-weighted local polynomial regressions to investigate the functional form of the COB age-
performance relation. As the dependent variable, the graph uses residuals from OLS regressions of ROA (ROE) on the same 
control variables as in Table 3, except for COB age. The independent variable is COB age, winsorized at the bottom and top 
decile. The values are obtained using an Epanechnikov kernel function with a rule-of-thumb bandwidth estimator and local-mean 
smoothing. The dashed lines plot the 90-percent confidence band. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
The table shows the descriptive statistics. Variable definitions are in Table 10 at the end of the paper. All variables are winsorized 
at the 5th and the 95th percentile of their distribution (except for the binary variable bCEO-COB duality). The data refer to unlisted 
Swiss firms in 2006.  
 Mean Std. p25 Med. p75 N IR (%) 
        
Panel A: Firm characteristics 
Assets (mio. CHF) 28 47 4 10 25 1'101 72.7 
Sales (mio. CHF) 35 51 6 15 35 1'342 88.6 
Net income (mio. CHF) 1.36 2.45 0.10 0.39 1.20 1'133 74.8 
Leverage 0.43 0.27 0.19 0.44 0.66 1'022 67.5 
Firm age (years) 51.18 37.4 19.0 43.0 77.0 1'479 97.7 
        
Panel B: COB characteristics 
COB age (years) 56.8 9.6 49.0 57.0 64.0 1'502 99.2 
COB tenure (years) 15.5 10.3 7.0 14.0 22.0 1'488 98.3 
        
Panel C: Firm performance measures 
ROA (%) 7.67 6.89 2.96 5.13 10.47 963 63.6 
ROE (%) 11.98 13.43 2.64 7.20 16.67 950 62.7 
NPM (%) 4.30 4.57 0.96 2.83 6.25 1'110 73.3 
ROEMP (thousand CHF) 14.39 19.89 1.82 6.07 16.90 1'110 73.3 
Sales-to-assets  1.85 1.26 0.92 1.54 2.50 1'081 71.4 
        
Panel D: Control Variables 
bCEO-COB duality 0.47 – – – – 1'503 99.3 
Board size 3.90 1.48 3.00 4.00 5.00 1'500 99.1 
Board independence 0.24 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.40 1'487 98.2 
Family directors 0.38 0.37 0.00 0.33 0.67 1'487 98.2 
vr Largest 0.59 0.31 0.35 0.53 0.90 1'354 89.4 
vr Founders 0.46 0.45 0.00 0.42 1.00 1'176 77.7 
vr Executives 0.56 0.41 0.05 0.60 1.00 1'246 82.3 
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Table 2: Correlation coefficients between pairs of control variables and performance measures 
The table shows Pearson correlation coefficients. Variable definitions are in Table 10 at the end of the paper. The data refer to 
unlisted Swiss firms in 2006. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
(1) ROA (%) 1.00                
(2) ROE (%) 0.91 1.00               
(3) NPM (%) 0.64 0.58 1.00              
(4) ROEMP (1’000 CHF) 0.52 0.46 0.76 1.00             
(5) Sales-to-assets ratio 0.36 0.30 –0.22 –0.08 1.00            
(6) COB age –0.10 –0.07 –0.05 –0.03 –0.10 1.00           
(7) COB tenure –0.06 –0.05 0.02 –0.01 –0.12 0.49 1.00          
(8) Firm age –0.17 –0.15 –0.02 0.00 –0.20 0.09 0.19 1.00         
(9) bCEO-COB duality –0.03 –0.05 –0.07 –0.09 0.06 –0.21 0.13 –0.08 1.00        
(10) Board size –0.05 –0.05 0.09 0.13 –0.11 0.04 –0.09 0.07 –0.28 1.00       
(11) Board independence 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.09 –0.04 0.02 –0.13 0.03 –0.23 0.30 1.00      
(12) Family directors –0.10 –0.09 –0.12 –0.09 –0.04 0.08 0.27 0.10 0.22 –0.28 –0.35 1.00     
(13) vr Largest 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.09 0.07 0.12 –0.22 0.09 0.02 1.00    
(14) vr Founders 0.06 0.04 –0.01 0.00 0.14 0.07 –0.02 –0.40 0.09 –0.08 –0.04 0.00 0.02 1.00   
(15) vr Executives 0.01 –0.01 –0.08 –0.14 0.07 –0.08 0.16 –0.05 0.47 –0.34 –0.29 0.28 0.07 0.07 1.00  
(16) Leverage –0.05 0.10 –0.19 –0.17 –0.10 0.04 –0.05 0.04 –0.06 –0.04 0.03 0.07 –0.04 –0.05 –0.04 1.00
(17) Assets –0.10 –0.10 0.21 0.35 –0.24 0.05 –0.03 0.14 –0.19 0.34 0.26 –0.17 –0.01 –0.05 –0.26 0.01
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Table 3: COB age and firm performance 
The table investigates the relation between COB age and firm performance. Variable definitions are in Table 10 at the end of the 
paper. In regressions (1), the dependent variable is ROA. In regressions (2), (3), (4) and (5), the dependent variable is ROE, NPM, 
ROEMP, and Sales-to-asset respectively. All regressions are estimated with OLS. The first argument in parentheses shows robust 
standard errors. For significant coefficients, we add a second argument, which shows the sensitivity of the dependent variable (in 
%) to an increase in the independent variable by one standard deviation. In the case of bCEO-COB duality, the sensitivity is for a 
change from 0 to 1. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance with confidence 99%, 95%, and 90%, respectively. The data 
refer to Swiss firms in 2006. 
 
 ROA ROE NPM ROEMP Sales-to-asset 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
COB age –0.082** –0.144** –0.042** –0.151* –0.004 
 (0.033; –10.3) (0.067; –11.5) (0.020; –9.4) (0.085; –10.1) (0.006) 
COB tenure 0.039 0.072 0.033 0.083 –0.006 
 (0.033) (0.067) (0.020) (0.087) (0.006) 
ln(firm age) –0.779** –1.538** –0.111 –1.366 –0.168*** 
 (0.324; –5.6) (0.669; –7.0) (0.233) (0.863) (0.061; –5.0) 
bCEO-COB duality –1.268** –2.662** –0.495 –1.329 –0.043 
 (0.608; –16.5) (1.192; –22.2) (0.384) (1.531) (0.107) 
Board size –0.078 –0.254 0.002 –0.452 –0.000 
 (0.212) (0.433) (0.146) (0.596) (0.035) 
Board independence 0.453 –1.162 –0.240 –0.564 0.076 
 (1.012) (1.972) (0.646) (2.681) (0.180) 
Family directors –1.703** –3.790** –0.860* –0.948 –0.136 
 (0.843; –8.2) (1.654; –11.7) (0.516; –7.4) (2.038) (0.135) 
vr Largest 2.105** 4.539** 0.516 1.936 0.331** 
 (0.919; 8.5) (1.908; 11.7) (0.567) (2.276) (0.160; 5.5) 
vr Founders 0.144 0.073 0.183 0.543 0.069 
 (0.627) (1.294) (0.425) (1.585) (0.107) 
vr Executives –0.040 –0.686 –0.086 –1.232 –0.050 
 (0.742) (1.528) (0.506) (1.907) (0.138) 
Leverage –3.568*** 6.127*** –2.707*** –12.277*** –0.361** 
 (1.022; –12.6) (2.118; 13.8) (0.603; –17.0) (2.392; –23.0) (0.163;–5.3) 
Size –0.831*** –1.340*** 0.622*** 5.583*** –0.330*** 
 (0.240; –5.6) (0.465; –5.8) (0.172; 7.5) (0.716; 20.1) (0.046; –9.2) 
Constant 17.256*** 23.056*** 8.015*** 31.070*** 3.245*** 
 (2.991) (5.690) (2.472) (10.396) (0.524) 
Industry fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included 
      
Observations 694 685 684 683 722 
Adjusted R-squared 0.084 0.058 0.141 0.227 0.162 
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Table 4: Piecewise COB age and firm performance 
The table investigates the functional form of the relation between COB age and firm performance by estimating piecewise linear 
regressions. Variable definitions are in Table 10 at the end of the paper. The dependent variables are the same as in Table 3. All 
regressions are estimated with OLS. The first argument in parentheses shows robust standard errors. For significant control 
variables, we add a second argument, which shows the sensitivity of the dependent variable (in %) to an increase in the 
independent variable by one standard deviation. For the piecewise COB age measure, we investigate the impact of plus/minus half 
a standard deviation (4.8 years) around mean COB age (56.8). Therefore, the two cases we project are COB age 52 (COB age < 
50 = 49; 50 ≤ COB age < 65 = 3) and COB age 61.6 (COB age < 50 = 49; 50 ≤ COB age < 65 = 12.6). In the case of bCEO-
COB duality, the sensitivity is for a change from 0 to 1. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance with confidence 99%, 95%, 
and 90%, respectively. The data refer to Swiss firms in 2006. 
 
 ROA ROE NPM ROEMP Sales-to-asset 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
COB age < 50 –0.063 –0.063 –0.007 0.230 0.005 
 (0.135) (0.271) (0.081) (0.282) (0.022) 
50 ≤ COB age < 65 –0.127** –0.248** –0.119*** –0.471*** –0.003 
 (0.064; –14.9) (0.126; –18.2) (0.039; –26.3) (0.156;  –31.1) (0.010) 
65 ≤ COB age 0.051 0.123 0.178*** 0.542** –0.020 
 (0.104) (0.212) (0.068) (0.246) (0.022) 
COB tenure 0.035 0.064 0.028 0.059 –0.006 
 (0.033) (0.067) (0.020) (0.087) (0.006) 
ln(firm age) –0.774** –1.526** –0.107 –1.287 –0.164*** 
 (0.325; –5.5) (0.675; –7.0) (0.232) (0.857) (0.062; –4.9) 
bCEO-COB duality –1.199* –2.536** –0.380 –0.964 –0.055 
 (0.613; –15.6) (1.205; –21.2) (0.382) (1.527) (0.109) 
Board size –0.068 –0.232 0.020 –0.366 0.000 
 (0.212) (0.430) (0.145) (0.591) (0.036) 
Board independence 0.498 –1.036 –0.183 –0.203 0.077 
 (1.012) (1.977) (0.649) (2.679) (0.180) 
Family directors –1.728** –3.796** –0.910* –0.767 –0.120 
 (0.849; –8.3) (1.664; –11.7) (0.514; –7.8) (2.014) (0.137) 
vr Largest 2.055** 4.458** 0.437 1.774 0.340** 
 (0.926; 8.3) (1.923; 11.5) (0.566) (2.288) (0.161; 5.7) 
vr Founders 0.109 0.003 0.115 0.401 0.077 
 (0.626) (1.287) (0.419) (1.561) (0.109) 
vr Executives –0.084 –0.760 –0.155 –1.434 –0.044 
 (0.745) (1.538) (0.507) (1.894) (0.139) 
Leverage –3.599*** 6.089*** –2.775*** –12.267*** –0.354** 
 (1.024; –12.7) (2.125; 13.7) (0.604; –17.4) (2.386; –23.0) (0.163; –5.2) 
Size –0.825*** –1.341*** 0.632*** 5.575*** –0.333*** 
 (0.240; –5.6) (0.464; –5.8) (0.171; 7.6) (0.707; 20.1) (0.046; –9.3) 
Constant 16.491** 19.651 6.541 13.831 2.769** 
 (6.830) (13.559) (4.313) (15.317) (1.183) 
Industry fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included 
      
Observations 694 685 684 683 722 
Adjusted R-squared 0.083 0.057 0.150 0.233 0.161 
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Table 5: Robustness tests 
The table tests the robustness of the results in Table 3. Variable definitions are in Table 10 at the end of the paper. In Panel A, we 
interact COB age (demeaned) with the following dummy variables: (1) bClosely held: firms with a single shareholder who owns 
more than 90% of the voting rights; (2) bMajority shareholder: firms in which a single shareholder owns more than 50% of the 
voting rights; (3) bNot founder: firms where the COB is not founder; and (4) bTenure < 5: firms with COB tenure below 5 years; 
All regressions are estimated with OLS. The dependent variable is ROA. To preserve space, we do not report the coefficients of 
the control variables. Panel B estimates Heckman (1979) selection models with ROA and ROE as dependent variables. The 
selection variable is bConfidential, a dummy variable that identifies respondents who state that the questionnaire contains 
questions that touch on potentially confidential issues. The first argument in parentheses shows robust standard errors. For 
significant control variables, we add a second argument, which shows the sensitivity of the dependent variable (in %) to an 
increase in the independent variable by one standard deviation. For the interaction term, we keep bMajority shareholder at 1 and 
vary COB age. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance with confidence 99%, 95%, and 90%, respectively. The data refer to 
Swiss firms in 2006. 
Panel A: Owner-managed firms and the old guard 
 Dependent variable: ROA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
COB age –0.105*** –0.156*** –0.139** –0.082** 
 (0.037; –13.1) (0.052; –19.5) (0.063; –17.4) (0.035; –10.3) 
bClosely held –0.131    
 (0.976)    
COB age × bClosely held 0.087    
 (0.061)    
bMajority shareholder  –0.210   
  (0.853)   
COB age × bMajority shareholder  0.110*   
  (0.058; 13.8)   
bNot founder   0.039  
   (0.815)  
COB age × bNot founder   0.072  
   (0.069)  
bTenure < 5    0.625 
    (0.965) 
COB age × bTenure < 5    –0.001 
    (0.094) 
COB tenure 0.039 0.041 0.038 0.050 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.035) 
Other controls Included Included Included Included 
Industry fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
     
Observations 694 694 694 694 
Adjusted R-squared 0.075 0.077 0.074 0.073 
 
Panel B: Sample selection 
 Dependent variable: ROA Dependent variable: ROE 
First step: bConfidential –0.870*** –0.859*** 
 (0.090) (0.090) 
Controls (selection) Included Included 
   
Second step: COB age –0.077** –0.132*** 
 (0.034; –9.6) (0.067; –10.6) 
Controls Included Included 
Inverese mills ratio 1.306 3.898 
 (1.279) (2.607) 
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Table 6: COB age and cognitive abilities 
The table asks whether the COBs’ cognitive abilities change with age. Our proxies for cognitive abilities are Survey time and 
Complexity, respectively. Variable definitions are shown in Table 10 at the end of the paper. Panel A reports descriptive statistics. 
Panel B shows the results from multivariate OLS (regressions 1 and 2) and ordered logit regressions (3 and 4). In regression (1) 
and (2), the dependent variable is Survey time. Regression (3) and (4) investigates the determining factors of Complexity. In 
addition to the linear COB age measure (regressions 1 and 3) we also estimate piecewise linear models (regressions 2 and 4). The 
first argument in parentheses shows robust standard errors. For significant control variables, we add a second argument, which 
shows the sensitivity of the dependent variable (in %) to an increase in the independent variable by one standard deviation. For 
the piecewise COB age measure, we investigate the impact of plus/minus half a standard deviation (4.8 years) around mean COB 
age (56.8). Therefore, the two cases we project are COB age 52 (COB age < 50 = 49; 50 ≤ COB age < 65 = 3) and COB age 61.6 
(COB age < 50 = 49; 50 ≤ COB age < 65 = 12.6). To assess the marginal effects in the ordered logit regressions 3 and 4, we 
compute the change in the cumulative predicted probabilities of the two categories ‘I strongly agree’ and ‘I agree.’  ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance with confidence 99%, 95%, and 90%, respectively. The data refer to Swiss firms in 2006. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Std. Med. N 
Survey time 21.56 9.34 20.00 1'347 
Complexity 4.11 1.20 5.00 1'449 
 
Panel B: Multivariate regressions 
 Dependent variable: Survey time Dependent variable: Complexity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
COB age 0.243***  0.020**  
 (0.047; 10.8)  (0.009; 4.2)  
COB age < 50  0.147  0.009 
  (0.149)  (0.034) 
50 ≤ COB age < 65  0.269***  0.046** 
  (0.088; 9.7)  (0.018; 8.0) 
65 ≤ COB age  0.261  –0.051 
  (0.186)  (0.033) 
COB tenure 0.023 0.024 –0.018** –0.017* 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.009; –3.8) (0.009; –3.5) 
Other controls Included Included Included Included 
Industry fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
     
Observations 697 697 719 719 
Adjusted R-squared 0.084 0.082 0.033 0.036 
Wald chi-2   62.525*** 67.567*** 
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Table 7: COB age and motivation 
The table asks whether the COBs’ job-related motivation changes with age. Variable definitions are in Table 10 at the end of the 
paper. Our proxy for business objectives is Shareholder value. To examine the COBs’ job activities, we investigate how much 
time the COBs actually dedicate to a) strategic tasks, b) monitoring activities, c) controlling, reporting, and auditing, d) interaction 
with external stakeholders, and e) other activities. We both measure the actual as well as the target time allocation to these 
functions. To assess the COBs’ financial incentives, we use the actual structure of the compensation package (bVariable 
compensation) as well as the desired structure (Higher incentives). Panel A shows descriptive statistics for the COBs’ business 
objectives and compensation packages. Panel B summarizes the COBs’ actual and desired job activities. Panel C shows the results 
from multivariate regressions of business objectives and compensation on COB age and controls. Regressions (1), (3), and (4) are 
estimated with an ordered logit model. Regression (2) uses a logit model. Finally, Panel D studies the relation between COB age 
and job activities in a multivariate framework. Each row shows the results of two separate regressions of the job activity listed to 
the left of the table on COB age, COB tenure, and the standard controls (including industry fixed effects, IFE). To preserve space, 
we only report the coefficients of COB age and COB tenure. The left part of the table refers to the COBs’ actual time allocation 
whereas the right part studies the target time allocation. The first argument in parentheses shows robust standard errors. For 
significant variables, we add a second argument, which shows the sensitivity of the dependent variable (in %) to an increase in the 
independent variable by one standard deviation. In the case of bRisk perception, the sensitivity is for a change from 0 to 1. To 
assess the marginal effects in the ordered logit regressions 1, 3, and 4 of Panel B, we compute the change in the cumulative 
predicted probabilities of the two categories ‘I strongly agree’ and ‘I agree.’ For the logit regression, it’s the change in the 
probability of a positive outcome. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance with confidence 99%, 95%, and 90%, respectively. 
The data refer to Swiss firms in 2006. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for business objectives and compensation 
 Mean Std. Med. N 
Shareholder value 1.82 1.17 1.00 1'443 
bVariable compensation 0.19 – – 1'144 
Higher incentives 2.18 1.38 2.00 1'434 
bRisk perception 0.81 – – 1'448 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for job activities 
 Actual time allocation Target time allocation Mean 
comparison Mean Std. Med. N Mean Std. Med. N 
Strategic tasks 0.272 0.186 0.20 1'255 0.312 0.172 30.00 831 *** 
Monitoring activities 0.278 0.158 0.26 1'251 0.262 0.139 25.00 831 ** 
Controlling, reporting, and auditing 0.280 0.172 0.25 1'255 0.253 0.147 25.00 832 *** 
Interaction with external stakeholders 0.145 0.168 0.10 1'253 0.151 0.155 10.00 831 – 
Other activities 0.036 0.103 0.00 1'228 0.028 0.081 0.00 808 ** 
 
Panel C: Multivariate regressions for business objectives and compensation 
 Shareholder value bVariable compensation Higher incentives 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
COB age –0.024** –0.032** –0.023** –0.022** 
 (0.010; –17.2) (0.014; –20.6) (0.010; –15.0) (0.010; –14.7)
COB tenure –0.009 0.031** –0.004 –0.004 
 (0.010) (0.014; 26.5) (0.009) (0.009) 
bRisk perception    0.300* 
    (0.181; 25.5) 
Other controls Included Included Included Included 
Industry fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
     
Observations 718 595 715 713 
Adjusted R-squared 0.040 0.063 0.019 0.020 
Wald chi-2 61.180*** 35.088*** 792.579*** 853.604*** 
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Panel D: Multivariate regressions for job activities 
 Actual time allocation Target time allocation 
 COB age COB tenure Controls, IFE COB age COB tenure Controls, IFE
       
Strategic tasks –0.003 –0.003 Included –0.007 –0.005 Included 
 (0.005) (0.004)  (0.005) (0.004)  
       
Monitoring activities 0.000 –0.007* Included 0.000 –0.003 Included 
 (0.004) (0.004; –4.8)  (0.005) (0.004)  
       
Controlling, reporting, and auditing 0.012*** 0.002 Included 0.011** 0.002 Included 
 (0.004; 8.5) (0.004)  (0.005; 8.2) (0.005)  
       
Interaction with external stakeholders –0.010* 0.009 Included –0.005 0.009 Included 
 (0.006; –8.0) (0.006)  (0.006) (0.007)  
       
Other activities 0.027** –0.007 Included 0.053*** –0.020 Included 
 (0.013; 27.6) (0.014)  (0.017; 61.9) (0.017)  
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Table 8: COB age, determinants of job performance, and firm performance 
The table asks whether changes in cognitive abilities and motivation help explain the COB age effect we observe. Variable 
definitions are in Table 10 at the end of the paper. The dependent variable is ROA. All regressions are estimated with OLS. To 
preserve space, we only report the coefficients of COB age, COB tenure, the proxies for abilities and motivation, as well as 
various interaction terms. The first argument in parentheses shows robust standard errors. For significant variables, we add a 
second argument, which shows the sensitivity of the dependent variable (in %) to an increase in the independent variable by one 
standard deviation. In the case of Shareholder value, the sensitivity is for a change from ‘neutral’ to ‘strongly agree.’  ***, **, and 
* denote statistical significance with confidence 99%, 95%, and 90%, respectively. The data refer to Swiss firms in 2006. 
 
 Dependent variable: ROA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
COB age –0.082** –0.063* –0.071** –0.074** –0.074** –0.043 
 (0.033; –10.3) (0.034; –7.9) (0.033; –8.9) (0.036; –9.3) (0.033; –9.3) (0.038) 
Cognitive abilities       
 Survey time  –0.093***    –0.104*** 
  (0.027; –11.3)    (0.030; –12.7)
Motivation       
 Shareholder value   0.463*   0.444* 
   (0.251; 11.0)   (0.268; 10.5)
 Strategic tasks (actual)    1.912  1.695 
    (1.560)  (1.710) 
 Controlling, rep., aud. (actual)    –0.221  0.607 
    (1.675)  (1.761) 
 Higher incentives     0.139 0.041 
     (0.194) (0.211) 
COB tenure 0.039 0.040 0.037 0.041 0.035 0.038 
 (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.036) (0.033) (0.039) 
Other controls Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
       
Observations 694 661 681 619 678 583 
Adjusted R-squared 0.084 0.099 0.085 0.081 0.081 0.102 
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Table 9: Firm performance and board retirement policy  
This table investigates whether the presence of a mandatory retirement age (bAge limit) affects the relation between COB age and 
firm performance. COB age is demeaned. Variable definitions are in Table 10 at the end of the paper. Panel A performs a mean 
comparison test of COB age and Survey time for firms with and without bAge limit. Panel B shows the results from multivariate 
OLS. The dependent variable is ROA. To preserve space we do not report the coefficients of the control variables. The first 
argument in parentheses shows robust standard errors. For significant variables, we add a second argument, which shows the 
sensitivity of the dependent variable (in %) to an increase in the independent variable by one standard deviation. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance with confidence 99%, 95%, and 90%, respectively. The data refer to Swiss firms in 2006. 
 
Panel A: Univariate results 
 bAge limit = 1 bAge limit = 0 Mean 
comparison Mean N Mean N 
COB age 57.68 285 56.52 1'195 ** 
Survey time 21.82 257 21.51 1'074 – 
 
Panel B: Multivariate regressions 
 Dependent variable: ROA 
 (1) (2) 
COB age –0.093*** –0.073** 
 (0.035; –11.6) (0.036; –9.1) 
bAge limit 0.304 0.326 
 (0.753) (0.751) 
COB age × bAge limit 0.099 0.090 
 (0.088) (0.088) 
Survey time  –0.096*** 
  (0.027; –11.7) 
COB tenure 0.040 0.042 
 (0.033) (0.035) 
Other controls Included Included 
Industry fixed effects Included Included 
   
Observations 690 658 
Adjusted R-squared 0.082 0.098 
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Table 10: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
bAge limit Binary variable equal to 1 if the firm has a mandatory retirement policy, and equal to 0 otherwise.
bCEO-COB duality Binary variable equal to 1 if the same person is simultaneously CEO and COB, and equal to 0 
otherwise. 
bClosely held Binary variable equal to 1 if a single shareholder owns more than 90 percent of the voting rights, 
and equal to 0 otherwise. 
bConfidential Binary variable equal to 1 if respondent states that the questionnaire contains questions that touch 
on potentially confidential issues, and equal to 0 otherwise. 
bMajority shareholder Binary variable equal to 1 if a single shareholder owns more than 50 percent of the voting rights, 
and equal to 0 otherwise. 
bNot founder Binary variable equal to 1 if the COB is not founder, and equal to 0 otherwise. 
bRisk perception Binary variable equal to 1 if the COB agreed to the statement ‘The risks associated with a 
directorship have increased in recent years’, and equal to 0 otherwise. 
bTenure < 5 Binary variable equal to 1 if the COB’s tenure is below 5 years, and equal to 0 otherwise. 
bVariable compensation Binary variable equal to 1 if the COB receives performance sensitive compensation, and equal to 
0 otherwise. 
Board independence Fraction of independent directors on the board. A director is classified as independent if he does 
not have business-ties to the firm and did not have so over the preceding three years. 
Board size Number of directors on the board. 
COB age Age of the COB (years). 
COB tenure Term during which the COB held his position (years). 
Complexity The COB’s assessment of the statement ‘in recent years, it has become more difficult to be a 
director’, measured on a 5-point Likert scale. 
Family directors Fraction of directors which are members of the founding family. 
Firm age Number of years since the foundation of the company (years). 
Higher incentives The COB’s assessment of the statement ‘the COB prefers a more performance sensitive 
compensation package’, measured on an ordinal 5-point Likert scale. 
Leverage The firm’s leverage, calculated as the book value of debt divided by total assets.  
ROA The firm’s return on assets, calculated as operating profit after taxes (= net income + interest 
expenses after taxes) divided by book value of assets. We assume a cost of debt of 4%. 
ROE The firm’s return on equity, calculated as the net income divided by the book value of the firm’s 
equity times 100.  
ROEMP The firm’s annual return per full time equivalent employee, calculated as the net income divided 
by the number of full time equivalent employees (thousand CHF).  
NPM The firm’s net profit margin, also known as return on sales, calculated as the net income divided 
by the total annual sales of the firm times 100. 
Sales-to-assets The firm’s ratio of annual sales to total assets. 
Shareholder value Based on the COB’s assessment of the statement ‘for our board the firm’s interests come prior to 
the shareholders’ interest’; measured on an ordinal 5-point Likert scale. To enhance readability, 
we compute Shareholder value as 6 minus the COB’s answer to the above statement. 
Size The natural logarithm of the firms total assets (million CHF). 
Survey time The time it took the COB to fill in the questionnaire (minutes). 
vr Executives Fraction of voting rights controlled by all executives. 
vr Founders Fraction of voting rights controlled by the founders. 
vr Largest Fraction of voting rights controlled by the largest blockholder. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper I examine whether internationally firms age in a similar way as in the US and 
whether differences in institutional settings cause variation in the speed of corporate aging. 
Loderer, Stulz, and Wälchli (2013; hereafter LSW) are the first to comprehensively document a 
corporate aging phenomenon in the US. With increasing age, US firms struggle to maintain their 
initial level of success. Tobin’s Q and return on assets (ROA) decline, sales growth slows, market 
shares shrink, capital expenditures are cut, and investments in R&D are reduced over the lifetime 
of a firm.  LSW suggest that this phenomenon is the result of time-constrained managers who 
focus on the firm’s efficient operation and neglect innovation. However, not only internal 
structures seem to influence corporate aging. LSW show that the negative age dependence of Q is 
mediated by the institutional environment that firms operate in. Legislation regulating the 
competitiveness of the product market, the labor market, and the market for corporate control 
seem to have an impact on the age-Tobin’s Q relation. Given that, relative to other countries, the 
US have numerous distinctive features with respect to labor markets, product markets, and the 
market for corporate control, the corporate aging phenomenon documented by LSW is potentially 
a US-specific effect. However, whether corporate aging occurs internationally is an empirical 
question. This paper examines whether the corporate aging phenomenon, documented by LSW, 
subsists in non-US countries, whether there are cross-country differences in the strengths of the 
effect, and, if so, whether these differences are related to country-level institutional settings 
relevant for the competitiveness in the labor market, the product market, and the market for 
corporate control. 
 In a large international panel which covers more than 32’000 firms in 19 countries and a 
period between January 1985 and December 2010, I document a robust, monotonic, and 
economically significant decrease in Tobin’s q over the average firm’s lifetime. The effect is 
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present in a sample containing all observations, a subsample excluding the US, and in each of the 
19 countries measured individually. I measure age as years since the firm’s incorporation as well 
as years since IPO and I use binary variables indicating whether the firm is older than the sample 
median in any given country and year. Results are robust, irrespective of the age measure and 
also hold for different sub-periods. In addition to Tobin’s Q, operating profitability measured by 
ROA, sales growth, and market shares, decrease over a firm’s lifetime in most of the countries. 
Moreover, firms reduce their capital expenditures and R&D outlays and instead distribute part of 
the proceeds to the shareholders. Overall, it seems that corporate aging is not confined to the US 
but is a genuine phenomenon affecting listed firms worldwide. 
 Comparing the magnitude of this age effect internationally reveals considerable cross-country 
differences. Therefore, I investigate whether part of this cross-country variation is driven by 
international institutional differences with respect to legislation regulating the competitiveness of 
labor markets, product markets, and the market for corporate control. To correctly identify the 
effect of institutional settings on the age-Tobin’s Q relation, I exploit the natural experiment 
created by the staggered passage of changes in legislations across countries.  Since these changes 
occurred at different times in different countries, I can identify the impact of institutional changes 
using a difference-in-differences test design (Imbens and Wooldrige (2009)). Specifically, I 
estimate the before-after difference of the corporate age effect in countries where institutions 
changed vis-à-vis the difference in countries where institutions did not change. To estimate the 
difference-in-differences, I employ panel regressions with an interaction term of proxies for 
institutions and firm age, and control for country, year, and industry fixed-effects. The results 
suggest that especially labor market aspects play a significant role in moderating the age-Tobin’s 
Q relation. However, the results of these tests are only tentative and need to be buttressed further. 
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The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 presents the data and the investigative approach.  
Section 3 studies the relation between firm age and firm performance in my 19 sample-countries. 
Section 4 asks how institutions impact the age-Tobin’s Q relation and section 5 concludes.
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2. Data and Method 
 
2.1. Sample Description 
The limited availability and cross-country comparability of firm-level data is a challenge for any 
international empirical analysis. In my investigation, I require reliable data on firm age and 
financial characteristics. Because only listed firms comprehensively report such data, I start the 
sample construction by selecting countries with the world’s most important stock exchanges 
according to the World Federation of Exchanges. I restrict my sample to countries with stock 
exchanges of more than USD 500 billion market capitalization as of December 2010. For those 
countries, the sample starts with all available firms in the Thomson Financial’s WorldScope 
database in fiscal years 1985 through 2010. The WorldScope database provides fundamental 
information on the world’s leading public firms, such as annual balance sheets, income 
statements, cash flows, and general firm information.1 Due to poor data availability, I exclude 
several emerging markets.2 The final sample therefore contains 19 countries (see column 1 of 
Table 1). Following Desai, Foley, and Forbes (2008), firms are identified as local based on the 
country in which they are incorporated. As indicated in Table 2, the overall sample contains more 
than 48’000 firms and more than 492’000 firm-years. Table 2 lists the restrictions that apply to 
the sample. Specifically, I exclude all financial firms (SIC 6000–6999) and regulated utilities 
(SIC 4900–4949).3 In order to have similar length of accounting periods in every firm-year, I 
ignore all firm-year observations which do not last between 361 and 371 days. I also exclude all 
firm-year observations with missing or negative assets, sales, market value of equity, and book 
                                                 
1  Alternatively, Compustat offers financial data on listed firms internationally. Ulbricht and Weiner (2005), 
however, document that WorldScope covers considerably more firms for time periods after 1997, making it the 
first choice for cross-country studies concerned with recent periods. 
2  Specifically, I exclude firms listed on the Shanghai SE, BSE India, National SE India, BM&FBOVESPA, 
Shenzhen SE, MICEX, Johannesburg SE, and Taiwan SE. 
3  This omission does not change the conclusions of the analysis. The tables including the omitted industries are 
available from the author upon request.  
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value of equity. Finally, following LSW, I ignore all firms younger than 5 years.4 Due to the 
imposed restrictions, approximately 16 percent of the firms leave the sample. The final sample 
contains 32’330 firms and 293’468 firm-years. 
Columns 4 to 7 of Table 1 show how the firms and firm-years are distributed across the 
19 sample-countries. For an appropriate interpretation of the relative importance of the country-
specific results, it is essential to note that cumulatively the US and Japan account for more than 
half and the ten largest sample-countries for more than 90 percent of the observations, as 
indicated by column 8 of Table 1. Over time, the coverage increases from 3’795 firms in 1985 to 
16’215 firms in 2010. Sample growth is not uniform over time. The number of firms covered 
increases sharply prior to 1995 by an annual 14 percent, on average. Between 1995 and 2004, the 
increase is 12 percent and thereafter only 3 percent annually. Splitting the sample into these sub-
periods, however, yields consistent results over time, suggesting, that the findings are not driven 
by the expansion of WorldScope’s sample-coverage.5 
 There are several caveats to using WorldScope data. As Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson 
(2006) point out, the data have a bias toward large firms, they suffer from backfilling, and the 
accounting conventions used in producing the data are not the same across countries. In addition 
to what WorldScope already does to make the data more comparable across countries and time, 
the analysis below addresses these issues by including industry, year, and country fixed-effects in 
the cross-country regressions or, alternatively, by estimating separate regressions for each 
country. Moreover, to reduce the influence of outliers, I winsorize all firm-level variables (except 
the binary and age variables) at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled distribution at the 
country-level.  
                                                 
4  This omission does not change the conclusions of the analysis. The tables including firms younger than 5 years 
are available from the author upon request. 
5  See 3.3 for the empirical results. 
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2.2. Method 
To test whether the corporate age effect exists also outside the US, I methodologically borrow 
from LSW by modifying their econometric approach to reflect the cross-country features of my 
dataset and the differences in data sources. In what I refer to as my standard regression, I regress 
various measures of firm performance on firm age and a set of variables that should help to 
control for potential confounding effects: 
 
Performance = f(firm age, return on assets, capital expenditures, R&D outlays,  (1) 
cross-listings, the degree of specialization, financial flexibility,  
leverage, firm size, volatility, industry, year). 
 
The following three sections describe in detail, how my econometric approach and the 
measurement of the variables is distinct from the approach of LSW. 
 
2.2.1. Firm Age 
To measure firm age, I closely follow LSW using the number of years (plus one) that the firm has 
been listed on a stock exchange (Ageipo) and, alternatively, the number of years (plus one) elapsed 
since the firm’s incorporation (Ageinc). In line Shumway (2001), I argue that also in an 
international context listing age is the economically most meaningful measure of firm age. In 
every sample-country, listing is a defining moment in a firm’s life because it affects ownership 
and capital structure, growth opportunities, media exposure, and corporate governance structure. 
However, cross-country studies not only use listing age (Dahya, Dimitrov, and McConnell 
(2008)) but also incorporation age (Bena and Ortiz-Molina (2013), Holderness (2011), Masulis, 
Pham, and Zein (2011), Gianetti (2003) or Claessens et al. (2002)) as a proxy for firm age. 
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One of the main challenges of this paper is to comprehensively collect firm age data because 
WorldScope only contains incomplete information on this variable. Several approaches have been 
used in the literature. For listing age Dahya, Dimitrov, and McConnell (2008) complement 
WorldScope data with information from SDC Platinum. For listing age, Holderness (2011) uses 
WorldScope as a main source and complements his sample with information from company 
websites. Other databases used in the cross-country literature are Amadeus from Bureau Van Dijk 
(Bena and Ortiz-Molina (2013) and Gianetti (2003)), Osiris from Bureau Van Dijk (Masulis, 
Pham, and Zein (2011)). To compile the most complete data set possible, I collect the two age 
proxies from various sources combining the approaches above. I start with age data obtained 
from LSW, which contains the two proxies for the US, and add information on firm age for non-
US countries obtained from WorldScope, Compustat, Osiris, SDC Platinum, Zephyr, CRSP, stock 
exchange websites, IR-managers, Amadeus, commercial registers, corporate websites, Reuters, 
encyclopedias and a web search, in this order. This pecking order has a somewhat arbitrary 
component because the ranking according to quality and reliability of a database is difficult to 
determine objectively. However, the ranking should not introduce any bias because consistency 
across different data sources is very high. The firm age distribution for subsamples of firms with 
simultaneous entries in two databases is almost identical for any pair of database. I can verify this 
consistency because my collection process is designed in a way that for any database I collect all 
available and assignable observations and not only the residual missing observations.6 
Panel A of Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the two age proxies. In terms of incorporation 
age, the average firm is 39 years old and the median incorporation age is 28 years. For IPO age 
the respective numbers are 21 and 15 years. Noticeably, the standard deviation of incorporation 
                                                 
6 As an alternative to the pecking order age proxies, I also employ a measure which uses the earliest appearance 
across all data sources as the birth date of a firm. Using these age proxies in untabulated regressions does not 
change the conclusion of the analysis. The tables are available from the author upon request. 
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age is higher than for IPO age for any sample-country. Coverage indicates percentages of firm-
year observations for which data on firm age is available. For both age proxies the coverage is on 
a high level, which makes sample selection bias unlikely to be a problem. Additionally, a 
subsample comparison of firms where age data is missing with firms where age data is available 
does not reveal any significant differences in terms of size, leverage and volatility. 
 
2.2.2. Firm Performance 
As in LSW, my main measure for growth opportunities is Tobin’s Q. Alternatively, I use ROA, 
Gross margin, the Probability of decline in market share, the Probability of negative sales 
growth, and Sales growth as measures of current profitability. Panel B of Table 3 reports 
descriptive statistics for the six firm profitability measures.  
 
2.2.3. Control Variables 
 The control variables are, in principle, identical to those in the model of LSW. However, they 
are measured based on the approaches of Ferreira and Matos (2008), Durnev and Kim (2005), 
Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004), Doidge et al. (2009), and Mitton (2002).  These studies all 
estimate firm performance regressions in an international context and employ data from the 
WorldScope database. The purpose of the alternative measurement is, on one hand, to find the 
best proxies in a setting of limited data availability and, on the other hand, to address problems of 
limited international comparability. For instance, the measures try to avoid accounting data which 
is prone to managerial discretion. Variable definitions are in Table 13. 
 The three main differences with regard to variable measurement concern the degree of 
specialization (bFocus), financial flexibility (FF-index), and volatility (Volatility). LSW use a 
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Herfindahl index based on segment sales to measure the degree of specialization. Due to the low 
availability of segment sales in WorldScope, I follow Mitton (2002) and measure the degree of 
specialization with an indicator that is set to one if the number of two-digit SIC level industries in 
which a firm operates is below the median in a given country and year. Alternatively, I measure 
the degree of specialization using the number of industries in which the firm operates and the 
results do not change (not shown). To measure firm-level financial constraints, LSW use the 
index of Kaplan and Zingales (1997). However, this index is only available for US firms. 
Following Doidge et al. (2009), I calculate a simple index of financial flexibility (FF-index). The 
FF-index is constructed as a count variable by adding one point for a firm with above median 
cash and liquid assets, one point for above median dividends, and one more point for below 
median capital expenditures. Volatility of the firm’s monthly stock return is calculated over a 
two-year window as opposed to five years in LSW because my sample period is considerably 
shorter. A five year window at the start of the sample period constrains too many observations. A 
problem with WorldScope’s stock return data is that returns are carried forward to every 
consequent month for inactive firms. I follow Ince and Porter (2006) and delete all monthly zero 
returns from the end of the sample period to the first nonzero return to address this issue. 
 Finally, as indicated in the standard regression model (1) above, I add an indicator variable for 
cross-listings (bADR) to the model of LSW because Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004) find that 
the decision to cross-list in the US is value enhancing. This higher valuation seems to be driven 
by the firms’ commitment to improved disclosure and invest in good corporate governance.
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3. International corporate age effect 
In this section I examine whether the corporate aging phenomenon documented by LSW in the 
US subsists in other countries and whether the effect varies in strength across countries.  
 
3.1. Worldwide decline in Tobin’s Q ratios 
To investigate the relation between firm age and Tobin’s Q, I start with estimating OLS panel 
regressions with robust standard errors clustered at the country-level. Table 4 shows a very robust 
decrease of Tobin’s q with firm age for a set of different specifications. The results are robust to 
different age proxies. As age proxy, I alternatively use incorporation age or IPO age and natural 
logs of age (panel A) or binary variables indicating if the firm is older than the sample median in 
any given country and year (panel B). The negative relation also holds irrespective of whether I 
only include the age proxy as a control variable in regressions 1 and 2, add the control variables 
except volatility in regressions 3 and 4, include the full set of control variables in regressions 5 
and 6, or, finally, include country fixed-effects in regressions 7 and 8. Regression 3 to 6 include 
industry (Fama and French's (1997) 48 industry grouping) and year fixed-effects, and regressions 
7 and 8 add country fixed-effects. Further, the results obtain for the full sample containing all 
countries (World) and a subsample containing only non-US countries. R-squared values are 
reasonably high, explaining 26 to 29 percent of variation across all specifications. 
 The coefficients of the control variables in my standard regressions (7 and 8) are mostly in line 
with LSW. Consistent with their findings, R&D outlays, focus, size, and volatility are associated 
with larger Tobin’s q ratios. Financial frictions seem to be immaterial. Financial leverage and 
ROA have a negative coefficient. The only difference to LSW’s results is that capital 
expenditures are insignificant (but still positive) in my regressions. The additional control 
variable for cross-listings also produces an insignificant coefficient, possibly because the variable 
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not only involves cross-listings in the US but dual-listings with any other country. Note that non-
disclosed R&D outlays are set to zero and indicated with a dummy variable. The coefficient of 
this dummy is insignificant in most of the regressions and therefore not shown. However, the 
coefficients of R&D outlays should be interpreted cautiously. 
 To find out more about the functional form of the relation between firm age and Tobin’s Q, I 
also estimate non-parametric kernel-weighted local polynomial regressions using an 
Epanechnikov kernel function with at rule-of-thumb bandwidth estimator and local-mean 
smoothing. Panel A of Figure 1 shows the unconditional relation. The white area identifies the 
interquartile range with the median indicated by the vertical black reference line.  The age-
Tobin’s Q relation is negative regardless of whether I measure firm age from the date of IPO or 
from that of incorporation and whether the estimation relates to the full sample or only to non-US 
countries. In panel B, I examine whether the documented unconditional relation also holds if I 
use the full set of control variables of my standard regressions. To obtain these conditional 
results, I first estimate an OLS regression of Tobin’s Q on ROA, Capex, R&D outlays, bADR, 
bFocus, FF-index, Leverage, Size, and Volatility and include industry, year, and country fixed-
effects and robust standard errors clustered at the country-level. I then regress the residuals of this 
OLS regression on incorporation and IPO age, respectively. The resulting graphical illustration of 
this conditional estimation corroborates the negative age-Tobin’s Q relation, regardless of 
whether I measure firm age from the date of IPO or from that of incorporation and whether the 
estimation relates to the full sample or only to non-US countries. However, strikingly, Tobin’s Q 
seems to pick up 30 years after IPO. This could either be a random result because the upward-
bending occurs at the tail of the distribution or it could also be driven by some countries with 
distinctive age-Tobin’s Q patterns in older age. Therefore, I explore the age-Tobin’s Q relation 
for each country separately in the next section. 
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 However, the overall non-parametric results suggest that a linear estimation is a suitable 
approximation for the Tobin’s q regressions. For reading convenience, I switch back to the linear 
age measure for the remaining analysis.    
  
3.2. Decline in Tobin’s Q ratios across countries 
To examine whether the aging phenomenon subsists internationally, I estimate the standard 
regressions for each of the 19 sample-countries separately. The regression specifications are the 
same as in regressions 7 and 8 of Table 4, except that, since subsamples are country-specific, I do 
not include country fixed-effects and cluster standard errors at the firm- instead of the country-
level. Table 5 shows the results. To conserve space, I only report the coefficient of ln(Age) and 
the attributed significance level. For reading convenience, the two top rows reproduce the age 
coefficients of Table 4, regression 7 and 8 for the full and the non-US sample. The age 
coefficients of the separate country regressions are almost all negative and statistically 
significant. If I measure age from the date of incorporation, the reported age-Tobin’s Q relation is 
negative for all 19 countries and negative and statistically significant for 15 out of the 19 
countries. For IPO age the respective numbers are 18 negative and 17 negative and statistically 
significant coefficients. The two bottom rows show percentages of negative and significantly 
negative age coefficients with equal weighting (columns 1 and 6) and firm-year observation 
weighting (columns 4 and 9). The results of Table 5 suggest that the age effect documented in 
LSW is very robust across the countries under investigation. The results are also robust to a 
specification using ln(Tobin’s Q) instead of Tobin’s Q as dependent variable (not shown). 
 In order to make the coefficients more comparable across different countries, I estimate 
sensitivities. Columns 5 and 10 show the sensitivity of Tobin's Q (in percent) to an increase in 
age of one standard deviation of the pooled age-distribution in the country. The impact is 
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measured relative to the average Tobin’s Q in the country, and is shown only for statistically 
significant age coefficients. The magnitude of the sensitivities exhibits much less variation than 
the coefficients in columns 1 and 6, suggesting that the age effect is more similar in magnitude 
across countries once the age distribution is taken into account. For incorporation age, the 
sensitivities range from 2.7 percent (Australia) to 7.5 percent (South Korea) and for IPO age from 
2.5 percent (Australia) to 12.5 percent (Sweden). 
 Analogously to the non-parametric analysis for the full sample, I also estimate non-parametric 
kernel-weighted local polynomial regressions for each country separately. For brevity, I skip the 
unconditional approach and only estimate the conditional regressions following the same 
approach as in Figure 1, panel B. The only difference is that I do not include country fixed-effects 
and cluster standard errors at the firm- instead of the country-level. Figure 2 shows the results. 
Most of the graphs are characterized by a general pattern of a negative age-Tobin’s q relation. 
However there seem to be differences across countries since the shapes of the graphs are not 
uniform. To facilitate interpretation across countries, all graphs display the interquartile range 
(white area) and the median (vertical black reference line) of the pooled age distribution in the 
country.  
 Overall, the country specific results reveal a very robust international age effect. There is 
almost no country exempted from the deterioration of Tobin’s Q over the lifetime of a firm. Since 
there are cross-country differences in the magnitude of the age coefficients and the sensitivities 
and also the graphical patterns are not uniform, the next section examines whether the US is 
significantly different from other countries with respect to the strength of the age effect. 
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3.3. International variation and persistence of the decline in Tobin’s Q ratios 
LSW document that the speed of corporate aging is driven by competitiveness of labor markets, 
product markets, and the market for corporate control. Since the competitiveness of these markets 
is not identical across countries and given that LSW’s results also hold internationally, I should 
be able to detect cross-country differences in the speed of corporate aging. The fact that in Table 
4, all adjusted R-squared values are slightly higher in the specifications using country fixed-
effects can be interpreted as evidence that country characteristics matter for corporate aging. 
More importantly, I estimate specifications including interactions of all countries with age (not 
shown) and test for joint significance of these interactions (Wald test). The F-values are all 
significant, suggesting that country characteristics explain variation in the cross-country 
differences of the age effect. 
 A more straightforward approach to find out whether the speed of corporate aging varies 
across countries is to estimate separate regressions (as in Table 5) and then compare their age 
coefficients. Table 6 shows the results of the ln(Age) coefficient comparison of the separate 
country regressions with the US. For reading convenience, columns 1 and 5 in the first row repeat 
the ln(Age) coefficients of the US from Table 5 as the benchmark for the comparison. The 
remaining rows in these columns show the difference between the US coefficient and the 
respective country coefficient along with its significance level in columns 2 and 6. For instance, 
Japan has an ln(Age) coefficient of –0.192 + 0.070 = –0.122 and the difference of 0.070 is 
statistically significant at the 99 percent level. The significance levels are estimated with a two-
sample two-sided t-test with unequal variances. This simple coefficient comparison shows that 
for incorporation age, the ln(Age) coefficient of 12 out of 18 countries is significantly different 
from the US. For IPO age the count is even higher with 14 out of 18 countries. However, as 
Table 5 has shown, taking the age distributions of the countries into account considerably reduces 
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the variation of the age effect across countries. Therefore I estimate standardized regression in 
columns 3 and 7. In these regressions all variables are standardized by industry (Fama and 
French's (1997) 48 industry grouping), year, and country. Using this standardized regression 
approach, 9 out of 18 incorporation age coefficients and 11 out of 18 IPO age coefficients are 
significantly different from the respective US coefficient. 
 Overall, the results shown in Table 6 suggest that corporate aging is significantly different in 
magnitude compared to the US, even if I estimate standardized regressions. In section 4, I explore 
whether differences in country-level institutional settings drive the cross-country differences in 
the strength of the corporate age effect. 
 In addition to the variation across countries, I also explore whether the results hold across 
different time periods. Table 7 shows the ln(Age) coefficients if I replicate the standard 
regressions for the three subperiods 1985–1994, 1995–2004, and 2005–2010. This approach 
helps alleviating potential concerns about backfilling bias, changes in the size bias of the sample, 
and the dotcom era which could possibly spur the results. I cut the sample in 1994 because prior 
to 1994 the data suffer from a backfilling bias. 1994 is therefore a common cutoff date in many 
cross-country studies using WorldScope data. The second decade contains the run-up to and crash 
of the dotcom bubble and simultaneously the coverage of tracked firms in the WorldScope 
sample considerably increased in most of the countries which reduces the size bias because an 
increasing number of smaller firms were added to the database. 
 The results suggest that the age effect persist across different time periods for the majority of 
the countries. Most coefficients also retain their statistical significance and only 3 out of a total of 
114 ln(Age) coefficients are positive and significant. 
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3.4. Decline in current profitability 
In their model, LSW predict that with increasing firm age management’s attention is focused on 
managing assets in place as opposed to developing new growth opportunities. Consequently, 
current profitability could initially increase but eventually will also decline because the supply of 
innovations ceases. 
 Table 8 investigates the relation between firm age and current profitability based on ROA, 
measures of changes in sales, and gross margin. Panel A starts with ROA as dependent variable. 
Regressions 1 to 4 relate to the full sample and regressions 5 to 8 exclude US firms. I include 
incorporation age and IPO age as age proxies, alternatively. Regressions 1, 3, 5, and 7 are 
estimated without country fixed-effects. The evidence shows that ROA significantly decreases 
with firm age. All eight age coefficients in panel A are negative and 7 out of 8 are negative and 
significant. 
 Analogously to the standard regressions with Tobin’s Q, panel B replicates the multivariate 
analysis with ROA as dependent variable for each country separately. The left-hand side of the 
panel relates to the full sample and the right-hand side repeats the analysis with the subsample of 
firms older than the median firm in each country, industry, and year. To conserve space, I only 
report the ln(Age) coefficient of each regression in this and the remaining panels and only use 
IPO age for the remainder of the analysis. However, the results obtain when I use incorporation 
age. The evidence of the 19 country-specific regressions with ROA is not as robust as with 
Tobin’s Q. While still 16 out of 19 age coefficients are negative, the fraction of significant 
coefficients is considerably lower with 9 out of 19 countries. The less robust results are consistent 
with the model of LSW. It is possible that ROA increases in the early life of a firm. By focusing 
on managing the assets in place, firms become more and more efficient producers until they reach 
a maximum level of efficiency. If, meanwhile, they neglect to innovate, they cannot replace their 
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antiquating products with new innovative ones. In older firms ROA then starts decreasing. The 
right-hand side of panel B provides support for this story. ROA decreases more in relatively older 
firms. Compared to the full sample, 15 of 19 age coefficients have a larger magnitude in the sub-
sample of older firms. 
 Panel C and the left-hand side of panel D in Table 8 show that in 18 out of 19 countries sales 
growth is negatively related to firm age (in 16 significantly), in all countries sales growth in older 
firms is more likely to be negative (in 17 significantly), and in 18 out of 19 countries the market 
share shrinks over the lifetime of a firm (11 significantly). This is consistent with LSW who 
document for US firms, that the eventual decline in ROA is not compensated by bigger sales 
volume.  
 Finally, also gross margins seem to deteriorate, although the results are less clear. Panel D 
shows that in 13 out of 19 countries the ln(Age) coefficient is negative (in 7 significantly).  
 In sum, the evidence in Table 8 suggests that the overall firm profitability decreases as firms 
grow older. ROA decreases along with sales, market shares and gross margin. 
 
3.5. Investment activities, payout, and technical efficiency 
As managers tend to focus on efficient management of assets in place at the expense of creating 
growth opportunities, they are also expected to invest less to develop these growth opportunities. 
The international data support this conjecture. Table 9 documents that capital expenditures 
standardized by the firm’s market value of assets decrease in 18 out of 19 countries (in 11 
significantly). The results obtain if I standardize by sales. Also R&D outlays decrease over the 
lifetime of a firm. The ln(Age) coefficient is negative in 15 and significantly negative in 10 out of 
19 countries. Note that none of the few positive coefficients is statistically significant, neither in 
the regressions with capital expenditures nor with R&D outlays as dependent variable. The 
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results for R&D, however, should be interpreted cautiously, since disclosure varies considerably 
across countries from 8 percent in Spain to 68 percent in the US. Moreover, conditional on firms 
disclosing R&D, the median R&D spending goes from 1.6 percent of sales in Spain to 37 percent 
in Canada. Both, the coverage and the median values suggest that the reliability of R&D data in 
WorldScope substantially differs across countries. 
 As firms reduce their capital expenditures and R&D outlays the question turns up on what else 
firm spend their profits. Table 10 shows that the firms in most countries seem to return at least 
part of the cash to shareholders. Accordingly, their cash balances get smaller in 15 and 
significantly smaller in 8 sample-countries with none of the four positive coefficients being 
significant. They also increase their payout ratio in 15 and significantly increase it in 7 sample-
countries with only one negative coefficient being weakly statistically significant (Canada). 
 While most results from the international sample in this paper are consistent with the US 
results from LSW, there seems to be one exception. As Table 11 reveals, technical efficiency 
measured with the Sales-to-assets ratio only increases with firm age in the US. For all remaining 
countries the ln(Age) coefficient is either insignificant or significantly negative. Especially firms 
in the Asian sample-countries have lower asset turnover with increasing firm age. One reason for 
why the US stands out against the rest of the world could be related to corporate governance 
standards. Ang, Cole, and Lin (2000) use Sales-to-assets to measure agency costs. Given that the 
installment of entrenchment in a firm takes time, firms in countries with comparatively low 
corporate governance standards should encounter increased agency costs when they get older. US 
firms could be profiting from one of the strictest corporate governance systems in the world (La 
Porta et al. (2000)). However, this explanation is non-exclusive and needs further corroboration.7
                                                 
7  Another explanation could be related to depreciation practices. The US was one of the first countries worldwide 
to introduce accelerated depreciation allowance. If US firms depreciate their assets in young years more 
aggressively than firms in other countries, this could cause Sales-to-assets to increase initially. 
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4. Institutional differences 
In this section I address the question whether the competitiveness of the product market, the labor 
market, and the market for corporate control has an impact on the age dependence of Tobin’s Q. 
The cross-sectional variation with respect to these institutions is much more pronounced in an 
international setting than within one country. Therefore, LSW only have limited possibilities to 
analyze the effects of these institutional settings on the age-Tobin’s Q relation. My cross-country 
dataset allows me to test whether competition in these three market dimensions drives the speed 
of corporate aging internationally. The evidence of these tests, however, is tentative and needs to 
be buttressed further.8 
 
4.1.  Method 
To identify the impact of institutions on the speed of corporate aging, the most promising 
approach is to examine institutional changes and their impact on the magnitude of the age effect 
in a given country. To find out whether institutional changes cause a change in the magnitude of 
corporate aging, the method of choice is a panel regression with interaction terms of institutional 
proxies with firm age, using a difference-in-differences test design in a multiple treatment groups, 
multiple time periods setting as explained by Imbens and Wooldrige (2009). I estimate country-
level changes of the corporate age effect in countries where institutions changed in contrast to 
contemporaneous changes of the age effect in countries where institutions did not change. This 
treatment-control contrast identifies the average causal effect of institutional changes on the 
speed of corporate aging under the assumption that corporate aging would have otherwise 
evolved similarly in changing and non-changing countries. 
                                                 
8 See for example Loderer, Wälchli, and Zeller (2014) for an analysis of the impact of employment protection on 
the speed of corporate aging. 
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In the spirit of Subramanian and Megginson (2012), all panel regressions include country, year, 
and industry fixed-effects. The country fixed-effects control for all time-invariant unobserved 
factors at the country-level. The year fixed-effects control for common global trends and the 
industry fixed-effects control for time-invariant unobserved factors at the industry-level. 
 To measure product market competition internationally, a commonly used proxy is trade-
liberalization. As argued by Subramanian and Megginson (2012), trade liberalization in a country 
results in an increase of competition. I employ the aggregate level of imports into and exports 
from a country (Trade openness) as a proxy for trade liberalization, since trade liberalization 
should result in an increase in imports and exports (Subramanian and Megginson (2012)).  
 My proxy for competition in the market for corporate control is the size of the stock market 
relative to the gross domestic product per capita in a given year and country (Stock market in % 
GDP). Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argue that a substantial portion of merger activity is driven by 
stock market valuations. This might be because, as Harford (2005) suggests, there must be 
sufficient capital liquidity to accommodate the asset reallocation. Given that Stock market in % 
GDP is a valid proxy for competition in the market for corporate control, I expect that an increase 
in stock market size triggers an increase in the speed of corporate aging because firms are forced 
to do a good job in efficiently managing their assets in place in order to avoid a hostile takeover 
(see LSW). 
 The effect of labor market competition on the magnitude of corporate aging is not a priori 
clear. On one hand, LSW argue that laws imposing frictions on the mobility of human capital 
help younger firms to retain an innovative and competitive labor force.  In contrast, it will make it 
difficult for older firms to find creative employees. Hence, firms headquartered in countries that 
increase restrictions on the mobility of human capital should experience a quicker decline in 
Tobin’s q ratios over time. On the other hand, Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian (2012) and 
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(2014) show that laws restricting labor mobility by protecting employees against unjust dismissal 
can motivate employees to engage in innovative activities. Hence, such laws should slow down 
the decline in Tobin’s q ratios over time. 
 I use four different time-varying proxies for the competition in the labor market. The first 
proxy is a change in the political leaning of governments. As documented by Botero et al. (2004), 
left-leaning governments tend to have more stringent labor laws. I use the index from Armingeon 
et al. (2012), which captures Government orientation, the balance of power between left and 
right-leaning parties in a given country’s parliament. The second proxy is unemployment 
insurance benefits. Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian (2014) argue that employees in firms that 
are located in states with generous unemployment insurance benefit laws may be more willing to 
take more risk when choosing innovative projects. This could potentially have an impact on the 
choice of managers to focus on assets in place versus focusing their attention on innovation. I 
measure unemployment insurance benefit using the annual expenditures for Labor market 
programs in a country. Third, in more unionized countries, employees exert considerable political 
pressure to install employment protection. At the same time Atanassov and Kim (2009) document 
that poorly performing managers, associated with lower firm performance, are more likely to 
retain their jobs when unions are strong. Therefore, unionization measured with the annual 
Fraction of union members in a country could potentially have an impact on the choice of 
managers between managing assets in place and creating growth opportunities and therefore 
influence the speed of corporate aging. Finally, Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian (2012) 
document that the introduction of labor laws that prevent employers from arbitrarily dismissing 
their employees spurs firm-level innovation. Therefore, I argue that strong employment 
protection should slow down the decrease in Tobin’s Q. Employment protection is measured with 
the EPL index of OECD. 
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 Since economic growth is possibly correlated with the size of the stock market, as well as with 
the competition in the labor market, I include the real Per-capita GDP growth in the analysis to 
correctly identify the impact of institutional changes on the magnitude of the corporate age 
effect.9   
 
4.2.  Results 
Table 12 shows the results of the difference-in-differences regressions. Specifications 1 and 3 of 
the table include the proxies for institutional changes and an interaction term of the demeaned 
proxies with demeaned ln(Age) along with the full set of standard control variables and the 
industry, year, and country fixed-effects. Specifications 2 and 4 add the country-level variables. 
 For the market of corporate control, Panel A of Table 12 documents that the larger the stock 
market is relative to GDP, the quicker the Tobin’s Q ratios decline over time. The coefficients of 
the interaction term are, however, only significant on a 10 percent level. 
 With respect to product market competition the evidence in panel B of Table 12 is mixed. 
When firm age is measured from the date of incorporation, an increase in competition seems to 
make the Tobin’s Q-age relation flatter. However, with firm age measured since IPO, the effect is 
insignificant. 
 For labor market competition the evidence suggests that laws and institutions which provide 
protection for employees slow down the corporate aging process. All coefficients of the 
interaction terms of my labor market proxies with firm age are positive. For incorporation age 7 
out of 8 coefficients are statistically significant and for IPO age two out of 8. Consistent with 
Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian (2014), especially changes in employment protection seem to 
have a significant impact. For all four specifications the coefficients are statistically significant 
                                                 
9  See for instance Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian (2012) for an argument for the impact of economic growth 
on one of my proxies for labor market competition. 
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on the 1 percent level and the economic significance is also relatively large. The speed of 
corporate aging decreases for about one third when the index of employment protection increases 
by one standard deviation. An index change of one standard deviation corresponds to a 
comprehensive but not uncommon reform of employment protection legislation. 
 Overall, this section documents that country-level institutional changes can have an impact on 
the strength of the corporate age effect. The exact channels through which the effects work are 
left to be determined. However, the preliminary evidence suggests that this is a fruitful area for 
future research.   
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5. Conclusion 
This paper documents that, in an extensive panel of listed firms with headquarters in the 19 
countries with the most developed capital markets, older firms have comparatively lower Tobin’s 
Q ratios and lower operating performance. Tobin’s Q ratios decline by approximately 5 percent 
for every standard deviation increase in firm age. This result is very robust with respect to 
different estimation techniques, regression specifications, sub-periods, and the way I measure 
firm age. Not only Tobin’s Q ratios decline, but also ROA, sales growth, market shares, and gross 
margins. Moreover, older firms are less actively investing in R&D and reduce their capital 
expenditures. There is evidence that firms instead return the cash to shareholders since they have 
lower cash ratios and slightly higher payout ratios.  
 Overall, these results are consistent with the model of LSW postulating that after listing, 
managers tend to focus their limited attention on efficiently managing the assets already in place. 
This comes at the cost of generating new growth opportunities which eventually causes Tobin’s 
Q ratios and operating performance to decline with firm age. 
 Comparing the magnitude of this age effect internationally reveals considerable cross-country 
differences. Since LSW document that the speed of corporate aging depends on the competition 
in the market for corporate control and product and labor market competition, I investigate 
whether part of this cross-country variation is driven by international institutional difference with 
respect to these three dimensions. The results suggest that especially labor market aspects play a 
significant role in moderating the age-Tobin’s Q relation. However, the results of these tests are 
only tentative and need to be buttressed further. 
 Taken at face value, the results of the paper suggest that the corporate age effect is not limited 
to the US but constitutes a worldwide economic reality and that there is a chance for policy 
makers to influence the aging speed via labor market policies. 
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Table 1: Sample 
The table shows information about the sample selection. Column (1) indicates the country under investigation. To be part of the 
sample, a country has to have one of the world’s 25 largest stock exchanges with a market capitalization above USD 500 billion 
as of December 2010 (Source: http://www.world-exchanges.org.). Column (2) shows the stock exchanges’ market capitalization 
as of December 2010. For reasons of data availability, I exclude several emerging markets: Shanghai SE, BSE India, National SE 
India, BM&FBOVESPA, Shenzhen SE, MICEX, Johannesburg SE, and Taiwan SE. The remaining columns show information 
about the sample composition. The sample period is 1985 – 2010. 
Country Stock Exchange 
Domestic Market 
Capitalization 
USD billion, 2010 Firms 
% of Firms 
in Sample Firm-Years 
% of Firm-
Years in 
Sample 
Cumulative 
% of Firm-
Years 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
US NYSE Euronext (US)  13'394 11'170 34.6 89'531 30.5 30.5
Japan Tokyo SE  3'828  4'389 13.6  62'609 21.3 51.8 
UK London SE  3'613  3'023 9.4  26'517 9.0 60.9 
Canada Toronto SE  2'170  3'060 9.5  19'712 6.7 67.6 
Australia Australian SE  1'454  2'038 6.3  14'492 4.9 72.5 
Korea (South) Korea Exchange  1'092  1'781 5.5  14'277 4.9 77.4 
France NYSE Euronext (Europe)  2'930  1'335 4.1  12'751 4.3 81.7 
Germany Deutsche Börse  1'430  1'064 3.3  10'967 3.7 85.5 
Hong Kong Hong Kong Exchanges  2'711  975 3.0  8'782 3.0 88.5 
Singapore Singapore Exchange  647  690 2.1  6'140 2.1 90.6 
Sweden OMX Nordic Exchange  1'042  652 2.0  5'084 1.7 92.3 
Switzerland SIX Swiss Exchange  1'229  303 0.9  3'700 1.3 93.6 
Netherlands NYSE Euronext (Europe)  2'930  336 1.0  3'670 1.3 94.8 
Italy London SE  3'613  364 1.1  3'556 1.2 96.0 
Norway OMX Nordic Exchange  1'042  347 1.1  2'649 0.9 96.9 
Denmark OMX Nordic Exchange  1'042  230 0.7  2'644 0.9 97.8 
Spain BME Spanish Exchanges  1'172  198 0.6  2'321 0.8 98.6 
Finland OMX Nordic Exchange  1'042  195 0.6  2'142 0.7 99.3 
Belgium NYSE Euronext (Europe)  2'930  180 0.6  1'924 0.7 100.0 
Total    32'330 100.0  293'468 100.0  
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Table 2: Sample restrictions 
The table shows the restrictions that apply to my sample. The sample starts with all available firms in fiscal years 1985 through 
2010 in the Thomson Financial’s WorldScope database (row 1). I exclude all financial firms and regulated utilities (row 2). In 
order to have similar length of accounting periods in every firm-year, I ignore all firm-year observations which do not last 
between 361 and 371 days (row 3). I also exclude all firm-year observations with missing or negative assets, sales, market value 
of equity, and book value of equity (rows 4 to 7). Finally, I ignore all firms younger than 5 years (row 8). Row 9 shows the final 
sample size. 
  Firms 
% of orig. 
sample Firm-Years 
% of orig. 
sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(1) All firms available in fiscal year 1985 through 2010 48'718  492'320 
(2) Sample, excluding financial firms (SIC 6) 
and regulated utilities (SIC 49) 38'379 100.0  383'421 100.0 
      
 Less:     
(3)  Firms with accounting period not between 361 and 371 days  –13 0.0  –3'860 1.0 
(4)  Firms with total assets missing or negative  –37 0.1  –1'918 0.5 
(5)  Firms with sales missing or negative  –42 0.1  –993 0.3 
(6)  Firms with market value of equity missing or negative  –1'765 4.6  –33'819 8.8 
(7)  Firms with book value of equity missing or negative  –1'556 4.1  –24'166 6.3 
(8)  Firms younger than 5 years  –2'636 6.9  –25'197 6.6 
      
(9) Final sample  32'330 84.2 293'468 76.6 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
The table shows the descriptive statistics of the proxies for firm age and firm performance for each country separately. Variable 
definitions are in Table 13 at the end of the paper. The sorting of the countries is according to the relative size in the sample (see 
Table 1). All variables (except the binary variables and age proxies) are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled 
distribution at the country-level. The descriptive statistics are calculated over the pooled distribution at the country-level. Panel A 
shows the firm age proxies and panel B shows the proxies for firm performance. The sample period is 1985 – 2010. 
Panel A: Firm age 
 Incorporation age IPO age 
 Median Mean SD Coverage Median Mean SD Coverage 
US 22.0 32.0 27.3 0.95 15.0 19.4 15.4 0.94 
Japan 48.0 50.0 30.6 0.98 29.0 28.4 17.7 0.96 
UK 24.0 37.7 32.2 0.94 13.0 20.0 15.9 0.76 
Canada 18.0 23.7 21.4 0.99 12.0 16.0 12.5 0.86 
Australia 18.0 24.8 22.0 0.92 14.0 16.7 11.7 0.89 
Korea (South) 27.0 28.4 14.9 0.99 13.0 15.6 9.7 0.95 
France 31.0 48.3 49.6 0.91 10.0 17.7 19.5 0.70 
Germany 54.0 67.7 57.3 0.96 10.0 19.8 20.0 0.76 
Hong Kong 12.0 17.2 17.0 0.89 12.0 15.6 13.8 0.88 
Singapore 19.0 22.5 16.2 0.97 10.0 13.3 8.7 0.95 
Sweden 22.0 42.6 46.4 0.93 10.0 13.7 13.3 0.80 
Switzerland 77.0 82.6 70.8 0.95 9.0 13.5 15.8 0.64 
Netherlands 67.0 67.3 54.6 0.86 14.0 23.7 21.5 0.61 
Italy 40.0 49.0 35.5 0.88 10.0 19.3 22.6 0.67 
Norway 22.0 48.3 53.9 0.89 10.0 18.4 20.5 0.77 
Denmark 55.0 58.4 38.9 0.97 16.0 24.2 23.7 0.74 
Spain 39.0 46.8 28.6 0.96 10.0 11.6 7.2 0.58 
Finland 46.0 58.5 53.1 0.93 12.0 17.6 16.1 0.91 
Belgium 63.0 63.0 45.8 0.94 15.0 34.7 33.7 0.75 
Total 28.0 39.0 35.0 0.95 15.0 20.8 16.6 0.88 
Panel B: Performance measures 
 
Median 
Tobin’s Q 
Median 
ROA (%) 
Median 
Sales growth (%)
Probability of 
negative sales 
growth
Median 
Gross margin (%) 
Probability of 
decline 
in market share
US 1.47 12.38 6.03 0.35 38.17 0.41
Japan 1.08 7.12 1.85 0.42 24.96 0.50 
UK 1.35 13.34 5.33 0.36 32.55 0.41 
Canada 1.40 6.12 6.31 0.38 31.80 0.28 
Australia 1.41 5.96 5.15 0.40 21.05 0.31 
Korea (South) 0.96 10.25 5.80 0.37 19.43 0.49 
France 1.20 12.34 4.89 0.35 14.89 0.40 
Germany 1.28 12.55 3.40 0.40 26.77 0.41 
Hong Kong 0.99 7.99 6.24 0.40 26.35 0.49 
Singapore 1.05 9.25 5.22 0.40 23.12 0.43 
Sweden 1.38 11.86 7.18 0.35 17.22 0.36 
Switzerland 1.21 12.32 3.29 0.39 29.47 0.34 
Netherlands 1.27 15.40 4.34 0.37 25.40 0.36 
Italy 1.13 11.06 3.21 0.41 39.59 0.37 
Norway 1.23 12.50 7.59 0.34 27.06 0.33 
Denmark 1.13 13.34 4.39 0.38 24.14 0.28 
Spain 1.20 12.37 4.43 0.36 26.51 0.32 
Finland 1.20 13.46 4.83 0.37 27.19 0.31 
Belgium 1.16 13.05 4.28 0.37 14.08 0.25 
Total 1.24 10.19 4.23 0.38 28.91 0.41 
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Table 4: Firm age and Tobin’s Q 
The table investigates the relation between firm age and Tobin’s Q. Variable definitions are in Table 13 at the end of the paper. 
All variables (except the binary and age variables) are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled distribution at 
the country-level. The dependent variable is Tobin's Q. The age proxy in panel A is the natural logarithm of the firm’s age. Panel 
B repeats the analysis with a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is older than the median firm in the same country, industry, and year, 
and zero otherwise. Regression 3 to 6 include industry (I) (Fama and French's (1997) 48 industry grouping) and year (Y) fixed-
effects (FE) regressions 7 and 8 additionally country (C) FE. All regressions include robust standard errors clustered at the 
country-level, which are given in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance in two-sided tests with 
confidence 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively. The sample period is 1985 – 2010. 
Panel A: Age proxy = ln(Age) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 World 
ln(Ageinc) –0.459***  –0.204*** –0.151*** –0.148***  
 (0.102)  (0.037)  (0.028)  (0.018)  
ln(Ageipo)  –0.323***  –0.172***  –0.145***  –0.143*** 
  (0.065)  (0.019)  (0.013)  (0.019) 
ROA   –0.015*** –0.015*** –0.013*** –0.013*** –0.013*** –0.013*** 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Capex   –0.002 –0.002 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.002 
   (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
R&D outlays   0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
bADR   –0.139 –0.138 –0.157 –0.161 –0.041 –0.047 
   (0.102) (0.109) (0.104) (0.104) (0.034) (0.033) 
bFocus   0.058 0.041 0.048* 0.032 0.061*** 0.049*** 
   (0.039) (0.037) (0.029) (0.029) (0.016) (0.016) 
FF-index   –0.062*** –0.062** –0.035** –0.033 –0.012 –0.010 
   (0.022) (0.025) (0.018) (0.020) (0.014) (0.016) 
Leverage   –2.812*** –2.785*** –2.813*** –2.794*** –2.659*** –2.631*** 
   (0.600) (0.604) (0.608) (0.617) (0.662) (0.669) 
Size   0.098*** 0.105*** 0.132*** 0.140*** 0.126*** 0.135*** 
   (0.016) (0.018) (0.024) (0.023) (0.017) (0.016) 
Volatility     0.827*** 0.831*** 0.740*** 0.722*** 
     (0.111) (0.110) (0.078) (0.072) 
Constant 3.310*** 2.565*** 1.556*** 2.195*** 1.498*** 0.274 1.404*** 0.084 
 (0.480) (0.332) (0.227) (0.221) (0.191) (0.253) (0.230) (0.147) 
I FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Y FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
C FE No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 277'867 257'866 230'554 214'583 219'329 206'002 219'329 206'002 
Adjusted R-squared 0.042 0.030 0.244 0.238 0.256 0.252 0.266 0.262 
 Non-US countries 
ln(Ageinc) –0.316***  –0.160***  –0.125***  –0.122***  
 (0.059)  (0.033)  (0.029)  (0.018)  
ln(Ageipo)  –0.232***  –0.155***  –0.137***  –0.119*** 
  (0.022)  (0.015)  (0.012)  (0.011) 
Controls – – Included Included Included Included Included Included 
I, Y, and C FE N, N, N N, N, N Y, Y, N Y, Y, N Y, Y, N Y, Y, N Y, Y, Y Y, Y, Y 
Observations 193'414 173'605 157'689 141'978 150'749 137'508 150'749 137'508 
Adjusted R-squared 0.037 0.028 0.231 0.234 0.241 0.245 0.255 0.258 
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Panel B: Age proxy = bOldfirm 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
 World 
bOldfirminc –0.486***  –0.199***  –0.149***  –0.187***  
 (0.146)  (0.039)  (0.031)  (0.026)  
bOldfirmipo  –0.382***  –0.163***  –0.125***  –0.154*** 
  (0.092)  (0.027)  (0.023)  (0.016) 
Controls – – Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. 
Observations 277'867 257'866 230'554 214'583 219'329 206'002 219'329 206'002 
Adjusted R-squared 0.016 0.010 0.239 0.233 0.254 0.248 0.265 0.259 
 Non-US countries 
bOldfirminc –0.301***  –0.157***  –0.125***  –0.149***  
 (0.035)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.022)  
bOldfirmipo  –0.268***  –0.147***  –0.119***  –0.140*** 
  (0.034)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
Controls – – Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. 
Observations 193'414 173'605 157'689 141'978 150'749 137'508 150'749 137'508 
Adjusted R-squared 0.011 0.009 0.225 0.227 0.238 0.239 0.253 0.255 
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Figure 1: Functional form of the firm age and Tobin’s Q relation 
The figure shows the relation between firm age and Tobin’s Q implied by kernel-weighted local polynomial regressions using an 
Epanechnikov kernel function with at rule-of-thumb bandwidth estimator and local-mean smoothing. The dashed lines plot the 
95-percent confidence band. The white area displays the interquartile range and the black reference line indicates the median. The 
figures in panel A show the unconditional relation between firm age and Tobin’s q. To obtain conditional the figures in panel B, I 
first estimate an OLS regression with industry (Fama and French's (1997) 48 industry grouping), year, and country fixed-effects 
and robust standard errors clustered at the country-level of Tobin’s Q on ROA, Capex, R&D outlays, bADR, bFocus, FF-index, 
Leverage, Size, and Volatility. I then regress these residuals on incorporation and IPO age, respectively. The sample period is 
1985 – 2010. 
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Panel B: Conditional 
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Table 5: Country-specific relation of firm age and Tobin’s Q 
The table investigates the relation between firm age and Tobin’s Q at a country-level. Variable definitions are in Table 13 at the 
end of the paper. All variables (except the binary and age variables) are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled 
distribution at the country-level. The dependent variable is Tobin's Q. Control variables are the same as in Table 4: ROA, Capex, 
R&D outlays, bADR, bFocus, FF-index, Leverage, Size, and Volatility. All estimations use industry (Fama and French's (1997) 48 
industry grouping) and year fixed-effects and robust standard errors clustered at the firm-level. To conserve space, I only report 
the ln(Age) coefficient of each regression (columns 1 and 6). Columns 5 and 10 show the sensitivity of Tobin's Q (in percent) to 
an increase in age of one standard deviation. The two bottom rows show the percentage of negative and significantly negative 
coefficients, respectively. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance in two-sided tests with confidence 0.99, 
0.95, and 0.90, respectively.  The sample period is 1985 – 2010. 
 Incorporation age IPO age 
 Coefficient SE N Adj. R2 Sensitivity Coefficient SE N Adj. R2 Sensitivity
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
World –0.148*** (0.008) 219'329 0.27 –5.53 –0.143*** (0.007) 206'002 0.26 –5.53 
Non-US –0.122*** (0.008) 150'749 0.26 –5.25 –0.119*** (0.007) 137'508 0.26 –5.31 
US –0.192*** (0.020)  68'580 0.27 –5.36 –0.194*** (0.017) 68'494 0.26 –5.83
Japan –0.122*** (0.010)  41'778 0.41 –5.06 –0.073*** (0.007)  41'643 0.40 –3.39 
UK –0.152*** (0.017)  21'867 0.27 –5.55 –0.174*** (0.017)  18'015 0.27 –6.84 
Canada –0.132*** (0.034)  14'437 0.29 –3.95 –0.108*** (0.036)  12'985 0.29 –3.17 
Australia –0.089** (0.039)  11'076 0.25 –2.71 –0.093** (0.041)  10'830 0.25 –2.54 
Korea (South) –0.200*** (0.020)  11'583 0.36 –7.51 –0.132*** (0.013)  11'185 0.35 –6.28 
France –0.100*** (0.019)  8'933 0.39 –4.84 –0.112*** (0.018)  7'120 0.42 –6.55 
Germany –0.094*** (0.019)  8'523 0.22 –3.77 –0.060** (0.026)  6'950 0.23 –3.28 
Hong Kong –0.108*** (0.037)  7'153 0.25 –5.23 –0.121*** (0.036)  7'121 0.25 –5.60 
Singapore –0.093*** (0.029)  5'320 0.31 –4.01 –0.131*** (0.025)  5'253 0.31 –5.86 
Sweden –0.173*** (0.048)  3'740 0.30 –6.64 –0.306*** (0.073)  3'372 0.30 –12.54 
Switzerland –0.048 (0.047)  2'728 0.47 – –0.036 (0.046)  2'009 0.47 – 
Netherlands –0.091*** (0.030)  2'686 0.41 –3.38 –0.122*** (0.039)  1'959 0.43 –5.49 
Italy –0.042 (0.029)  2'616 0.41 – –0.095*** (0.021)  2'018 0.47 –6.59 
Norway –0.075* (0.039)  1'902 0.42 –3.38 –0.126*** (0.044)  1'693 0.42 –6.76 
Denmark –0.151** (0.059)  1'939 0.41 –5.38 –0.152*** (0.054)  1'638 0.42 –7.53 
Spain –0.006 (0.062)  1'647 0.51 – 0.029 (0.095)  1'102 0.58 – 
Finland –0.049 (0.042)  1'475 0.52 – –0.105** (0.049)  1'469 0.53 –4.56 
Belgium –0.145*** (0.045)  1'346 0.59 –5.46 –0.086*** (0.028)  1'146 0.60 –4.76 
% negative 100  100   95  99   
% neg. and sig. 79  96   89  98   
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Figure 2: Functional form of the country-specific relation of firm age and Tobin’s Q 
The figure shows the relation between firm age and Tobin’s Q implied by kernel-weighted local polynomial regressions using an 
Epanechnikov kernel function with at rule-of-thumb bandwidth estimator and local-mean smoothing. Each country is estimated 
separately. The dashed lines plot the 90-percent confidence band. The white area displays the interquartile range and the black 
reference line indicates the median. To obtain the figures, I first estimate an OLS regression with industry (Fama and French's 
(1997) 48 industry grouping) and year fixed-effects and robust standard errors clustered at the firm-level of Tobin’s Q on ROA, 
Capex, R&D outlays, bADR, bFocus, FF-index, Leverage, Size, and Volatility.  I then regress these residuals on incorporation 
(panel a) and IPO age (panel B), respectively. The sample period is 1985 – 2010. 
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Panel B: IPO age 
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Table 6: Differences of age coefficients in Tobin’s Q regressions 
The table examines the differences in the coefficients of the country-specific regressions of Table 5. Differences in coefficients 
are tested for significance with a two-sample two-sided t-test with unequal variances. Regressions 1 and 5 estimate the same 
model as Table 5 and, for convenience, reproduce the US ln(Age) coefficient in the first row. Regressions 3 and 7 estimate panel 
regressions using standardized variables. Standardization is by industry (Fama and French's (1997) 48 industry grouping), year, 
and country. Control variables are otherwise identical to the model in Table 5. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance with confidence 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively. The sample period is 1985 – 2010. 
 Incorporation age IPO age 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
US –0.192***  –0.065***  –0.194***  –0.084***  
Δ Japan 0.070*** 0.002 –0.008 0.110 0.121*** 0.000 0.031*** 0.000 
Δ UK 0.041 0.117 –0.037*** 0.000 0.020 0.404 –0.044*** 0.000 
Δ Canada 0.061 0.120 0.015** 0.030 0.085** 0.031 0.050*** 0.000 
Δ Australia 0.103** 0.019 0.007 0.408 0.101** 0.024 0.032*** 0.001 
Δ Korea(South) –0.007 0.793 –0.139*** 0.000 0.062*** 0.004 –0.117*** 0.000 
Δ France 0.092*** 0.001 –0.074*** 0.000 0.081*** 0.001 –0.030*** 0.000 
Δ Germany 0.098*** 0.000 –0.006 0.519 0.134*** 0.000 0.043*** 0.002 
Δ Hong Kong 0.084** 0.043 –0.005 0.632 0.073* 0.069 –0.007 0.548 
Δ Singapore 0.100*** 0.005 –0.035** 0.028 0.062** 0.040 –0.078*** 0.000 
Δ Sweden 0.020 0.702 –0.008 0.555 –0.112 0.134 –0.095*** 0.000 
Δ Switzerland 0.145*** 0.004 0.029 0.116 0.158*** 0.001 0.086*** 0.000 
Δ Netherlands 0.101*** 0.005 –0.056*** 0.002 0.072* 0.091 –0.020 0.465 
Δ Italy 0.150*** 0.000 0.027 0.234 0.098*** 0.000 0.024 0.393 
Δ Norway 0.117*** 0.007 0.032 0.225 0.067 0.151 –0.007 0.790 
Δ Denmark 0.041 0.507 0.016 0.624 0.041 0.467 0.046 0.230 
Δ Spain 0.187*** 0.004 0.069** 0.039 0.223** 0.020 0.132*** 0.005 
Δ Finland 0.143*** 0.002 0.060** 0.034 0.089* 0.085 0.010 0.722 
Δ Belgium 0.048 0.331 –0.106*** 0.001 0.107*** 0.001 0.025 0.491 
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Table 7: Firm age and Tobin’s Q in different sub-periods 
The table replicates the regressions of Table 5 in different sub-periods over the sample-years. Variable definitions are in Table 13 
at the end of the paper. All variables (except the binary and age variables)  are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their 
pooled distribution at the country-level. The dependent variable is Tobin's Q. Control variables are the same as in Table 5: ROA, 
Capex, R&D outlays, bFocus, FF-index, Leverage, Size, and Volatility. All estimations use industry (Fama and French's (1997) 48 
industry grouping) and year fixed-effects and robust standard errors clustered at the firm-level. To conserve space, I only report 
the ln(Age) coefficient and its associated significance level. The sub-periods are 1985–1994, 1995–2004, and 2005–2010. The two 
bottom rows show the percentage of negative and significantly negative coefficients, respectively. The symbols ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance in two-sided tests with confidence 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively. 
 Incorporation age IPO age 
 1985–1994 1995–2004 2005–2010 1985–1994 1995–2004 2005–2010 
World –0.136*** –0.151*** –0.128*** –0.139*** –0.137*** –0.131***
Non-US –0.083*** –0.131*** –0.110*** –0.080*** –0.125*** –0.105*** 
US –0.219*** –0.176*** –0.171*** –0.203*** –0.154*** –0.205***
Japan –0.017 –0.131*** –0.122*** –0.046 –0.071*** –0.074*** 
UK –0.113*** –0.166*** –0.118*** –0.116*** –0.188*** –0.119*** 
Canada –0.136*** –0.143*** –0.083* –0.132** –0.127** –0.065 
Australia –0.018 –0.166*** –0.032 –0.126* –0.159*** –0.038 
Korea (South) –0.158** –0.194*** –0.205*** –0.157*** –0.107*** –0.151*** 
France –0.037* –0.118*** –0.102*** –0.078*** –0.128*** –0.107*** 
Germany –0.119*** –0.072*** –0.113*** 0.011 –0.046 –0.079** 
Hong Kong 0.033 –0.029 –0.171*** 0.073 –0.045 –0.165*** 
Singapore 0.050 –0.137*** –0.074** –0.078 –0.127*** –0.188*** 
Sweden –0.067* –0.138** –0.148** –0.174*** –0.341*** –0.260*** 
Switzerland –0.002 0.001 –0.104 –0.025 –0.020 –0.037 
Netherlands –0.012 –0.123*** –0.085* –0.021 –0.207*** 0.001 
Italy 0.016 –0.040 –0.068** 0.043* –0.096*** –0.107*** 
Norway 0.072* –0.075 –0.081* 0.074** –0.134* –0.107* 
Denmark –0.136*** –0.115* –0.230* –0.134*** –0.216*** –0.091 
Spain 0.030 –0.027 0.049 0.177 –0.070 0.126 
Finland –0.152** –0.063 –0.020 0.029 –0.128* –0.149** 
Belgium –0.050 –0.187*** –0.136* –0.117*** –0.128*** –0.068 
% negative 74 95 95 68 100 89
% neg. and sig. 47 68 79 47 84 63 
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Table 8: Firm age and operating performance 
The table investigates the relation between firm age and operating performance. Variable definitions are in Table 13 at the end of 
the paper. All variables (except the binary and age variables) are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled 
distribution at the country-level. In panel A, the dependent variable is ROA. Regressions 1 to 4 relate to the full sample of firms. 
Regressions 5 to 8 exclude US firms. Panel B repeats the multivariate analysis for each country separately. The left-hand side 
relates to the full sample of firms and the right-hand side repeats the analysis with the subsample of firms older than the median 
firm in each country, industry, and year. To conserve space, I only report the ln(Ageipo) coefficient of each regression in this and 
the remaining panels. The left-hand side of panel C repeats the analysis with Sales growth as dependent variable and the right-
hand side estimates logistic regressions with Probability of negative sales growth as dependent variable, defined as a binary 
variable equal to 1 if the firm’s change in net sales in relation to the previous year is negative, and 0 otherwise. In Panel D on the 
left-hand side, I repeat the analysis with Gross margin as dependent and on the right-hand side, I estimate logistic regressions 
with Probability of decline in market share as dependent variable, defined as a binary variable equal to 1 if the firm’s ratio of 
sales to total sales of all sample firms in the same three-digit SIC level industry, country, and year decreases in relation to the 
previous year, and 0 otherwise. All estimations use industry (Fama and French's (1997) 48 industry grouping) and year fixed-
effects and robust standard errors clustered at the firm-level. The two bottom rows in each panel (except panel A) show the 
percentage of negative (positive) and significantly negative (positive) coefficients, respectively. The symbols ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance in two-sided tests with confidence 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively. The sample period is 1985 – 
2010. 
Panel A: ROA 
 World Non-US countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ln(Ageinc) –1.183* –0.637   –1.700*** –1.174**   
 (0.639) (0.527)   (0.632) (0.492)   
ln(Ageipo)   –2.102*** –1.701***   –2.908*** –2.359*** 
   (0.774) (0.625)   (0.569) (0.499) 
Capex –0.019 –0.030 –0.033 –0.043 –0.062 –0.073 –0.077 –0.091 
 (0.146) (0.138) (0.146) (0.139) (0.157) (0.153) (0.158) (0.152) 
R&D outlays –0.143*** –0.142*** –0.142*** –0.140*** –0.155*** –0.149*** –0.154*** –0.150*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.026) (0.024) (0.026) (0.023) 
bADR –3.788*** –4.612*** –3.679*** –4.380*** –2.842** –4.076** –2.516* –3.995** 
 (1.250) (1.104) (1.334) (1.100) (1.438) (1.632) (1.448) (1.606) 
bFocus 0.674 0.796 0.499 0.601 1.265 1.338* 0.921 1.043 
 (0.670) (0.614) (0.572) (0.500) (0.811) (0.784) (0.702) (0.660) 
FF-index –0.115 –0.102 –0.142 –0.130 0.076 0.084 0.113 0.091 
 (0.509) (0.469) (0.524) (0.475) (0.640) (0.593) (0.656) (0.600) 
Leverage –8.204*** –7.570*** –8.149*** –7.563*** –9.263*** –8.784*** –8.689*** –8.380*** 
 (1.924) (1.537) (1.615) (1.312) (1.472) (1.259) (1.458) (1.385) 
MTB-equity –1.132*** –1.138*** –1.093*** –1.100*** –1.173* –1.187* –1.242* –1.248* 
 (0.176) (0.172) (0.182) (0.179) (0.679) (0.668) (0.665) (0.655) 
Size, 1 year lag 2.479*** 2.528*** 2.680*** 2.708*** 2.453*** 2.585*** 2.777*** 2.914*** 
 (0.412) (0.397) (0.407) (0.411) (0.732) (0.741) (0.707) (0.742) 
Volatility –27.662*** –28.790*** –26.984*** –28.547*** –23.640*** –24.744*** –23.144*** –24.765*** 
 (3.972) (3.486) (4.095) (3.445) (5.509) (5.358) (5.515) (5.372) 
Constant 13.344*** 13.478*** 5.787 2.723 1.482 –0.062 –7.853 –4.503 
 (4.006) (3.832) (4.392) (4.683) (7.276) (7.697) (5'095.558) (9'082.101) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 219'320 219'320 205'993 205'993 150'745 150'745 137'504 137'504 
Adjusted R-squared 0.275 0.283 0.275 0.283 0.240 0.253 0.246 0.258 
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Panel B: ROA – Country-specific regressions 
 ROA ROA if bOldfirmipo = 1 
 Coefficient SE N adj. R2 Coefficient SE N adj. R2 
World –1.701*** (0.122)  205'993 0.28 –2.740*** (0.235)  104'140 0.26 
Non-US –2.359*** (0.138)  137'504 0.26 –2.456*** (0.282)  69'074 0.26 
US –0.049 (0.264)  68'489 0.32 –3.182*** (0.448)  35'066 0.29 
Japan –1.629*** (0.083)  41'643 0.26 –0.807*** (0.238)  21'906 0.28 
UK –1.553*** (0.221)  18'015 0.36 –1.888*** (0.424)  8'846 0.32 
Canada –2.318*** (0.812)  12'985 0.30 –6.144*** (1.832)  6'394 0.32 
Australia –0.464 (0.888)  10'830 0.30 –3.674 (2.270)  5'380 0.34 
Korea (South) –2.409*** (0.305)  11'185 0.27 –3.214*** (0.708)  5'686 0.26 
France –0.115 (0.249)  7'120 0.21 0.104 (0.368)  3'594 0.26 
Germany –0.603* (0.323)  6'946 0.22 –0.981** (0.492)  3'246 0.20 
Hong Kong –1.789*** (0.451)  7'121 0.22 –1.731** (0.778)  3'421 0.20 
Singapore –2.078*** (0.333)  5'253 0.22 –2.363*** (0.652)  2'571 0.20 
Sweden 0.417 (0.781)  3'372 0.37 –1.157 (1.214)  1'723 0.42 
Switzerland –0.679 (0.440)  2'009 0.38 –1.090 (0.828)  936 0.38 
Netherlands –0.859* (0.516)  1'959 0.34 –1.716 (1.402)  1'020 0.41 
Italy –1.278*** (0.385)  2'018 0.36 –1.357 (0.820)  967 0.41 
Norway 0.402 (0.769)  1'693 0.32 –0.631 (1.512)  848 0.29 
Denmark –0.429 (0.624)  1'638 0.39 –0.125 (0.829)  764 0.42 
Spain 0.014 (0.798)  1'102 0.42 –4.272* (2.341)  529 0.58 
Finland –0.870 (0.765)  1'469 0.39 –1.254 (0.914)  683 0.41 
Belgium –0.429 (0.528)  1'146 0.44 –0.656 (0.888)  560 0.47 
% negative 84  97 95 97 
% neg. and sig. 47  52  47  84  
 
Panel C: Sales growth 
 Sales growth Probability of negative sales growth 
 Coefficient SE N adj. R2 Coefficient SE N pseud. R2 
World –5.870*** (0.259)  202'695 0.05 0.285*** (0.008)  202'695 0.08 
Non-US –3.897*** (0.335)  132'485 0.05 0.257*** (0.009)  132'485 0.08 
US –9.410*** (0.399)  70'210 0.08 0.322*** (0.014)  70'210 0.10
Japan –1.952*** (0.112)  42'480 0.18 0.310*** (0.018)  42'480 0.15 
UK –6.759*** (0.550)  17'562 0.07 0.264*** (0.026)  17'562 0.10 
Canada –11.709*** (2.251)  9'847 0.05 0.249*** (0.032)  9'845 0.08 
Australia –22.271*** (4.808)  8'173 0.04 0.269*** (0.040)  8'173 0.06 
Korea (South) –2.992*** (0.581)  11'242 0.06 0.188*** (0.036)  11'240 0.07 
France –3.227*** (0.526)  7'310 0.13 0.209*** (0.044)  7'310 0.14 
Germany –4.397*** (0.726)  6'991 0.07 0.208*** (0.038)  6'991 0.10 
Hong Kong 2.377 (1.777)  7'157 0.05 0.258*** (0.047)  7'157 0.09 
Singapore –2.544** (0.991)  5'263 0.06 0.288*** (0.052)  5'262 0.08 
Sweden –3.804 (2.762)  3'355 0.10 0.208*** (0.064)  3'354 0.12 
Switzerland –3.216*** (1.213)  2'034 0.12 0.176** (0.070)  1'999 0.16 
Netherlands –3.471*** (0.922)  1'991 0.16 0.253*** (0.079)  1'982 0.21 
Italy –2.498*** (0.820)  2'022 0.12 0.406*** (0.079)  2'016 0.14 
Norway –3.515 (2.771)  1'696 0.12 0.301*** (0.068)  1'685 0.11 
Denmark –3.564** (1.464)  1'635 0.13 0.322** (0.126)  1'632 0.14 
Spain –3.352** (1.407)  1'104 0.24 0.261 (0.166)  1'100 0.17 
Finland –2.451* (1.339)  1'470 0.24 0.171* (0.098)  1'469 0.21 
Belgium –2.899* (1.657)  1'153 0.14 0.070 (0.082)  1'149 0.12 
% negative 95  96 % positive 100  100  
% neg. and sig. 84  94 % pos. and sig. 89  99  
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Panel D: Market share and gross margin 
 Probability of decline in market share Gross margin 
 Coefficient SE N adj. R2 Coefficient SE N pseud. R2 
World 0.209*** (0.008)  211'135 0.04 –2.839*** (0.498)  197'983 0.06 
Non-US 0.155*** (0.009)  139'541 0.05 –3.827*** (0.727)  128'736 0.08 
US 0.324*** (0.013)  71'594 0.04 –1.476*** (0.281)  69'247 0.15 
Japan 0.215*** (0.016)  42'471 0.04 –2.386*** (0.214)  42'009 0.43 
UK 0.186*** (0.023)  18'069 0.04 –1.471*** (0.405)  17'033 0.22 
Canada 0.184*** (0.035)  13'489 0.09 –2.214 (2.936)  9'555 0.10 
Australia 0.211*** (0.040)  10'958 0.08 20.477 (12.537)  7'851 0.12 
Korea (South) 0.176*** (0.034)  11'238 0.03 –1.015** (0.404)  10'887 0.35 
France 0.092** (0.043)  7'269 0.04 –0.546 (0.552)  6'872 0.39 
Germany 0.162*** (0.034)  6'981 0.03 –1.524*** (0.513)  6'570 0.28 
Hong Kong 0.179*** (0.054)  7'166 0.04 0.384 (0.881)  7'084 0.21 
Singapore 0.093 (0.058)  5'222 0.05 0.058 (0.765)  5'235 0.31 
Sweden 0.095 (0.083)  3'362 0.05 17.434 (10.933)  3'101 0.15 
Switzerland 0.227*** (0.085)  1'901 0.09 –0.869 (1.024)  1'991 0.46 
Netherlands 0.144 (0.100)  1'954 0.08 –1.317 (1.100)  1'937 0.44 
Italy 0.051 (0.109)  1'939 0.08 0.660 (1.111)  1'971 0.41 
Norway 0.215*** (0.075)  1'629 0.09 0.154 (4.124)  1'545 0.17 
Denmark 0.069 (0.145)  1'515 0.10 –3.885** (1.511)  1'537 0.48 
Spain 0.178 (0.167)  931 0.12 –1.209 (2.330)  1'078 0.30 
Finland –0.097 (0.127)  1'327 0.12 –0.643 (1.011)  1'393 0.48 
Belgium 0.082 (0.101)  1'022 0.15 –1.906* (1.144)  1'087 0.55 
% positive 95  99 % negative 68 86 
% pos. and sig. 58  92 % neg. and sig. 37  75  
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Table 9: Firm age and investment activities 
The table investigates the relation between firm age and investment activities considering capital expenditures and R&D 
expenses. Variable definitions are in Table 13 at the end of the paper. All variables (except the binary and age variables) are 
winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled distribution at the country-level. Panel A shows the medians of the 
pooled distributions of the proxies for investment activities, Capex and R&D outlays. Panel B shows the results of the multivariate 
analysis for each country separately. On the left-hand side of the panel I regress Capex on R&D outlays, bFocus, FF-index, 
Leverage, MTB-Equity, Size (1 year lag), and Volatility. On the right-hand side R&D outlays is the dependent variable and control 
variables are Capex, bFocus, FF-index, Leverage, MTB-Equity, Size (1 year lag), and Volatility. To conserve space I only report 
the ln(Age) coefficient of each regression. All estimations use industry (Fama and French's (1997) 48 industry grouping) and year 
fixed-effects and robust standard errors clustered at the firm-level. The two bottom rows show the percentage of negative and 
significantly negative coefficients, respectively. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance in two-sided tests 
with confidence 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively. The sample period is 1985 – 2010. 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
 Capex R&D outlays R&D Coverage  Capex R&D outlays R&D Coverage
US 0.57 22.08 0.68 Sweden 0.25 19.51 0.32
Japan 0.31 2.36 0.51 Switzerland 0.49 6.72 0.44 
UK 1.41 11.64 0.33 Netherlands 0.90 4.91 0.26 
Canada 5.23 37.37 0.30 Italy 0.40 3.49 0.26 
Australia 3.64 36.88 0.29 Norway 4.13 9.35 0.26 
Korea (South) 2.09 1.64 0.67 Denmark 1.56 19.02 0.22 
France 0.34 5.89 0.24 Spain 1.00 1.61 0.08 
Germany 0.20 6.48 0.33 Finland 1.46 4.06 0.54 
Hong Kong 1.54 2.05 0.19 Belgium 1.00 7.41 0.24 
Singapore 1.71 1.70 0.13 Total 1.23 14.67 0.47 
 
Panel B: Multivariate analysis 
 Capex R&D outlays 
 Coefficient SE N adj. R2 Coefficient SE N adj. R2 
World –0.341*** (0.024)  211'229 0.23 –2.153*** (0.196)  211'229 0.14
Non-US –0.387*** (0.030)  139'629 0.22 –0.560*** (0.132)  139'629 0.10 
US –0.204*** (0.034)  71'600 0.28 –5.759*** (0.536)  71'600 0.17
Japan –0.260*** (0.026)  42'482 0.22 –0.085*** (0.029)  42'482 0.47 
UK –0.257*** (0.060)  18'086 0.30 –0.630** (0.253)  18'086 0.22 
Canada –0.375** (0.172)  13'503 0.29 –2.595*** (0.988)  13'503 0.21 
Australia –1.180*** (0.168)  11'005 0.28 –3.568*** (1.170)  11'005 0.14 
Korea (South) –0.868*** (0.123)  11'243 0.16 –0.357*** (0.056)  11'243 0.22 
France –0.292*** (0.090)  7'315 0.21 –0.214** (0.100)  7'315 0.40 
Germany –0.279*** (0.093)  7'013 0.26 –0.238** (0.095)  7'013 0.37 
Hong Kong –0.318** (0.146)  7'167 0.14 0.018 (0.040)  7'167 0.31 
Singapore –0.868*** (0.168)  5'269 0.19 –0.024 (0.027)  5'269 0.35 
Sweden –0.177 (0.165)  3'399 0.28 –0.008 (2.430)  3'399 0.19 
Switzerland –0.134 (0.154)  2'037 0.25 –0.422* (0.246)  2'037 0.48 
Netherlands –0.328** (0.159)  1'995 0.22 0.042 (0.120)  1'995 0.56 
Italy –0.015 (0.144)  2'025 0.30 0.031 (0.066)  2'025 0.63 
Norway –0.227 (0.416)  1'707 0.24 –0.350 (0.278)  1'707 0.51 
Denmark 0.084 (0.267)  1'653 0.23 –1.535 (1.436)  1'653 0.32 
Spain –0.389 (0.304)  1'104 0.27 –0.023 (0.075)  1'104 0.48 
Finland –0.084 (0.281)  1'473 0.23 0.118 (0.221)  1'473 0.50 
Belgium –0.272 (0.240)  1'153 0.27 –0.753* (0.428)  1'153 0.41 
% negative 95  99 79 94 
% neg. and sig. 58  93  47  88  
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Table 10: Firm age and cash payouts 
The table investigates the relation between firm age and cash payouts considering cash balances and payout ratios. Variable 
definitions are in Table 13 at the end of the paper. All variables (except the binary and age variables) are winsorized at the 1st and 
the 99th percentile of their pooled distribution at the country-level. Panel A shows descriptive statistics of the pooled distributions 
of the proxies for cash payouts, Cash and Payout ratio. Panel B shows the results of the multivariate analysis for each country 
separately. On the left-hand side of the panel, I regress Cash on ROA, Capex, R&D outlays, bFocus, FF-index, Leverage, MTB-
Equity, Size (1 year lag), and Volatility. On the right-hand side, I exchange Cash for Payout ratio as the dependent variable. To 
conserve space, I only report the ln(Age) coefficient of each regression. All estimations use industry (Fama and French's (1997) 48 
industry grouping) and year fixed-effects and robust standard errors clustered at the firm-level. The two bottom rows show the 
percentage of negative and significantly negative coefficients, respectively. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance in two-sided tests with confidence 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively. The sample period is 1985 – 2010. 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
 
Median 
Cash 
Median 
Payout ratio  
Median 
Cash 
Median 
Payout ratio 
US 9.96 0.05 Sweden 10.74 0.12 
Japan 14.85 0.09 Switzerland 12.35 0.11 
UK 7.56 0.14 Netherlands 6.11 0.11 
Canada 9.53 0.06 Italy 8.59 0.10 
Australia 10.91 0.10 Norway 11.78 0.09 
Korea (South) 9.85 0.06 Denmark 9.96 0.10 
France 9.86 0.09 Spain 5.75 0.13 
Germany 7.74 0.09 Finland 8.32 0.18 
Hong Kong 15.07 0.18 Belgium 8.22 0.12 
Singapore 13.01 0.17 Total 11.26 0.09 
 
Panel B: Multivariate analysis 
 Cash Payout ratio 
 Coefficient SE N adj. R2 Coefficient SE N pseud. R2 
World –1.631*** (0.081)  205'852 0.41 0.006*** (0.001)  204'545 0.19
Non-US –1.050*** (0.088)  137'414 0.37 0.003*** (0.001)  136'174 0.18 
US –3.566*** (0.164)  68'438 0.50 0.015*** (0.001)  68'371 0.24 
Japan –1.284*** (0.135)  41'642 0.46 0.001 (0.001)  41'275 0.15 
UK –0.718*** (0.208)  18'014 0.41 0.011*** (0.003)  17'998 0.19 
Canada –1.583*** (0.343)  12'914 0.42 –0.005* (0.003)  12'811 0.23 
Australia –1.594*** (0.416)  10'829 0.45 0.007** (0.003)  10'808 0.38 
Korea (South) –1.909*** (0.250)  11'179 0.43 –0.003 (0.002)  11'124 0.22 
France –0.501 (0.367)  7'120 0.41 0.004 (0.004)  7'003 0.20 
Germany –0.364 (0.337)  6'946 0.44 –0.001 (0.003)  6'708 0.21 
Hong Kong –0.623 (0.494)  7'120 0.37 0.015 (0.012)  7'087 0.22 
Singapore 0.596 (0.483)  5'253 0.40 0.013 (0.009)  5'242 0.18 
Sweden –1.487** (0.648)  3'372 0.44 0.006 (0.006)  3'272 0.26 
Switzerland –0.407 (0.583)  2'009 0.43 0.005 (0.005)  1'989 0.24 
Netherlands 0.399 (0.693)  1'957 0.45 0.010* (0.006)  1'940 0.30 
Italy –0.961** (0.433)  2'018 0.37 –0.003 (0.005)  1'995 0.25 
Norway –0.836 (0.545)  1'693 0.55 0.013 (0.009)  1'661 0.21 
Denmark –0.842 (0.994)  1'632 0.49 0.011 (0.007)  1'617 0.21 
Spain 0.373 (0.838)  1'101 0.38 0.019* (0.012)  1'066 0.38 
Finland –0.254 (0.702)  1'469 0.51 0.016* (0.009)  1'463 0.24 
Belgium 1.022 (0.705)  1'146 0.51 0.019*** (0.007)  1'115 0.25 
% negative 79  95 % positive 79 84 
% neg. and sig. 42  82 % pos. and sig. 37  50  
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Table 11: Firm age and technical efficiency 
The table investigates the relation between firm age and technical efficiency. Variable definitions are in Table 13 at the end of the 
paper. All variables (except the binary and age variables) are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled 
distribution at the country-level. Panel A shows the medians of the pooled distributions of the proxy for technical efficiency, 
Sales-to-assets. Panel B shows the results of the multivariate analysis for each country separately. I regress Sales-to-assets on 
Capex, R&D outlays, bFocus, FF-index, Leverage, MTB-Equity, Size (1 year lag), and Volatility. The left-hand side relates to the 
full sample of firms and the right-hand side repeats the analysis with the subsample of firms older than the median firm in each 
country, industry, and year. To conserve space, I only report the ln(Age) coefficient of each regression. All estimations use 
industry (Fama and French's (1997) 48 industry grouping) and year fixed-effects and robust standard errors clustered at the firm-
level. The two bottom rows show the percentage of negative and significantly negative coefficients, respectively. The symbols 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance in two-sided tests with confidence 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively. The sample 
period is 1985 – 2010. 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
 Sales-to-assets  Sales-to-assets 
US 1.13 Sweden 1.18 
Japan 1.03 Switzerland 1.02 
UK 1.23 Netherlands 1.42 
Canada 0.40 Italy 0.82 
Australia 0.47 Norway 0.98 
Korea (South) 0.96 Denmark 1.16 
France 1.18 Spain 0.88 
Germany 1.25 Finland 1.16 
Hong Kong 0.69 Belgium 1.13 
Singapore 0.83 Total 1.03 
 
Panel B: Multivariate analysis 
 Sales-to-assets Sales-to-assets if bOldfirmipo = 1 
 Coefficient SE N adj. R2 Coefficient SE N adj. R2 
World –0.037*** (0.005)  211'174 0.28 –0.063*** (0.013)  105'740 0.30
Non-US –0.061*** (0.006)  139'620 0.29 –0.069*** (0.015)  69'764 0.31 
US 0.037*** (0.010)  71'554 0.29 0.014 (0.025)  35'976 0.28 
Japan –0.082*** (0.009)  42'482 0.32 –0.016 (0.028)  22'138 0.34 
UK –0.054*** (0.017)  18'086 0.30 –0.076* (0.040)  8'864 0.28 
Canada 0.015 (0.014)  13'497 0.48 –0.029 (0.037)  6'595 0.53 
Australia –0.006 (0.022)  11'002 0.34 0.099 (0.063)  5'459 0.37 
Korea (South) –0.085*** (0.019)  11'243 0.17 –0.162*** (0.048)  5'709 0.16 
France 0.009 (0.020)  7'315 0.28 –0.033 (0.037)  3'659 0.24 
Germany 0.025 (0.031)  7'013 0.24 0.012 (0.050)  3'259 0.28 
Hong Kong –0.202*** (0.030)  7'167 0.26 –0.383*** (0.058)  3'437 0.35 
Singapore –0.181*** (0.034)  5'269 0.27 –0.146** (0.071)  2'579 0.34 
Sweden 0.033 (0.037)  3'399 0.29 0.061 (0.066)  1'728 0.44 
Switzerland –0.034 (0.044)  2'037 0.28 –0.297*** (0.099)  941 0.40 
Netherlands 0.051 (0.080)  1'995 0.50 –0.026 (0.201)  1'024 0.58 
Italy –0.081*** (0.021)  2'025 0.37 –0.133*** (0.037)  974 0.45 
Norway –0.088** (0.043)  1'707 0.40 –0.138** (0.057)  850 0.54 
Denmark 0.052 (0.058)  1'653 0.32 0.028 (0.139)  770 0.46 
Spain –0.002 (0.045)  1'104 0.53 –0.013 (0.130)  530 0.61 
Finland 0.015 (0.040)  1'473 0.43 0.121 (0.105)  683 0.48 
Belgium 0.012 (0.057)  1'153 0.45 0.123 (0.077)  565 0.58 
% negative 53  48 63 54 
% neg. and sig. 37  42  37  22  
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Table 12: Corporate aging and institutional differences  
The table investigates the relation between corporate aging and international institutional differences. Variable definitions are in 
Table 13 at the end of the paper. All firm-level variables (except the binary and age variables) are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th 
percentile of their pooled distribution at the country-level. The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. Panel A includes demeaned Stock 
market in % GDP and an interaction term of this variable with firm age. Panel B replicates the analysis of panel A by individually 
replacing the interaction term of Stock market in % GDP and firm age with interaction terms of Trade openness, Government 
orientation, Labor market programs (LMP), Fraction union members (FUM), and Employment protection legislation (EPL index) 
and (demeaned) firm age. All estimations include industry (I) (Fama and French's (1997) 48 industry grouping), year (Y), and 
country (C) fixed-effects (FE) and robust standard errors clustered at the country-level, which are given in parentheses. The 
symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance in two-sided tests with confidence 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively. The 
sample period is 1985 – 2010. 
Panel A: Stock market in % GDP 
 Incorporation age  IPO age 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ln(Age) –0.155*** –0.153*** –0.149*** –0.150***
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012) 
Stock market * ln(Age) –0.075* –0.083* –0.083* –0.084* 
 (0.042) (0.045) (0.043) (0.049) 
Stock market in % GDP 0.173* 0.121 0.157* 0.085 
 (0.101) (0.128) (0.086) (0.111) 
ROA –0.014*** –0.014*** –0.014*** –0.014*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Capex 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
bADR –0.042 –0.037 –0.048 –0.040 
 (0.055) (0.056) (0.054) (0.055) 
bFocus 0.061*** 0.062*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) 
FF-index –0.009 –0.009 –0.006 –0.005 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021) 
Leverage –2.672*** –2.827*** –2.649*** –2.794*** 
 (0.728) (0.784) (0.737) (0.797) 
Size, 1 year lag 0.127*** 0.128*** 0.135*** 0.137*** 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) 
Volatility 0.711*** 0.732*** 0.689*** 0.708*** 
 (0.085) (0.090) (0.072) (0.078) 
EPL index  –0.218  –0.219 
  (0.150)  (0.172) 
Per-capita GDP growth  1.500  1.516 
  (1.354)  (1.268) 
Trade openness  –0.111  –0.176 
  (0.348)  (0.352) 
Government orientation  –0.021  –0.020 
  (0.015)  (0.015) 
Labor market programs  –0.040  –0.049 
  (0.050)  (0.063) 
Fraction union members  –0.003  –0.009 
  (0.014)  (0.016) 
Constant 0.053 2.327 –0.090 0.835 
 (0.145) (2.072) (0.204) (1.289) 
I, Y, and C FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 199'277 184'233 187'330 173'153 
Adjusted R-squared 0.267 0.265 0.262 0.260 
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Panel B: Government orientation, Trade openness, Labor market programs, Fraction union members 
 Incorporation age IPO age 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Trade openness 
ln(Age) –0.162*** –0.162*** –0.148*** –0.149*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.020) (0.020) 
Trade openness * ln(Age) 0.081*** 0.083*** 0.020 0.019 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.044) (0.041) 
Trade openness 0.089 –0.133 0.081 –0.142 
 (0.197) (0.316) (0.172) (0.317) 
Observations 195'273 191'098 182'443 178'810 
 Government orientation 
ln(Age) –0.161*** –0.161*** –0.149*** –0.149***
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.020) (0.020) 
Gov. orient. * ln(Age) 0.032*** 0.032** 0.014 0.013 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Government orientation –0.020* –0.023* –0.017 –0.020 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.011) (0.015) 
Observations 195'197 191'098 182'406 178'810 
 Labor market programs (LMP) 
ln(Age) –0.163*** –0.161*** –0.150*** –0.150*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.018) (0.019) 
LMP * ln(Age) 0.040*** 0.044*** 0.018 0.019 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) 
LMP –0.081** –0.073* –0.091*** –0.071 
 (0.032) (0.042) (0.029) (0.054) 
Observations 201'334 191'098 188'890 178'810 
 Fraction union members (FUM) 
ln(Age) –0.158*** –0.156*** –0.148*** –0.150*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.020) 
FUM * ln(Age) 0.001 0.002* 0.000 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
FUM –0.003 0.003 –0.008 –0.000 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.015) 
Observations 206'856 191'098 193'628 178'810 
 Employment protection legislation (EPL) 
ln(Age) –0.159*** –0.159*** –0.150*** –0.152***
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) 
EPL index * ln(Age) 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.055*** 0.049*** 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
EPL index –0.128 –0.207* –0.102 –0.191 
 (0.092) (0.122) (0.087) (0.146) 
Observations 206'803 191'098 193'587 178'810 
   
Controls (panel A) Included Included Included Included 
I, Y, and C FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 
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Table 13: Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
Panel A: Firm age 
Ageinc Incorporation age, computed as one plus the difference between the year under investigation and the 
firm’s incorporation year. The incorporation age is from (a) Jay Ritter’s Website and Mergent 
Webreports, (b) WorldScope item 18273: “Date of Incorporation represents the date the company 
was incorporated”, (c) Osiris from Bureau van Djik, (d) SDC Platinum, (e) Zephyr from Bureau van 
Djik, (f) official websites from stock exchanges, (g) personal email to Investor Relations Manager, 
(h) Amadeus from Bureau van Djik, (i) official websites from trade registers, (j) corporate websites, 
and (k) online encyclopedias, filled up in this order 
Ageipo IPO age, computed as one plus the difference between the year under investigation and the firm’s 
IPO year. The IPO year is computed as (a), for the US, the minimum value of: (1) the first year the 
firm appears on the CRSP tapes; (2) the first year the firm appears on the COMPUSTAT tapes; and 
(3) the first year for which I find a link between the CRSP and the COMPUSTAT tapes, (b) 
WorldScope item 00000; the footnote contains information about “the date when the company 
became publicly held”, (c) Compustat, (d) Osiris from Bureau van Djik, (e) SDC Platinum, (f) 
Zephyr from Bureau van Djik, (f) CRSP, (g) official websites from stock exchanges, (h) personal 
email to Investor Relations Manager, (i) corporate websites, (j) Thomson Reuters, and (k) online 
encyclopedias, filled up in this order 
bOldfirminc 
(95.45) 
Binary variable equal to 1 if the firm’s incorporation age (Ageinc) is above the sample median in any 
given country and year, and equal to 0 otherwise 
bOldfirmipo 
(88.10) 
Binary variable equal to 1 if the firm’s IPO age (Ageipo) is above the sample median in a given 
country and year, and equal to 0 otherwise 
Panel B: Firm performance 
Gross margin The gross profit margin, defined as net sales (WorldScope item 01001) minus cost of goods sold 
(WorldScope item 01051) divided by net sales, multiplied by 100. 
Probability of decline in 
market share 
Binary variable equal to 1 if the firm’ ratio of sales (WorldScope item 01001) divided by the total of 
sales of all sample firms in the same three-digit SIC level industry, country, and year decreases in 
relation to the previous year, and 0 otherwise 
Probability of negative 
sales growth 
Binary variable equal to 1 if the firm’s change in net sales (WorldScope item 01001, expressed in 
USD) in relation to the previous year is negative, and 0 otherwise 
ROA The firm’s return on assets, calculated as the ratio of the firm’s earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization (WorldScope item 18198) divided by the lagged book value of the 
firm’s assets (WorldScope item 02999) multiplied by 100 
Sales growth The firm’s change in net sales (WorldScope item 01001, expressed in USD) in relation to the 
previous year, multiplied by 100 
Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q, computed as the market value of the firm’s assets (Size) divided by the book value of the 
firm’s assets (WorldScope item 02999) 
Panel D: Firm-level variables 
bADR Binary variable equal to 1 if the firm’s shares are listed on stock exchange in a country different from 
the country in which the firm is incorporated as indicated by WorldScope items 11496 and 06100, 
and is zero otherwise 
bFocus Borrowing from Mitton (2002), a binary variable equal to 1 if the number of two-digit SIC level 
industries in which a firm operates is less than the median in a given country and year, using the 
higher number of reported industries in WorldScope items 07021 to 07028 and 19506 to 19596, 
respectively, and 0 otherwise 
Capex The firm’s capital expenditures (WorldScope item 04601) net of depreciation and amortization 
(WorldScope item 01151), divided by the lagged market value of the firm’s assets (Size) 
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Variable Definition 
Cash-to-assets The firm’s cash balance (WorldScope item 02001) divided by the book value of the firm’s assets 
(WorldScope item 02999) 
FF-index Borrowing from Doidge et al. (2009), a financial flexibility index constructed as a count variable by 
adding one point for a firm with above median cash (WorldScope item 02001), one point for above 
median dividend payments (WorldScope item 04551 divided by WorldScope item 18198), and one 
point for below median capital expenditures (Capex) in a given country, industry (Fama and French's 
(1997) 48 industry grouping), and year 
Leverage The firm’s leverage, calculated as the firm’s total debt (WorldScope item 03255) divided by the 
market value of the firm’s assets (Size) 
MTB-equity The firm’s market-to-book ratio, calculated as the market value of the firm’s equity (WorldScope 
item 08001) divided by the book value of the firm’s equity (WorldScope item 03501) 
Payout ratio The firm’ ratio of dividends (WorldScope item 04551) devided by the firm’s earnings before interest, 
taxes, depreciation and amortization (WorldScope item 18198) 
ROA 
 
The firm’s return on assets, calculated as the ratio of the firm’s earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization (WorldScope item 18198) divided by the lagged book value of the 
firm’s assets (WorldScope item 02999) multiplied by 100 
R&D outlays 
 
The firm’s R&D expenditures (WorldScope item 01201) divided by the firm’s net sales (WorldScope 
item 01001). Undisclosed values are set to zero and I use non-disclosure indicators to control for the 
undisclosed values. 
Sales-to-assets The firm’s net sales (WorldScope item 01001) divided by the lagged book value of the firm’s assets 
(WorldScope item 02999). 
Size The firm’s size is the log of the market value of the firm’s assets, calculated as the book value of the 
firm’s assets (WorldScope item 02999) minus the book value of the firm’s equity (WorldScope item 
03501) plus the market value of the firm’s equity (WorldScope item 08001) minus deferred taxes 
(WorldScope item 03263) 
Volatility 
 
The volatility of the firm’s monthly stock return, calculated over a two-year window and including all 
firm-years with at least 12 monthly returns. The returns are continuously compounded and all padded 
zero-return records at the end of each stock’s time series are removed, as defined in Ince and Porter 
(2006) 
Panel E: Country-level variables 
EPL index 
 
OECD indicators of employment protection for 34 OECD countries and 9 emerging economies. We 
use version 1 of the employment protection summary indicator as described in Venn (2009), Table 
A2,  with the updated data from OECD (2013). 
Source: http://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotection.htm  
Fraction union members 
 
Net union membership as a proportion of wage and salary earners in employment. The data is from 
Comparative political data set I 1960-2010 (item ud) from Armingeon et al. (2012). 
Source: http://www.ipw.unibe.ch 
Government orientation 
 
Cabinet composition index ranging from 1 (hegemony of right-wing (and center) parties) to 5 
(hegemony of social-democratic and other left parties). The data is from Comparative political data 
set I 1960-2010 (item govparty) from Armingeon et al. (2012). 
Source: http://www.ipw.unibe.ch 
Labor market programs 
 
Grubb and Puymoyen’s (2008) annual public expenditure on labor market programs as a percentage 
of GDP. 
Source: http://stats.oecd.org 
Per-capita GDP growth 
 
The country’s change in per-capita gross domestic product (GDP) relative to the previous year. GDP 
is expressed in constant national currency per person. Data are derived by dividing constant price 
GDP by total population. The data is from World Economic Outlook database. 
Source: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/02/weodata/download.aspx 
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Variable Definition 
Stock market in % GDP 
 
The country’s ratio of stock market capitalization to gross domestic product in percent. The data is 
from Financial Development and Structure Dataset (item stmktcap) from Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Levine (2010). 
Source: http://econ.worldbank.org 
Trade openness 
(94.87) 
Openness of the economy, measured as total trade (sum of import and export) as a percentage of 
GDP. The data is from Comparative political data set I 1960-2010 (item openc) from Armingeon et 
al. (2012). 
Source: http://www.ipw.unibe.ch 
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1. Introduction 
As they age, firms progressively run out of growth opportunities (Loderer, Stulz, and Waelchli, 
2014).  At the same time, the evidence shows that employment protection legislation (EPL) 
encourages firms and employees to engage in innovation (Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian, 
2012 and 2013; henceforth ABS (2012) and (2013)).  Arguably, the effect of EPL should be more 
pronounced in mature firms than in young ones.  On the one hand, younger firms are busy 
exercising the growth options that induced them to list, as documented by the dramatic increase 
in book assets that follows the IPO (Mikkelson, Partch, and Shah, 1997).  Hence, the generation 
of new innovative projects is not a priority of younger firms.  On the other hand, older firms have 
a more urgent innovation problems, since the growth options they had when they went public are 
partially exhausted.  If so, EPL should have a comparatively stronger effect on mature firms than 
on young ones.  This paper tests this proposition.  We also test whether, as predicted by ABS 
(2013), EPL increases firm value, and whether that effect, as we just argued, is more pronounced 
in mature organizations.  Moreover, we want to know whether the effect on firm value is 
mediated by the effect on innovation effort. 
 According to Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian (2012 and 2013), laws that protect 
employees against unjust dismissal help reduce the underinvestment problem brought about by 
incomplete employment contracts and the ability of firms to hold up innovating employees.  A 
similar prediction follows from theoretical arguments that tolerance for failure in employment 
contracts fosters innovation and economic growth (Manso, 2011, Ederer and Manso, 2012), or 
that job security encourages workers to invest in firm-specific human capital (Suedekum and 
Ruehmann, 2003, and Wasmer, 2006).  Consistent with these predictions, ABS (2013) find 
evidence that employment protection spurs innovation in the US.  Similarly, ABS (2012) uncover 
cross-country evidence that more stringent employment protection leads to more innovation 
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internationally.  We test whether this effect is stronger in mature firms, based on the argument 
that mature firms are more likely to face the choice of routine versus innovation projects depicted 
in ABS (2013) than young firms are.  Young firms list to fund the exploitation of growth 
opportunities.  Hence, given limited managerial attention (Loderer, Stulz, and Wälchli, 2014), 
their focus will be on production, marketing, and distribution rather than on innovation 
(Holmstrom, 1989).  As firms grow older, innovation becomes an issue.  Stricter EPL will 
encourage innovation at the margin in these firms.     
  We test this proposition using an international panel, which covers more than 30,000 
firms in 17 countries between January 1985 and December 2010. To examine the impact of 
employment protection, we exploit the variation in the composite index of EPL compiled by the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which measures the 
evolution of EPL across countries and over time. The annual index varies considerably across 
countries and displays substantial time-series variation within countries. 
 Since these changes occur in different countries at different points in time, we can identify the 
impact of changes in EPL using a difference-in-differences test design with industry, year, and 
country fixed effects.  The results show that EPL does indeed encourage innovation effort, as 
measured by R&D expenses.  The results hold also when examining the number of patent 
applications.  The effect is significant both statistically as well as economically.  For a firm of 
average age, a change in the EPL index by one unit leads to an increase in R&D expenditures of 
2.3 percent of sales.  Compared with the unconditional sample-wide average of R&D to sales of 
7.3 percent, this is an increase of approximately 30 percent. 
 As predicted, however, the innovation boost occurs mostly in mature firms, and especially in 
innovation-intensive industries.  We obtain similar results when measuring employment 
protection legislation with the alternative index proposed by Deakin, Lele, and Siems (2007).  We 
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also find that the EPL effect we uncover is much stronger in countries in which patents are owned 
by the firm, consistent with ABS’s (2012) argument that EPL limits the employers’ ability to 
hold up innovating employees.  Moreover, the effect we find is particularly pronounced in the 
context of regular contracts as opposed to temporary contracts.  Consistent with increased 
innovation activities, EPL also stimulates corporate risk taking.  This is in line with ABS (2012), 
who find that EPL increases the standard deviation of patent citations, their measure of riskiness 
of innovation projects.  The evidence also shows that, possibly to hedge this increased risk, firms 
hold larger cash balances.    
 To address endogeneity concerns, we incorporate variables into our analysis that could be a 
determinant of innovation efforts and correlate with EPL.  The literature has identified a number 
of such time-varying country-level factors, such as economic growth or trade liberalization.1  
When we extend the specification of our regression models with these variables, however, the 
statistical significance and the economic magnitude of the impact of EPL on innovation remains 
the same. 
 More intensive innovation effort would not be economically very relevant if it didn’t affect 
firm value.  We therefore investigate whether, as predicted by ABS, EPL also contributes to 
higher firm value.  Because of the preceding results, this effect should be limited to mature firms. 
 We find that EPL tends to depress Tobin’s Q ratios, but less so in mature firms.  The more 
moderate effect on mature firms is especially pronounced in the countries in which patents are 
owned by the firm, and in the context of regular (as opposed to temporary) contracts.  These 
results are empirically robust to different measures of firm age, the exclusion of the US from the 
sample, and various error clustering procedures at the country- and firm-level.  Employment 
                                                           
1  See Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian (2013), Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian (2012), Atanassov and Kim 
(2009), Saint-Paul (2002), and Subramanian and Megginson (2012). 
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protection legislation is highly correlated with product market legislation.  There is no evidence, 
however, that EPL is a proxy for product market legislation in our tests.  
 We also find, however, that the differential effect of EPL on Q in mature firms is not mediated 
by higher R&D expenditures.  In other words, although EPL does affect R&D, higher R&D 
expenditures have no tangible effect on Q.  EPL influences Q through other channels than R&D.  
One possibility that is fully in line with the logic and the predictions of the ABS model is that 
stricter EPL encourages investment in firm-specific human capital (Belot, Boone, van Ours, 
2007).  This could increase the productivity of labor.  Consistent with this interpretation, the 
evidence shows that EPL boosts growth.  This effect, however, is swamped by the higher costs 
EPL brings about as well as the lower profitability, particularly in mature firms.  On net, 
however, EPL reduces firm value, even in mature firms.  In these firms, EPL seems to encourage 
greater effort in the form of R&D expenditures and sales, but it also imposes restrictions that 
mature firms, because of their rigidities [Loderer, Stulz, and Waelchli (2014)], are less able to 
cope with. 
 This paper makes four main contributions to the literature.  First, we show that the effect of 
EPL on innovation efforts documented in ABS (2012 and 2013) is limited to mature firms.  
Second, we find that EPL encourages risk taking in those firms, which they seem to hedge by 
increasing their cash balances.  Third, we illustrate that EPL adversely affects firm value, 
although less so in mature firms.  Fourth, the higher innovation effort that EPL sparks does not 
translate into higher firm value.  Fifth, EPL boosts sales in mature firms, possibly by encouraging 
higher investments in firm-specific human capital, but it also increases costs that especially 
mature firms have more problems dealing with.  Overall, stricter EPL reduces firm value, 
especially in mature firms.   
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 The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 discusses the data and provides summary statistics.  
Section 3 estimates the relation between EPL and innovation.  Section 4 does the same for the 
relation between EPL and Q.  Section 5 investigates whether innovation intermediates the 
association between EPL and Q.  Section 6 interprets the relation between EPL and Q.  Finally, 
Section 7 concludes.  
 
 
2. Data and summary statistics 
2.1. Employment protection legislation 
Employment protection generally refers to the rules governing the hiring and firing of employees. 
As outlined by Bassanini, Nunziata, and Venn (2009), for open-ended regular contracts, these 
rules typically define under what conditions the termination of employment is fair or unfair, what 
procedures should be followed in the case of individual layoffs, and how the dismissed employee 
can legally challenge the layoff decision. Usually, the regulations also specify the monetary 
compensation that employees are entitled to after dismissal.  Employment protection typically 
also regulates collective dismissal procedures and fixed-term contracts.  Employment protection 
is normally specified in legislation, collective agreements, or individual contracts.  It also 
depends on judicial interpretation as well as on law enforcement procedures. 
 To analyze the impact of employment protection on innovation and firm value, we exploit the 
time-series variation of changes in these laws. To measure how restrictive employment protection 
is, we use the OECD’s overall EPL index. The index covers the years 1985 to 2013 and is 
constructed by surveying existing laws and regulations in the OECD member countries with the 
help of labor law experts from the International Labor Organization. Most of the information 
used to calculate the EPL index refers to national and regional legislation.  However, the index 
also takes into account national, regional and industry-level collective agreements as well as, 
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where relevant, court rulings.  In the US, employment protection is mostly not statutory but rather 
based on court decisions.  OECD (2013) gives a detailed overview of the method and the data 
collection procedures of the EPL index.  The academic literature considers the OECD EPL index 
as the best summary of EPL across countries (see, among many others, Pagano and Volpin 
(2005), Bassanini and Garnero (2013), and Bassanini, Nunziata, and Venn (2009)). 
 The OECD index is compiled from eighteen aspects of EPL, grouped into three sub-indices: 
(a) Individual dismissal of employees with regular contracts; (b) Regulation of temporary 
contracts; and (c) Costs for collective dismissals.  Table 1 describes the index components and 
the weights used to aggregate them into the overall index.  
 There are different versions of the index, depending on the weights used to combine its 
components.  We rely on Version 1 of that index because it provides the longest time series.  This 
version does not include the subindex for collective dismissals.  As indicated in the table, it has 
two equally weighted components (Level 2 in the table): one for regular (EPLR) and one for 
temporary contracts (EPLT).   
 The two components themselves are composed of three and two elements, respectively (Level 
3 in the table).  The first element of the sub-index for regular contracts captures the procedural 
hurdles that employers have to take when they want to dismiss an employee based on fair 
grounds.  These hurdles include whether the notification of individual dismissal must be oral or 
written, whether a third party, such as work councils or the competent labor authority, must 
authorize the notification, and whether there is a delay before notice can start.  Generally, the 
notification must be in writing.  The exception is the US with no specific notification 
requirement.  The delay before the start of notice exhibits substantial cross-country variation.  In 
some countries, such as Switzerland and Norway, notice can only start at month-end, which adds 
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an average 15 days to the standard notice period.  If administrative authorization or preliminary 
court judgment is required, the associated delays are typically between two and four weeks.   
 The second element of the sub-index for regular contracts measures notice period and 
severance pay.  The notice period is quantified in months and the mandatory severance payment 
is the equally-weighted average of the number of monthly wages at three levels of job tenure (9 
months, 4 years, and 20 years).  All countries except the US enforce minimum notice periods but 
only two thirds provide for ordinary severance pay.   
 The third element of the sub-index for regular contracts assesses the difficulty of dismissal, 
which involves a classification of fair or unfair dismissal, the compensation and the possibility of 
reinstatement after unfair dismissal, and the length of the trial period.  Most countries have laws 
governing fair and unfair dismissal.  For example, Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, 
and Sweden consider dismissal in the case of redundancy as unfair if the employee could have 
been given another job within the same company.  Unfair dismissal can require compensation 
above ordinary severance pay.  The OECD average is six months of former pay, but Sweden 
typically mandates payment of 32 months, and Italy and France 21 and 16 months, respectively.  
The possibility of reinstatement and the length of the trial period also vary substantially across 
countries. 
 A substantial fraction of employer-employee agreements takes the form of temporary 
contracts.  The second component of the OECD EPL index we use has two elements, one for 
fixed-term contracts and the other for temporary work agencies, respectively. Both elements 
classify the conditions for valid use, the restrictions on renewals, and the maximum cumulated 
duration of these contracts.  Some countries have no restrictions on the use of temporary 
104 
 
contracts, whereas others permit these contracts only on the basis of an objective or material 
situation, for example to perform a task which in itself is of limited duration.2 
 Figure 1 shows the evolution of Version 1 of the EPL index in the seventeen sample countries 
for the period between 1985 and 2010.3  The index exhibits considerable cross-sectional variation 
and, with the exception of Canada, Switzerland, and the US, substantial time-series variation as 
well.  Table 2 provides a comprehensive description of all the changes in EPL during the sample 
period.4  The last column of Table 2 reports the associated index changes.  The majority of these 
changes are negative, indicating a deregulation trend.  Approximately half of the index changes 
concern regular contracts, and some are substantial whereas others are not.  The substantial 
changes include those that Spain enacted in 1994, namely: 1) a significant transfer of regulatory 
powers regarding pay and conditions from the law to collective agreements; 2) the 
decentralization of collective bargaining, especially in the form of enterprise agreements; 3) a 
lifting of the public monopoly of job placement to allow private employment agencies and 
temporary employment agencies ; 4) the facilitation of internal labor mobility within the 
enterprise; 5) the reduction of the costs of individual dismissal; and 6) a relaxation of the rules 
governing collective dismissal and redundancy.5  The legal reform led to a decrease in the EPL 
index from 3.65 to 2.80.  An example of a less sizeable legal change is the 2008 adjustment of the 
severance pay in the Netherlands.  That change decreased the EPL index from 1.91 to 1.88.   
 There are several alternatives to the EPL index.  First, there is the index compiled by 
Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2004) that measures labor protection in 
85 countries.  This index, however, is available only for 1997.  Second, there is the labor law 
index calculated by Deakin, Lele, and Siems (2007), which reflects the evolution of EPL across 
                                                           
2  This paragraph is based on OECD (2013). 
3  We exclude the years 2011-2013 for lack of data. 
4  The list is derived from Bertola, Boeri, and Cazes (1999), OECD (2004) and (2013), Subramanian and 
Megginson (2012), and Venn (2009). 
5  From: www.eurofound.europa.eu 
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countries from 1970 to 2005.  This Deakin index decomposes labor laws into the following five 
components: alternative employment contracts, work time regulation, dismissal regulation, 
employee representation, and industrial action.  Moreover, it “takes into account not just the 
formal or positive law but also the self-regulatory mechanisms that play a functionally similar 
role to laws in certain countries” (ABS, 2012).  We work with this index of EPL as well.  The 
index is available for only five countries: the US, the UK, France, Germany, and India.  These 
countries, however, account for 70% of the patents filed with the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office during 1970-2006.  Since reliable age data for India are difficult to obtain, we 
limit our attention to the other four countries.  All the variables related to employment protection 
are defined in panel A of Table 16. 
2.2. Performance, innovation measures, and control variables 
We use four alternative performance measures: Tobin’s Q, Sales growth, ROA, and SGA-to-sales.  
Most performance tests involve Tobin’s Q.  Innovation is measured with Number of patents 
(actually, patent applications) and Number of patents per million population at the country-level, 
and R&D expenditures at the firm-level.  Since we want to investigate the impact of EPL on 
innovation effort, R&D expenditures is probably the more appropriate innovation variable.  
Patent filings do not necessarily capture changes in innovation effort.  Moreover, not all 
innovations are patented.  In some cases, firms might be unable to or might prefer not to file for 
patent protection.  All these variables are defined in panel C of Table 16. 
 The control variables in the regression analysis we perform include return on assets, 
capital expenditures, cross-listings, the degree of specialization, financial flexibility, leverage, 
firm size, and volatility. These firm-level variables are defined in panel D of Table 16.  The data 
source is Worldscope.  In the analysis of firm performance, we also include a number of time-
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varying country-level control variables that could simultaneously affect Tobin’s Q ratios and the 
changes in EPL.  First, as suggested by ABS (2012) and Saint-Paul (2002), low economic growth 
compromises growth opportunities and increases the political support for employment protection.  
To control for this possibility, we include real Per-capita GDP growth in the analysis.  Second, 
as suggested by Subramanian and Megginson (2012), trade liberalization may boost Tobin’s Q 
and at the same time induce governments to enact stringent EPL following trade liberalization to 
offset the associated job losses.  To control for this effect, we include the country-level aggregate 
of imports and exports (Trade openness) as a proxy for trade reforms.  A third concern is that 
changes in EPL as well as growth opportunities could be correlated with government changes.  
As documented by Botero et al. (2004), left-leaning governments tend to have more stringent 
labor laws.  At the same time, the laws likely affect a given country’s growth opportunities.  We 
therefore include the Government orientation index from Armingeon et al. (2012), which 
captures the balance of power between left and right-leaning parties in a given country’s 
parliament.  Fourth, increases in unemployment insurance benefits could correlate with changes 
in EPL and at the same time affect the growth opportunities of firms in the economy.  Since this 
effect could also bias the results, we control for the annual expenditures for Labor market 
programs in a given country.  Finally, in more unionized countries, employees exert considerable 
political pressure to legislate employment protection. At the same time, poorly performing 
managers are more likely to retain their jobs when unions are strong (Atanassov and Kim, 2009).  
Therefore, the regression arguments include the degree of unionization in a given country, as 
measured by the annual Fraction of union members among wage and salary earners.  Finally, for 
robustness tests, we also use measures of bankruptcy codes (Creditor rights), financial 
development (Stock market in % of GDP), and education data (Tertiary enrolment). All country-
level variables are defined in panel E of Table 16 along with their data sources. 
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2.3. Sample composition and descriptive statistics 
The sample contains all the countries included in the OECD EPL indicators in 1985-2010 that 
host one of the 30 largest stock markets in the world according to the World Federation of 
Exchanges (December 2010).  As an exception, we also include South Korea, even though it is 
present in the EPL indicators only from 1993 onward.  For the resulting set of 17 countries, we 
gather firm-specific data from Worldscope.  To ensure comparable fiscal years, we ignore all 
firm-years which do not last between 361 and 371 days.  We disregard all financial firms (SIC 6) 
and regulated utilities (SIC 49).  We also exclude all firm-years with missing or negative assets, 
sales, market values of equity, and book values of equity.  Finally, we ignore all firms younger 
than 5 years, since these firms might have special characteristics and therefore not be 
representative (LSW, 2014).  This omission, however, does not alter our conclusions.   
 Across all years, the final sample contains 30,665 firms and 278,546 firm-years.  During the 
sample period the coverage increases from 3,741 firms in 1985 to 14,934 firms in 2010.  This 
increase is not uniform over time.  The number of firms covered increases sharply by an annual 
10 percent prior to 1995, on average.  Thereafter, the annual increase is only 3 percent.  Leaving 
out the first ten sample years in the analysis, however, yields consistent results. 
 To reduce the influence of outliers, we winsorize all firm-level variables at the 1st and the 99th 
percentile of their pooled distribution at the country-level.  To limit skewness, we take the log of 
firm age, firm size, tertiary enrolment, and trade openness.  Panel A of Table 3 shows descriptive 
statistics about the listing age of firms in the overall sample and across countries.  Overall, the 
median listing age is 15 years.  The variation is substantial.  The oldest companies are in Japan, 
with a median value of 29, and the youngest are in Switzerland, with a median age of 9.  For 
comparison, the panel also reports data about incorporation age.  The median incorporation age in 
the overall sample is 29 years.  Incorporation and listing age are positively correlated, but not 
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perfectly so.  For example, Switzerland has the oldest firms in terms of incorporation age (77 
years) but the youngest ones, as we have seen, in terms of listing age.  In the analysis, age is 
measured with listing age.  The results, however, are very similar when using incorporation age.  
Panel B reports median values for the variables used as dependent variables in the subsequent 
regression analysis. 
 
3. Employment protection and innovation 
3.1. General findings 
This section asks how employment protection affects innovation.  ABS (2012) and (2013) report 
that employment protection spurs innovation, as measured by number of patents filed and number 
of patent citations.  ABS (2012) investigate the U.S., the U.K., France, and Germany.  Table 4 
performs panel regressions of innovation against determining factors in the 17 countries included 
in our sample.  Innovation is measured alternatively with number of patents filed in column (1), 
number of patents per million population in column (2), and R&D-to-sales in columns (3) and 
(4).  Employment protection is measured with the binary variable bHigh EPL, which equals 1 if 
the EPL index is above the cross-sectional median value of the EPL index in any given year, and 
zero otherwise.   
 The staggered passage of changes in EPL across countries enables us to identify the effect 
of changes in EPL using a difference-in-differences approach.  To that end, we estimate panel 
regressions with year and country fixed-effects.  The country fixed-effects control for all time-
invariant unobserved factors at the country-level, such as other laws and institutions, the 
country’s legal origin (Botero, et al. (2004)), rule of law, anti-director rights index, efficiency of 
the judicial system, days to enforce a contract, and estimated cost of insolvency proceedings, (La 
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Porta, et al., (1997) and (1998)).  The year fixed-effects control for time-related unobserved 
variables.  All regressions are estimated with robust standard errors.   
 Columns (1) and (2) show that higher EPL values correlate with a larger number of 
patents at a country level, a finding that is consistent with ABS (2012 and 2013).  The availability 
of firm-level R&D expenditures data enables us a finer granularity of innovation at the firm level 
in columns (3) and (4).  There, the regression specification contains the set of control variables 
mentioned in the data section, including firm age, which we measure with the demeaned natural 
logarithm of the firm’s listing age (Age).  These regressions include industry fixed effects based 
on Fama and French's (1997) 48 industry grouping, and an indicator variable for R&D non-
disclosure.  Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm-level.  According to the results in 
column (3), the relation between EPL and innovation is statistically essentially zero.  The same 
results obtain when we add a squared term of EPL to assess possible nonlinearities in the relation 
(not shown).  Note that the coefficient of the demeaned value of company age is negative and 
significant.  Older firms tend to engage less in R&D activities, a result that Loderer, Stulz, and 
Waelchli (2014) observe in the U.S.  When we add an interaction variable of bHigh EPL with the 
demeaned value of firm age, the EPL-related results change.  EPL per se has a negative and 
significant coefficient, whereas the interaction term has a positive and highly significant 
coefficient (column 4).  This means that EPL tends to depress innovation efforts in young firms.  
In contrast, in mature firms, the effect is increasingly positive.  Age maintains a negative and 
significant coefficient.  Hence, EPL appears to slow down the negative impact of age on 
innovation efforts.  When we repeat the analysis in Table 4 for firms that report R&D data, this 
result is even stronger (not shown). A formal test shows that higher levels of EPL completely 
offset the age effect, on average.   
 
110 
 
3.2. EPL in innovation-intensive and other industries 
If EPL has an impact on innovation efforts in mature firms, this phenomenon should be 
particularly pronounced in high innovation industries.  In ABS (2013), the benefits from 
undertaking an innovative project in reaction to stricter legal employment protection is larger 
than that from undertaking a routine project.  Consistent with this prediction, they find that the 
impact of changes in EPL on innovation is in fact stronger in innovative industries than in 
traditional industries.  We perform a similar test and split the sample into a high and low 
innovation subsample.  Table 5 replicates the analysis of column (4) of the preceding table, our 
standard regression specification, for these two subsamples.  To sort industries into high vs. low 
innovation environments, we use information from the U.S., the largest economy in the world.6  
Since industries worldwide share technological commonalities, the relative distribution of 
innovation intensity across U.S. industries should be representative for other countries as well.  
We therefore compute the mean R&D-to-sales ratio in each 3-digit SIC industry over the full 
sample period in the U.S.  Using Fama and French's (1997) 48 industry classification yields 
similar results.  High innovation industries are those with an above median R&D-to-sales ratio in 
the U.S., and low innovation industries are those with a below median R&D-to-sales ratio in that 
country.  For example, a German firm operating in the textiles industry is classified into the low 
innovation subsample because the U.S. textiles industry’s mean R&D-to-sales ratio is below the 
typical R&D-to-sales ratio across all U.S. industries.  
The results show that employment protection per se has little if any effect on R&D effort.  
As before, the effect can only be observed in combination with age.  The coefficient of the 
interaction term between demeaned ln(Age) and demeaned EPL index is always positive and 
                                                           
6  Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2006), Acharya and Subramanian (2009),  Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian 
(2012), and Alimov (2013), among others, also create industry-level innovation intensity measures in cross-
country settings using U.S. data. 
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statistically significant with confidence of at least 0.9.  As predicted, the effect is more than ten 
times stronger in innovation intensive industries.  As noted in Table 4 before, age per se seems to 
discourage innovation efforts.  This effect is also much stronger in innovation intensive 
industries.  However, unlike what we noted in Table 4, EPL is unable to completely offset this 
aging effect.  Older firms engage in significantly less R&D activities even in countries with high 
legal protection of employees.  
3.3. The relevance of ownership of intellectual property 
To further assess the influence of EPL on innovation efforts, we distinguish between countries 
that grant ownership of intellectual property to the employer vs. countries that grant it to the 
inventor instead.  If EPL encourages innovation because it reduces the potential for holdup by 
employers, this effect should be stronger in countries in which the employer is entitled to the 
results of innovation effort.  In these countries, the employer can credibly threaten holdup to 
appropriate the rents from the employee’s effort.  In countries where that is not the case, the 
employee can simply walk away and take the intellectual property with him.  We therefore test 
the proposition that EPL has a stronger impact on innovation efforts in countries in which the 
employer owns the intellectual property produced in the firm, particularly if the latter is more 
mature and consequently more attentive to innovation. 
 OECD (2008) provides information about the ultimate ownership of intellectual property 
at the country-level. It classifies patent ownership into five categories, distinguishing between 
private businesses, individuals, governments, universities, and hospitals or private non-profit 
organizations. The data show that, in 2005, 80 percent of patents were owned by private 
businesses, on average. The cross-country variation in that percentage during the period in 
question is considerable.  It ranges from 52 percent in Spain to 93 percent in Finland. 
112 
 
 To test our proposition, we partition the sample into two subsamples according to the 
median country-level fraction of employer-ownership of patents in 2005 and then re-run the 
difference-in-differences regressions for each subsample, using our standard regression 
specification.  The results are in Table 6.  For space limitations, the table reports only the 
coefficients associated with firm age, the value of the EPL index, and the product of the two.  For 
ease of interpretation, we measure company age with the binary variable bOldfirm.  The results 
go through, however, also when measuring it with ln(Age).  Firms that operate in countries where 
employers own an above (below) median fraction of patents are classified into the Employer 
(Inventor) ownership subsample.   
 We find that in countries where relatively more employers own the intellectual property 
of their innovating employees (subsample Employer), the impact of changes in EPL is 
significantly stronger than in the subsample where employers enjoy weaker intellectual property 
rights (subsample Inventor).  This effect, however, is confined to mature firms.  Specifically, the 
coefficient of EPL is statistically zero, while that of the interaction between EPL index and the 
demeaned value of bOldfirm is positive and statistically significant.  Moreover, and as predicted, 
that coefficient has a larger magnitude and higher levels of significance in the Employer 
subsample. As an alternative to the OECD patent measure, we also used the classification in 
Wolk (2008) to attribute countries to a subsample of patent ownership (not shown).  The results 
were similar.   
 
3.4. Alternative EPL indices and index components 
As mentioned above, the EPL index is not the only measure of international labor protection.  An 
alternative index is the one compiled by Deakin, Lele, and Siems (2007) for the US, the UK, 
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France, Germany, and India for the years 1970-2005.  We therefore reestimate our standard 
regression specification with this index, leaving out, for lack of data, India.  We expect results 
similar to those in Table 4.  The evidence in column (1) of the first panel of Table 7 is consistent 
with this prediction.  Employment protection has little impact on R&D efforts, except in mature 
firms.  In those firms, the effect is strong enough to more than offset the negative influence of age 
at high enough levels of EPL. 
 In columns (2) and (3) of the table, we distinguish between regular (EPLR) and temporary 
contracts (EPLT).   The effect of employment protection on R&D activities should be felt more 
significantly in the context of regular contracts, simply because temporary contracts expire and a 
finite horizon decreases the employees’ incentives to be innovative.  The evidence is consistent 
with this prediction.  The results show that, in the context of regular contracts, EPL actually has a 
negative impact on young firms.  In contrast, even at the fairly low index levels of 1.1, EPL has 
the predicted boosting effect in mature firms. In the context of temporary contracts, EPL has little 
if any effect on innovation efforts in young firms.  In mature firms, the effect is positive and 
significant.  As predicted, however, the effect of EPL is significantly more pronounced in the 
context of regular contracts than in that of temporary contracts.  
3.5. Nonlinearities 
Bradley, Kim, and Tian (2013) argue that the relation between employee protection and firm 
innovation is probably inverted U-shaped.  According to that argument, increasing labor 
protection provides job insurance against failure risk from innovative investment projects and 
therefore spurs innovation, as reported in ABS (2013).  Too much employee protection, however, 
stifles innovation.  Their evidence shows that employee protection via unionization does 
discourage innovation.   
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 Column (4) in Table 7 investigates the existence of an inverted U-shaped relation between 
EPL and R&D expenditures.  The regression specification is the standard one except for the 
addition of the squared value of EPL index and of the interaction of that squared term with 
bOldfirm.  According to the estimates, employee protection per se has little impact on R&D 
expenditures.  As observed before, however, that protection has a statistically significant impact 
in mature firms.  To examine the shape of that impact in young vs. mature firms, Panel B of the 
table uses the estimated regression coefficients to plot the predicted R&D expenditures as a 
function of EPL.  We find little evidence of concavities in that relation.  Over the range of EPL 
observed in the sample, the relation is actually almost linear in mature firms and U-shaped in 
young firms.  Except for comparatively low levels of EPL, stricter employment protection 
legislation encourages innovation effort.  Moreover, as observed before, the effect is much 
stronger in mature firms regardless of how stringent EPL is.            
 
3.6. Innovation, business risk, and hedging 
According to ABS (2012), laws that prevent employers from arbitrarily discharging employees 
spur firm-level innovation and therefore encourage firms to invest in risky, but potentially mold 
breaking projects.  Consistent with that, they report that dismissal laws increase the standard 
deviation of patent citations, their proxy for the risk of innovative projects.  We investigate the 
existence of a similar pattern by examining the impact of EPL on the volatility of monthly stock 
returns.  Higher innovation should that volatility.   
 To test this prediction, we estimate our standard regression specification using Volatility as the 
dependent variable.  The results in Table 8 indicate that EPL is in fact associated with higher 
stock return volatility (column (1)) both in young and in mature firms.  Consistent with our 
115 
 
preceding findings, the innovation boost from EPL is more pronounced in older firms.  Hence, 
the evidence is consistent with the prediction that, by stimulating innovation, EPL induces firms 
to take riskier projects–or at least this is what investors believe.  Note that age per se has a 
negative relation with volatility, in line with LSW (2014) and Pastor and Veronesi (2003).   
 Higher risk brings about random fluctuations that could be detrimental to the firm.  We 
therefore inquired whether EPL is also associated with higher cash holdings for precautionary 
reasons.  The investigation replicates the one of volatility by simply replacing that variable with 
the firm’s cash holdings (as a proportion of total assets) as the dependent variable.  Because of 
space restrictions, the results are not reported in a separate table.  They are consistent with the 
proposition that EPL induces firms to hold higher cash balances, particularly in the case of 
mature firms.  The effect is inverted U-shaped.  Within the interquartile range of EPL values 
observed in the sample, however, higher levels of EPL are always associated with larger cash 
holdings.  At the lower end of that range, the holdings are about 15 percent of total assets, 
compared with 19 percent at the higher end.                 
 
4.     Employment protection and growth opportunities 
Established firms focus on their core abilities and their assets in place, and optimally dedicate 
comparatively less attention to growth opportunities.  Over time, their profitability, margins, and 
growth opportunities decline (Loderer, Stulz, and Wälchli, 2014).  EPL should change the 
allocation of managerial capacity at the margin.  By making innovation more attractive, it should 
induce, as we have seen, more active innovation in mature firms.  This should slow down the 
observed decline in Q over time.  What follows tests that prediction. 
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4.1. International evidence of a decline of Tobin’s Q ratios as firms get older  
We begin by documenting the phenomenon of an age related decline in Tobin’s Q ratios across 
countries.  Table 9 computes the association between Tobin’s Q and company age in the overall 
sample and in each individual country, separately.  For each one of these countries, we regress 
Tobin’s Q ratios against company age and the following control variables: ln(Age), ROA, Capex, 
bADR, bFocus, FF-index, Leverage, Size, and Volatility.  To conserve space, the table reports 
only age coefficients.  As one can see, all but one coefficient are negative and 31 out of the 36 are 
statistically significant.  Consequently, Tobin’s Q ratios decrease as firms grow older, a 
phenomenon that LSW (2014) document for the U.S. and Zeller (2014) confirms in an 
international context.7  Having assessed that EPL seems to boost innovation in older firms, we 
test whether it also tempers the negative age dependence of Q. 
   
4.2. Employment protection and Tobin’s Q ratios 
To measure the impact of changes in EPL on Q, we estimate panel regressions with interaction 
terms of EPL index with firm age, using the same difference-in-differences test design used in the 
analysis of innovation.  All panel regressions therefore include country, year, and industry fixed-
effects.  We use the standard regression specification.  The coefficient of EPL and the coefficient 
of the interaction between EPL and company age estimate the difference-in-differences effect of 
employment protection in a generalized multiple treatment groups, multiple time periods setting 
(see also ABS (2012)).    
                                                           
7 It could be that countries with high levels of employment protection could have higher average Q ratios for reasons 
unrelated to the ones investigated here.  If so, and assuming that Tobin’s Q ratios converge towards 1, on average, it 
would not be surprising to observe a stronger age-related decline of Q in these countries.  The results remain 
unchanged, however, when we replicate the analysis with standardized Tobin’s Q ratios.  To standardize, we demean 
each observation of Tobin’s Q with the industry’s average and then divide the difference by the industry’s standard 
deviation. 
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 Table 10 shows the results.  Column (1) reports the results of a regression of Tobin’s Q on 
ln(Age), EPL index, an interaction term of demeaned EPL index and demeaned ln(Age), and the 
control variables of our standard regression specification.  Colum (2) computes the same 
regression but replaces ln(Age) with the binary measure of age, bOldfirm.   
 In both regression specifications, the coefficient of EPL index is negative but statistically 
insignificantly different from zero across specifications at customary levels of significance.  In 
contrast, the coefficient of company age is negative and statistically significant with confidence 
better than 0.99.  Moreover, the coefficient of the interaction term between company age and the 
EPL index is positive and statistically significant, which suggests that an increase in EPL affects 
mature firms and makes the Tobin’s Q-age relation flatter.  This result is robust to the age proxy 
we use (natural logarithm or binary).  Moreover, it does not change when we exclude U.S. firms 
from the sample.  Unreported results also show robustness to clustering of the standard errors at 
the country- rather than the firm-level. 
 Economically, the magnitude of the coefficient of the interaction term generally amounts 
to one third of the coefficient of ln(Age).  Hence, a change by one unit in the EPL index leads to a 
reduction in the age effect by around one third.  The average EPL change equals 0.21, and the 
standard deviation of those changes is 0.26.  Although large, a change by one unit in the index is 
not uncommon.  EPL reforms with that impact occurred in Germany (1985), Spain (1994), 
Denmark (1995), Belgium (1997), and South Korea (1998).   
Despite the fact that all time-invariant unobserved factors at the industry-, year-, and 
country-level are controlled for by our fixed-effects approach, time-variant unobserved factors 
that are simultaneously correlated with the changes in EPL present an endogeneity problem.  To 
address this difficulty, we expand the standard regression specification by including the time-
varying country-level variables listed in Section 2.2 above.  These variables might have an 
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impact on both, Tobin’s Q and EPL.  Regressions 3 and 4 in Table 10 replicate the specifications 
in the first two columns with the addition of these time-varying country-level controls.  Only Per-
capita GDP growth has a coefficient that is marginally different from zero, although only at the 
0.10 confidence level.  More important, a comparison between columns (3) and (1), and (4) and 
(2), respectively, reveals that the addition of these control variables leaves the coefficients of age 
and those of the interaction term between EPL and age unaffected.   
In separate, unreported tests, we also controlled for financial development, which could 
boost innovation (Aghion and Howitt (1992)) and correlate with more liberal labor markets.  
However, when we add the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP as a proxy for financial 
development, the results remain the same.  We come to the same conclusion when controlling for 
a country’s intellectual resources as measured by the enrollment in institutions of higher 
education. The level of education could correlate both with the ability to innovate and with 
employment protection policies.   
 Overall, we therefore find that EPL encourages R&D in mature firms and that it slows down 
the age-related decrease in Q.  The question we want to pursue in the rest of the paper is whether 
these two effects are related.  Does EPL mitigate the age-related decline in Q ratios because, at 
the margin, it brings about more innovation?  To test this proposition, we examine first whether 
the situations in which we observe a boost in R&D effort are also situations in which Q ratios go 
up.     
 
4.3. EPL and Tobin’s Q in innovation-intensive vs. innovation-weak industries 
In analogy with Table 5, we therefore begin by splitting the sample into two by degree of 
industry-level innovation intensity.  We saw that changes in EPL animate mature firms to make a 
stronger innovation effort in innovation-intensive industries.  We want to test whether these 
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changes also revive the growth opportunities of mature firms.  We therefore reestimated the 
regression specification in Table 10 for each subsample separately.  For ease of interpretation, we 
relied on the binary measure of firm age, bOldfirm, and therefore focused on the specification in 
column (4) of that Table.  The conclusions were the same when measuring firm age with ln(Age). 
 The results showed that the age-sensitivity of Q is more than twice as pronounced in 
innovative industries than in other industries (not shown in a separate table).  More important, for 
our purposes, EPL appeared to slow down that effect in mature firms, as the coefficient of the 
interaction term between EPL and age was positive and significant (the coefficient of EPL alone 
was statistically zero).  This held regardless of whether we used the Fama-French or the 3-digit 
SIC industry classification.  However, and in contradiction with our prediction and the evidence 
concerning R&D expenses in Table 5, a formal test was unable to reject equality of the 
interaction coefficients across industries. 
  
4.4. The relevance of ownership of intellectual property 
In the second test of whether increased R&D effort is responsible for the impact of changes in 
EPL on the age-sensitivity of Tobin’s Q ratios, we sort firms by ownership of intellectual 
property as we did in Table 6.  There, we saw that EPL has a stronger impact on innovation 
efforts in countries in which the employer owns the intellectual property produced in the firm—at 
least in mature firms.  Consequently, it should follow that EPL has a stronger effect on Q in the 
mature firms of those countries.   
 We partition the sample into two according to the median country-level fraction of employer-
ownership of patents in 2005 and then re-run the difference-in-differences regressions for each 
subsample, separately.  The regression specification is again the one in column (4) of Table 10.  
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According to Table 11, the coefficient of EPL alone is statistically marginal at best.  However, in 
countries where patents tend to belong to the employer (subsample Employer), the coefficient of 
the interaction term of EPL index with bOldfirm is positive and significant.  Hence, as in the case 
of R&D, the effect of EPL is confined to mature firms.  In contrast, in the subsample where 
patents tend to belong to the inventor (subsample Inventor), the coefficient of that interaction 
term is statistically zero.  The difference between the coefficients of the interaction term in the 
two subsamples is statistically significant in a t-test with unequal variances.  We therefore 
conclude that mature firms in countries in which the employer tends to have the intellectual 
property rights experience both an increase in innovation activities and a boost to growth 
opportunities in reaction to EPL.   
 
4.5. Alternative EPL indices and index components 
In our third test, we replicate the analysis of Table 7 and inquire into whether the impact of EPL 
on the age dependence of Q also holds when we use the Deakin index of employment protection, 
and whether the effect is stronger in the case of regular, as opposed to temporary, employment 
contracts.  The results are in Table 12.  Column 1 shows that, when we replace the OECD index 
of EPL with the Deakin index, the results are similar to what we found in Table 7, but statistically 
much weaker.  In particular, unlike in the case of R&D expenditures, EPL has little marginal 
effect on the Q of mature firms.  If anything, it depresses Q in all firms, regardless of age.  
Columns 2 and 3 then compare regular and temporary contracts.  Here, the evidence is a bit more 
similar to what we observed for R&D expenses.  The effect of EPL on Q is positive, but there is 
no difference in that respect between regular and temporary contracts.  
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4.6. Nonlinearities 
Finally, we investigate the existence of nonlinearities.  In the case of R&D effort, we found that 
EPL has a positive and almost linear effect in mature firms (Table 7).  In contrast, in young firms, 
the effect is U-shaped and negative except for higher levels of EPL.  We would expect the effect 
of EPL on Q to reproduce that on R&D expenses.  Column (4) in Table 12 performs that analysis.  
To interpret the results, Panel B of the table uses the estimated coefficients to plot the relation 
between EPL and Q.  As one can see, the results are quite different.  First, EPL per se has now a 
negative, U-shaped relation with Q regardless of firm age.8  The effect flattens out but never 
reverts to positive for the EPL levels observed in the sample.  We will discuss the possible 
interpretation of this finding further down.  Second, when interacted with company age, EPL has 
a positive and concave impact on Q.  Given the values of the EPL index observed in the sample, 
this marginal effect of age is always positive, but not enough to offset the negative effect of EPL 
alone.  Graphically, this means that the decline in Q as a function of EPL is less extreme in 
mature firms.        
  
5. Does innovation intermediate the effect of EPL on Q?  
The evidence so far shows that EPL encourages R&D in mature firms.  At the same time, it 
seems to slow down the decrease in Q that firms experience over time.  The two effects could be 
related, since the impact of EPL on Q mimics, although only in part, its impact on R&D.  For a 
formal test, we could control for R&D in our standard Q regressions.  If R&D mediated the effect 
of EPL on Q, this should cause the size and significance of the coefficient of the interaction term 
between EPL and age to disappear.  When we estimate this regression specification, the 
                                                           
8  Using data from 17 OECD countries, Belot, Boone, and van Ours (2007) report an inverse U-shaped relation 
between EPL and economic growth.   
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coefficient of EPL index * ln(Age) does decline, even though only very imperceptibly, from 
0.049 in column 3 of Table 10 to 0.046 in column 1 of Table 13.  The problem with this approach 
of testing whether R&D expenditures intermediate the effect of EPL on Q is endogeneity.  R&D 
affects the firm’s future cash flows and therefore, if unexpected, it should have an impact on Q.  
At the same time, Q is a proxy for the firm’s investment opportunities and is therefore a 
determinant of R&D.  To get around this problem of reverse causality, we instrument R&D with 
the financial flexibility index, FF, proposed by Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2009). The rationale 
is that financial flexibility affects R&D expenditures.  Financial flexibility, however, satisfies the 
exclusion restriction, since it should not affect Q directly.  Hence, FF affects R&D but does not 
belong in the Q regression.  The results from estimating this regression model are in columns 2 
and 3 of Table 13.   
 The first stage regression shows that the FF-index has indeed a significant effect on R&D 
expenses: more financial flexibility is associated with larger R&D expenses.  The second stage 
regression shows that the instrumented R&D expenditures have little if any effect on Q, a result 
that we interpret as showing that annual R&D expenditures, a measure of research effort, provide 
little information to investors about value creation.  A Wu-Hausman test rejects the hypothesis of 
endogeneity of R&D expenditures.  Overall, we find little if any evidence that R&D expenditures 
mediate the effect of EPL on Q.  That effect must work through other channels than R&D.  
Equally importantly, the second-stage results also show that EPL has a negative and significant 
relation with Q, while the interaction term of EPL and company age maintains its positive and 
significant coefficient.      
 What follows investigates possible reasons why EPL has an adverse impact on Q, and why 
that impact is more pronounced in young firms than in mature ones.   
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6.     The economics of the impact of EPL on Q 
We entertain two possible reasons.  First, it could be that EPL is a proxy for product market 
regulation, and that market regulation is harmful, but less so to mature firms because it shields 
them from new entrants.  Second, EPL could impose costs on all firms but also persuade 
employees to invest in firm-specific human capital in mature firms.  What follows discusses these 
three interpretations. 
6.1. Product market regulation  
 Under the first hypothesis, EPL is a proxy for other government regulation.  As it turns out, 
EPL is highly correlated with product market regulation (PMR) across OECD countries 
(Nicoletti, Haffner, Nickell, Scarpetta, and Zoega (2001)). This positive correlation could come 
about because, according to Koeniger and Vindigni (2003)), employment protection imposes 
costs on firms, and product market regulation is designed to help them bear those costs.9  Product 
market regulation, however, has an asymmetric impact on firms, because it tends to protect 
incumbent firms against new entrants.  This could explain why EPL per se reduces the Q of 
young firms much more than that of mature firms.  To test this interpretation of the evidence, we 
use data on indicators of product market regulation that the OECD has published (PMR) in 34 
OECD countries in four different years (1998, 2003, 2008, and 2013).  These indicators measure 
the degree to which public policies promote or inhibit product market competition.  This 
regulation includes state controls (public ownership and public involvement in business 
operations, such as price controls); barriers to entrepreneurship (licenses and permits, and 
administrative burdens); and barriers to trade and investment (for example, tariffs).  We then 
                                                           
9 Another possibility that Koeniger and Vindigni (2003) offer is that product market regulation decreases 
employment and makes workers' outside options relatively worse, which could induce them to ask for employment 
protection.   
124 
 
reestimate the regression specification in column (4) of Table 12 with the addition of the 
demeaned value of the OECD PMR index.  We restrict the regression equation to the years for 
which PMR data are available.  This reduces the sample size from 178,810 to only 29,298 
observations.  Alternatively, to avoid losing so many observations, we estimate the regression 
under the assumption that PMR did not change in the years between the four years for which we 
have OECD data.  The sample size in that case goes up to 136,111.  The results are in Table 14.   
 To save space, we report regression coefficients only for company age, EPL and PMR index 
values, and the interaction term between EPL index and company age.  To make sure the four 
years with PMR data are not special, we first replicate the regression specification of column (3) 
in Table 10.  The results, which we report in column (1) of Table 14, are similar, in the sense that 
the coefficient of age is negative and significant, that of EPL is statistically zero, and that of the 
interaction between EPL and company age is positive and significant.  Moreover, at least in the 
case of the age-related variables, the coefficients are numerically similar (in the case of the 
interaction term, they are almost identical).  We reach the same conclusions when we include all 
sample years (column (3)).  Hence, there is little reason to believe that the years investigated in 
Table 14 are unusual. 
 We then add the PMR index to the regression specification.  When we do so, the age-related 
coefficients, in particular the one related to the interaction term between firm age and EPL, 
remain almost identical (columns (2) and (4)), whereas the coefficient of EPL alone becomes 
negative and marginally significant.  PMR has a positive and significant coefficient, especially 
for the years for which we have data.  Product market regulation seems to benefit existing firms.  
However, it cannot explain why the coefficient of EPL alone is nonpositive and why the 
interaction term of EPL and company age has a positive coefficient.      
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6.2. Firm-specific human capital 
  What could be happening is that EPL imposes higher labor costs on all firms while at the 
same time encouraging the employees of mature firms to increase their investment in firm-
specific human capital.  Firm-specific human capital is skills and knowledge that are 
idiosyncratic to the employing firm (Becker, 1962) or only relevant in a particular composition to 
the firm (Lazear, 2009).  It includes things such as relationships with clients or shop floor staff 
and knowledge of how the firm operates (Prendergast, 1993), and is not transferable to other 
firms.  The moral hazard logic of the ABS model applies to the investment in firm-specific 
human capital as well.  EPL protects the employee against holdup by the employer who could 
otherwise threaten dismissal to appropriate the rents generated by the employee’s know-how.  
EPL raises for the employee the net present value from investing in firm-specific human capital.  
If we assume that human capital is less firm-specific in younger companies because they are still 
deciding what they want to do, then the problem of appropriable quasi-rents in these firms will be 
less extreme.  If so, the effect of EPL on this type of investment should be felt more strongly in 
mature firms.  
 We cannot measure investments in firm-specific human capital directly.  However, if the 
hypothesis is correct and EPL does encourage investment in firm-specific human capital in 
mature firms, we would expect stronger growth, lower costs, and improved profitability there. 
 To test this prediction, we replace Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable in the regression of 
Column (4) of Table 12 with the variables Sales growth, Gross margin, and SGA-to-Sales.  The 
results are in Table 15.     
 As predicted, EPL does affect performance.  EPL appears to boost sales, but only in mature 
firms.  This is consistent with the above findings that EPL stimulates R&D effort in mature firms.  
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In contrast, however, EPL has an adverse effect on profitability and costs.  This effect is 
significant in young firms, but it gets compounded in mature firms.   
 Consequently, the evidence is consistent with the prediction that EPL sparks effort in both 
current production and innovation in mature firms.  This is consistent with an increased 
identification with the firm and an increased willingness to invest in firm-specific human capital.  
At the same time, however, EPL also increases the operating costs of firms, particularly in mature 
firms.  This effect dominates the increased incentives to invest in firm-specific human capital and 
leads to lower Q across age categories.   
 The reason why the costs of mature firms are more affected by EPL than young firms are 
could be the characteristics that make mature firms less flexible to changes in their business 
environment.  As discussed in Loderer, Stulz, and Waelchli (2014), mature firms, because of their 
optimal focus and specialization on assets in place, have less flexible cost structures, more rigid 
product portfolios, and more rigid organizations.  They are therefore comparatively less able to 
cope with the business implications of stricter EPL.  Their costs increase more and their 
profitability declines more.           
  
7. Conclusion 
The academic literature has shown an increasing interest in the relation between labor market 
institutions and productivity (e.g. Atanassov and Kim, 2009; Bassanini, et. al., 2009; Wasmer, 
2006).  These papers generally find that rigid labor market regulations hamper the reallocation of 
resources, and thus hinder growth (e.g. Lazear, 1990; Botero et al., 2004).  Also 
intergovernmental organizations, such as OECD and the IMF, regularly urge countries in Europe 
to relax their labor market regulations to stimulate economic growth.  Our evidence is consistent 
with these efforts. 
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 We rely on a large panel of seventeen countries over a period of twenty-five years to study the 
effect of the staggered passage of changes in employment protection legislation on innovation 
and firm value.  We employ a difference-in-differences identification strategy for multiple 
treatment groups and multiple time periods.  The evidence suggests that employment protection 
encourages innovative efforts and sales growth, although mainly in mature firms, where the 
potential conflict about the rents created by employees is more significant.  EPL, however, also 
increases costs in both young and established firms.  The net effect is to penalize Q, particularly 
in young firms. 
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Figure 1: Evolution of the employment protection legislation index by OECD   
The figure shows the evolution of the level of employment protection in a country as measured by the OECD composite index of 
employment protection legislation (EPL index). The level of the EPL index is shown on the vertical axis and the horizontal axis 
displays time, respectively. The sample period is 1985 – 2010. 
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Table 1: Employment protection summary indicator weights 
The table shows the composition of the OECD composite index of employment protection legislation (EPL index). The scale is 
between 0 and 6. The grey shaded components of the index are used throughout the analysis. Source: Venn (2009). 
Level 1 Level 2: sub-indices Level 3: components Level 4: items 
O
ve
ra
ll 
su
m
m
ar
y 
in
di
ca
to
r Regular contracts 
Version 1: (1/2) 
Version 2: (5/12) 
Procedural inconveniences (1/3)  1. Notification procedures (1/2) 
2. Delay to start a notice (1/2) 
Notice and severance pay for no-
fault individual dismissals (1/3) 
 9 months (1/7) 
3. Notice period after 4 years (1/7) 
 20 years (1/7) 
 9 months (4/21) 
4. Severance pay after 4 years (4/21) 
 20 years (4/21) 
Difficulty of dismissal (1/3) 
5. Definition of unfair dismissal (1/4) 
6. Trial period (1/4) 
7. Compensation (1/4) 
8. Reinstatement (1/4) 
Temporary contracts 
Version 1: (1/2) 
Version 2: (5/12) 
Fixed-term contracts (1/2) 
9. Valid cases for use of fixed-term contracts (1/2) 
10. Maximum number of successive contracts (1/4) 
11. Maximum cumulated duration (1/4) 
Temporary work agency 
employment (1/2) 
12. Types of work for which is legal (1/2) 
13. Restrictions on number of renewals (1/4) 
14. Maximum cumulated duration (1/4) 
Collective dismissals 
Version 1: (0) 
Version 2: (2/12) 
15. Definition of collective dismissal (1/4) 
16. Additional notification requirements (1/4) 
17. Additional delays involved (1/4) 
18. Other special costs to employers (1/4) 
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Table 2: Changes in employment protection legislation 
The table lists the major changes in employment protection legislation regulation which caused a change in the level of the EPL 
index in the sample countries. The list is derived from the changes described in Bertola, Boeri, and Cazes (1999), OECD (2004) 
and (2013), Subramanian and Megginson (2012), and Venn (2009). The gray (white) shaded changes in the last column concern 
the EPL component for regular (temporary) contracts (EPLR and EPLT). The hatched areas refer to both types of contracts. 
Country Year Changes EPL
Australia 1996 Workplace Relations Act 1996 restricted the scope of the unfair dismissals provisions. Employees 
were encouraged to push out of award regulation into a sphere of single-employer bargaining. 
+ 0.13
 2007 Work Relations Amendment Act dispensed with unfair dismissal laws for companies under workers
and for all companies, where dismissal is for a bona fide reason. 
– 0.13
 2009 Adoption of the Fair Work Act.46 which introduced a new provision preventing employers from 
dismissing a worker on the basis of redundancy without first considering opportunities for 
redeployment within the company or an associated entity of the company. Moreover, the size 
threshold was reduced from 100 to 15 workers. 
+ 0.25
Belgium 1997 Restrictions on temporary work agencies were reduced and fixed-term contracts were made 
renewable. 
– 1.13
 2000 Tightening of rule concerning notice period and compensation in case of unjustified dismissal for 
blue-collar workers. 
+ 0.02
 2009 Severance pay entitlements were increased. + 0.10
Canada  No changes. = 
Denmark 1995 Restrictions on temporary agency contracts were reduced. Introduction of lower compensation 
rates for employees wishing to take advantage of the leave schemes, restrictions on the use of 
sabbatical leave, abolishment of the early retirement scheme, reduction of the benefit entitlement 
period. 
– 0.90
Finland 1991 The delay before notice can start was shortened from 2 months (as set in the Act on the Dismissal 
Procedure) to 1-2 weeks (as set in the Act of Employment Contracts). 
– 0.17
 1996 Notice period was halved for workers with tenure less than 1 year. – 0.07
 1997 Introduction of limiting the circumstances in which the use of temporary agency contracts is 
permissible. Maximum total duration of temporary agency contracts was reduced. 
+ 0.16
 2001 The new employment contract act came into force reducing notice periods further. – 0.07
France 1986 Prior administrative authorization for dismissals for economic reasons was abolished. – 0.13
 1990 The list limiting the circumstances in which the use of fixed-term and temporary agency contracts is 
permissible is restored and the maximum total duration of fixed-term contracts and temporary 
agency contracts was reduced. 
+ 0.28
 2002 Severance pay entitlements were increased. + 0.06
 2008 Introduction of a formalized scheme of termination by mutual agreement and reduction of the 
length of the trial period. 
– 0.04
Germany 1985 Fixed-term contracts were allowed without specifying an objective reason. – 0.88
 1993 Notice period for blue collar workers was extended and aligned with that of white-collar workers. + 0.05
 1994 Temporary work agency legislation was loosened. – 0.06
 1996 The renewal period for fixed-term and temporary agency contracts and admissible frequency of 
renewals were increased. 
– 0.56
 2002 Maximum total duration of temporary agency contracts was brought to 24 months. – 0.25
 2004 The limit on the maximum total duration of temporary agency contracts was lifted. – 0.15
Italy 1987 Fixed-term contracts use was widened through collective agreements specifying target groups and 
employment shares 
– 0.19
 1991 Fixed-term contracts legislation was eased. – 0.06
 1997 In case of violation of fixed-term contracts legal discipline, a new Act limited the drastic sanction 
(conversion of the fixed-term contract into an open-ended one) only to serious cases. 
– 0.56
 1999 Reform of temporary work agencies extended the use of temporary work agencies and removed the 
restrictions concerning unskilled workers. 
– 0.19
 2001 Expansion of valid cases for the use of fixed-term contracts. – 0.44
 2003 Reform of temporary work agencies extended further the use of temporary work agencies. – 0.19
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Table 2: Changes in employment regulation (continued) 
Country Year Changes EPL
Japan 1996 The use of temporary work agencies was extended to 26 occupations. – 0.09
 1999 The use of temporary work agencies was extended to all occupations with some exclusions. – 0.31
 2006 Introduction of less stricter laws in case of reinstatement. – 0.17
Netherlands 1993 Inserts a new Section 1637f in the Civil Code establishing that the employer must provide the 
employee with given written information when concluding a labor contract. 
– 0.08
 1999 The flexibility and security law increased the maximum possible number of fixed-term contracts 
and lengthened the maximum total duration of contracts with temporary agency contracts. 
– 0.19
 2008 Introduction of a lower maximum severance pay. – 0.03
Norway 1995 Temporary work agencies legislation was eased. – 0.03
 2000 Temporary work agencies legislation was further eased. – 0.22
 2005 Temporary work agencies and fixed-term legislation was increased. + 0.13
South Korea 1998 Temporary work agencies were liberalized. Dismissals for managerial reasons are allowed (i.e. 
redundancy and economic restructuring). Whereas this new law may be used for dismissing a single 
person for urgent business needs, it was mainly introduced with collective dismissals in mind. 
– 0.83
Spain 1994 Procedural requirements for dismissals for economic reasons were relaxed and notice periods 
shortened. Rules governing renewals of fixed-term contracts were tightened and temporary work 
agencies permitted. 
– 0.85
 2006 The maximum allowable duration for temporary agency contracts was increased. – 0.13
Sweden 1991 Temporary work agencies were permitted. – 0.66
 1993 The maximum allowable duration for temporary agency contracts was increased. – 0.50
 1996 Fixed-term contracts were made possible without objective reason and notice periods were reduced. – 0.21
 1998 Notice period was shortened. – 0.02
 2001 Notice period was shortened. – 0.02
 2007 The maximum allowable duration for most kinds of fixed-term contracts was increased. – 0.31
Switzerland  No changes. = 
UK 2000 Trial period was halved. + 0.08
 2002 Maximum total duration of fixed-term contracts was reduced to 4 years (from unlimited). + 0.06
US  No changes. = 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
Variable definitions are in Table 16 at the end of the paper. All variables (except for the binary variables and indices) are 
winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled distribution at the country level. Panel A describes firm age across 
countries, and panel B shows the median values of the dependent variables for each country separately.  Countries are sorted 
according to number of observations in decreasing order.  The sample period is 1985 – 2010. 
Panel A: Company age  
 Age since incorporation Age since listing 
 Median Mean SD Coverage Median Mean SD Coverage 
World 29.0 40.0 35.4 0.95 15.0 21.2 16.8 0.88
US 22.0 32.0 27.3 0.95 15.0 19.4 15.5 0.94 
Japan 48.0 50.0 30.6 0.98 29.0 28.4 16.5 0.96 
UK 24.0 37.7 32.2 0.94 13.0 20.0 16.1 0.76 
Canada 18.0 23.7 21.4 0.99 12.0 16.0 12.6 0.86 
Australia 18.0 24.8 22.0 0.92 14.0 16.7 11.5 0.89 
Korea (South) 27.0 28.4 14.9 0.99 13.0 15.6 9.2 0.95 
France 31.0 48.3 49.6 0.91 10.0 17.7 21.9 0.70 
Germany 54.0 67.7 57.3 0.96 10.0 19.8 21.8 0.76 
Sweden 22.0 42.6 46.4 0.93 10.0 13.7 14.9 0.80 
Switzerland 77.0 82.6 70.8 0.95 9.0 13.5 18.1 0.64 
Netherlands 67.0 67.3 54.6 0.86 14.0 23.7 22.2 0.61 
Italy 40.0 49.0 35.5 0.88 10.0 19.3 25.5 0.67 
Norway 22.0 48.3 53.9 0.89 10.0 18.4 23.4 0.77 
Denmark 55.0 58.4 38.9 0.97 16.0 24.2 24.5 0.74 
Spain 39.0 46.8 28.6 0.96 10.0 11.6 7.0 0.58 
Finland 46.0 58.5 53.1 0.93 12.0 17.6 16.7 0.91 
Belgium 63.0 63.0 45.8 0.94 15.0 34.7 35.5 0.75 
Panel B: Median values of dependent variables and EPL 
 Tobin’s Q R&D-to-sales (%) 
Asset 
volatility
Cash-to-
assets
Sales growth
(%) ROA 
SGA-to-
Sales EPL index 
World 1.25 1.61 0.37 11.10 4.17   1.02 
US 1.47 2.34 0.44 9.96 6.03   0.25 
Japan 1.08 1.31 0.32 14.85 1.85   1.29 
UK 1.35 1.64 0.34 7.56 5.33   0.64 
Canada 1.40 0.99 0.57 9.53 6.31   0.59 
Australia 1.41 0.13 0.52 10.91 5.15   1.15 
Korea (South) 0.96 0.46 0.47 9.85 5.80   2.25 
France 1.20 2.39 0.32 9.86 4.89   2.98 
Germany 1.28 3.41 0.31 7.74 3.40   2.34 
Sweden 1.38 3.02 0.38 10.74 7.18   2.02 
Switzerland 1.21 4.11 0.27 12.35 3.29   1.36 
Netherlands 1.27 2.59 0.28 6.11 4.34   1.91 
Italy 1.13 2.05 0.30 8.59 3.21   3.01 
Norway 1.23 2.78 0.37 11.78 7.59   2.67 
Denmark 1.13 4.92 0.27 9.96 4.39   1.75 
Spain 1.20 0.65 0.30 5.75 4.43   2.80 
Finland 1.20 1.91 0.30 8.32 4.83   1.86 
Belgium 1.16 1.95 0.26 8.22 4.28   2.09 
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Table 4: Employment protection and innovation 
The table investigates the relation between employment protection and innovation. All variables (except for the binary and 
country-level variables) are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled distribution at the country level.  The 
dependent variables are Number of patents in regression 1, Number of patents per million population in regression 2, and R&D-to-
sales in regressions 3 and 4.  bHigh EPL is a binary variable equal to 1 if the EPL index is above the median value of the EPL 
index in any given year, and zero otherwise. The age proxy in regressions 3 and 4 is the demeaned natural logarithm of the firm’s 
IPO age (Age). All estimations include year and country fixed effects (FE) and robust standard errors, which are given in 
parentheses. Regressions 3 and 4 additionally include industry (Fama and French (1997) 48 industry grouping) FE, an indicator 
for R&D non-disclosure, and robust standard errors clustered at the firm-level, which are given in parentheses. The symbols ***, 
**, and * indicate statistical significance in two-sided tests with confidence 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively.  Variable 
definitions are in Table 16 at the end of the paper.  The sample period is 1985 – 2008. 
 
 Patents, country-level R&D-to-sales, firm-level 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
bHigh EPL 346.766* 5.095** 2.410 –6.044*** 
 (179.597) (2.312) (1.906) (2.100) 
bHigh EPL * ln(Age)    3.345*** 
    (0.318) 
ln(Age)   –2.650*** –4.216*** 
   (0.200) (0.322) 
ROA   –0.337*** –0.334*** 
   (0.016) (0.016) 
Capex   –0.042* –0.048** 
   (0.022) (0.022) 
bADR   1.805 1.458 
   (1.272) (1.276) 
bFocus   –0.383 –0.417 
   (0.446) (0.445) 
Leverage   –11.213*** –11.526*** 
   (0.749) (0.750) 
MTB-equity   0.229*** 0.226*** 
   (0.068) (0.068) 
Size, 1 year lag   0.443*** 0.445*** 
   (0.095) (0.095) 
Volatility   3.903*** 3.314*** 
   (0.837) (0.837) 
Constant –576.230 –3.234 0.601 6.137** 
 (561.659) (5.530) (2.961) (3.102) 
Industry FE No No Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 403 403 167'073 167'073 
Adjusted / Pseudo R2 0.949 0.915 0.183 0.184 
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Table 5: Employment protection and innovation in high vs. low innovation industries 
The table investigates the relation between employment protection and R&D-to-sales in high vs. low innovation industries. All 
firm-level variables (except for the binary variables and indices) are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled 
distribution at the country level.  Firms operating in industries whose corresponding US industry has an above (below) median 
average industry R&D-to-sales ratio are classified into the High innov. (Low innov.) subsample.  bOldfirm is the binary measure 
of firm age (equal to 1 if the firm’s IPO age is above the sample median in a given country and year, and equal to 0 otherwise).  
Industry classification is according to Fama and French's (1997) 48 industry grouping and, alternatively, the SIC 3-digit industry 
classification codes.  All estimations include industry (I) (Fama and French (1997) 48 industry grouping), year (Y), and country 
(C) fixed effects (FE).  Robust standard errors are clustered at the country level, and are given in parentheses. The symbols ***, 
**, and * indicate statistical significance in two-sided tests with confidence 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively. Difference indicates 
the difference between the coefficients of EPL index * ln(Ageipo) in the two subsamples.  Variable definitions are in Table 16 at 
the end of the paper.  The sample period is 1985 – 2010. 
 
 FF-48  SIC 3-digit 
 High innovation Low innovation High innovation Low innovation 
 industries industries industries industries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
bOldfirm –6.423*** –0.747*** –6.713*** –0.506***
 (1.009) (0.107) (1.011) (0.134) 
EPL index * bOldfirm 3.688*** 0.694*** 3.789*** 0.275*** 
 (0.506) (0.097) (0.507) (0.081) 
EPL index 3.236 0.615 4.584* 0.830** 
 (2.448) (0.445) (2.692) (0.373) 
ROA –0.569*** –0.053** –0.573*** –0.035*** 
 (0.040) (0.023) (0.052) (0.007) 
Capex 0.441** –0.041*** 0.471** –0.037** 
 (0.180) (0.013) (0.230) (0.016) 
bADR 5.562 0.094 5.171 –0.102 
 (7.483) (0.378) (6.498) (0.257) 
bFocus –2.248*** 0.089 –1.408*** –0.285 
 (0.436) (0.205) (0.274) (0.236) 
Leverage 3.065** 0.058 3.101* 0.054 
 (1.521) (0.057) (1.688) (0.068) 
MTB-equity –15.478*** –3.284*** –18.768*** –2.308*** 
 (4.387) (1.071) (3.611) (0.701) 
Size, 1 year lag 0.140 0.145*** 0.154 0.073 
 (0.164) (0.025) (0.160) (0.053) 
Volatility 0.434 –0.059 0.569 –0.114 
 (0.321) (0.120) (0.368) (0.097) 
Constant 5.466** 2.092*** 5.921** 1.130* 
 (2.237) (0.771) (2.424) (0.631) 
I, Y, and C FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 61'973 101'869 61'848 101'187 
Adjusted R2 0.218 0.034 0.219 0.024 
   
135 
 
Table 6: Employment protection and innovation by ownership of intellectual property rights 
The table investigates the relation between R&D-to-sales and employment protection as a function of who owns the intellectual 
property rights in the firm. Firms operating in countries whose employers own an above (below) median fraction of patents are 
classified into the Employer (Inventor) subsample. Patent ownership fractions are from OECD (2008).  The regression 
specification is that of column (4) in Table 4.  bOldfirm is the binary measure of firm age (equal to 1 if the firm’s IPO age is 
above the sample median in a given country and year, and equal to 0 otherwise).  All estimations include industry (I) (Fama and 
French (1997) 48 industry grouping), year (Y), and country (C) fixed effects (FE) and robust standard errors clustered at the 
country level, which are given in parentheses.  Variable definitions are in Table 16 at the end of the paper. All firm-level variables 
(except for the binary variables and indices) are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled distribution at the 
country-level. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance in two-sided tests with confidence 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, 
respectively. Difference indicates the difference between the coefficients of the interaction terms EPL index * bOldfirm in the two 
subsamples Employer and Inventor and statistical significance is indicated using a one-sided t-test. The sample period is 1985 – 
2010. 
 Patent ownership 
 Employer Inventor 
 (1) (2) 
bOldfirm –4.705*** –2.690*** 
 (0.202) (0.718) 
EPL index * bOldfirm 4.605*** 1.534*** 
 (0.269) (0.457) 
EPL index –1.718 0.411 
 (2.579) (1.344) 
Difference 3.070*** 
 (0.531) 
Controls Included Included 
I, Y, and C FE Yes Yes 
Observations 125'909 52'892 
Adjusted R2 0.207 0.152 
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Table 7: Employment protection and innovation: alternative indices and nonlinearities 
The dependent variable is the R&D-to-sales ratio. As proxies for employment protection we use the Deakin index in regression 1 
and the component of the EPL index for regular contracts (EPLR) in regression 2 and for temporary contracts (EPLT) in 
regression 3.  Regression 4 uses the EPL index.  All indices are demeaned and we include an interaction term of the index with 
firm age.  In addition, in regression 4, we add the squared EPL index and an interaction term of the squared index with firm age. 
The specification is that of column (4) in Table 4.  bOldfirm is the binary measure of firm age (equal to 1 if the firm’s IPO age is 
above the sample median in a given country and year, and equal to 0 otherwise).  All estimations include industry (I) (Fama and 
French (1997) 48 industry grouping), year (Y), and country (C) fixed effects (FE) and robust standard errors clustered at the 
country level, which are given in parentheses.  All firm-level variables (except for the binary variables and indices) are winsorized 
at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled distribution at the country-level.  Variable definitions are in Table 16 at the end of 
the paper. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance in two-sided tests with confidence 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, 
respectively.  Difference indicates the difference between the coefficients of the interaction terms EPL index * bOldfirm in the 
two subsamples.  Statistical significance there is indicated using a one-sided t-test. Panel B uses the index-related regression 
coefficients to plot the relation between EPL and R&D-to-sales.  The sample period is 1985 – 2010. 
Panel A: Regression estimates 
 Deakin index EPLR EPLT EPL index 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
bOldfirm –5.577*** –4.291*** –4.314*** –4.298***
 (0.614) (0.366) (1.042) (0.459) 
Index * bOldfirm 14.765*** 4.038*** 2.662*** 9.346*** 
 (4.006) (0.194) (0.785) (1.319) 
Index 3.073 –4.312** 1.147 –5.071 
 (4.812) (1.824) (0.755) (4.309) 
Index2 * bOldfirm    –1.997*** 
    (0.429) 
Index2    2.044** 
    (0.938) 
Difference  1.075** 
  (0.541) 
Controls Included Included Included Included
I, Y, and C FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 75'045 178'801 178'801 178'801 
Adjusted R2 0.206 0.185 0.184 0.185 
 
Panel B: R&D and employment protection  ADD AVERAGE CONTROLS 
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Table 8: Employment protection, firm age, and asset volatility 
The table investigates the relation between asset volatility, firm age, and employment protection.  The table shows the results of a 
panel regression.  bOldfirm is the binary measure of firm age (equal to 1 if the firm’s IPO age is above the sample median in a 
given country and year, and equal to 0 otherwise). All estimations include industry (I) (Fama and French's (1997) 48 industry 
grouping), year (Y), and country (C) fixed-effects (FE) and robust standard errors clustered at the country-level, which are given 
in parentheses. Variable definitions are in Table 16 at the end of the paper. All variables (except for the binary variables and 
indices) are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled distribution at the country-level.  The symbols ***, **, and 
* indicate statistical significance in two-sided tests with confidence 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively.  The sample period is 1985 
– 2010. 
 
 (1) 
bOldfirm –0.049*** 
 (0.007) 
EPL index * bOldfirm 0.028*** 
 (0.011) 
EPL index 0.114** 
 (0.046) 
ROA –0.002*** 
 (0.000) 
Capex –0.001 
 (0.001) 
Badr 0.075*** 
 (0.023) 
bFocus 0.013** 
 (0.006) 
Size, 1 year lag –0.036*** 
 (0.008) 
Constant 0.863*** 
 (0.060) 
I, Y, and C FE Yes 
Observations 193,597 
Adjusted R2 0.444 
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Table 9: Age dependence of Tobin’s Q – country-year level 
The table investigates the age dependence of Tobin’s Q in the different countries in the sample.  For each one of these countries, 
we regress Tobin’s Q ratios against company age and the following control variables: ln(Age), ROA, Capex, bADR, bFocus, 
Leverage, Size, and Volatility across all sample years.  All estimations use industry (Fama and French (1997) 48 industry 
grouping) and year fixed-effects, as well as robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.  Variable definitions are in Table 16 
at the end of the paper.  To conserve space, the table reports only information concerning the coefficient of ln(Age).  The symbols 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance in two-sided tests with confidence 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively.  The sample 
period is 1985 – 2010. 
 Coefficient of ln(Age) SE N Adj. R2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
World –0.148*** (0.008)  193,628 0.260 
US –0.198*** (0.017)  68,494 0.259 
Japan –0.074*** (0.007)  41,643 0.402 
UK –0.183*** (0.017)  18,015 0.259 
Canada –0.117*** (0.035)  12,985 0.282 
Australia –0.096** (0.041)  10,830 0.247 
Korea (South) –0.140*** (0.013)  11,185 0.347 
France –0.118*** (0.019)  7,120 0.400 
Germany –0.062** (0.026)  6,950 0.229 
Sweden –0.309*** (0.077)  3,372 0.286 
Switzerland –0.055 (0.048)  2,009 0.448 
Netherlands –0.123*** (0.040)  1,959 0.418 
Italy –0.093*** (0.021)  2,018 0.465 
Norway –0.124*** (0.044)  1,693 0.417 
Denmark –0.153*** (0.054)  1,638 0.420 
Spain 0.030 (0.092)  1,102 0.568 
Finland –0.106** (0.052)  1,469 0.498 
Belgium –0.114*** (0.036)  1,146 0.552 
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Table 10: Tobin’s Q and employment protection 
The table investigates the relation between employment protection and Tobin’s Q.  All estimations include industry (I) (Fama and 
French's (1997) 48 industry grouping), year (Y), and country (C) fixed effects (FE).  The age proxy, ln(Age), is demeaned. 
bOldfirm is the binary measure of firm age (equal to 1 if the firm’s IPO age is above the sample median in a given country and 
year, and equal to 0 otherwise).  Robust standard errors are clustered at the country-level and reported in parentheses.  Variable 
definitions are in Table 16 at the end of the paper.  All firm-level variables (except for the binary variables and indices) are 
winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled distribution at the country-level.  The symbols ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance in two-sided tests with confidence 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively.  The sample period is 1985 – 2010. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ln(Age) –0.150***  –0.152***  
 (0.008)  (0.010)  
bOldfirm  –0.162***  –0.165*** 
  (0.014)  (0.013) 
EPL index –0.102 –0.119 –0.190 –0.196 
 (0.087) (0.093) (0.140) (0.148) 
EPL index * ln(Age) 0.055***  0.049***  
 (0.016)  (0.017)  
EPL index * bOldfirm  0.066***  0.068*** 
  (0.019)  (0.022) 
ROA –0.014*** –0.014*** –0.014*** –0.014*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Capex 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
bADR –0.060 –0.068 –0.055 –0.064 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.057) (0.057) 
bFocus 0.048*** 0.062*** 0.049*** 0.063*** 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Leverage –2.672*** –2.701*** –2.799*** –2.828*** 
 (0.710) (0.712) (0.776) (0.777) 
Size, 1 year lag 0.136*** 0.128*** 0.136*** 0.128*** 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) 
Volatility 0.704*** 0.745*** 0.713*** 0.755*** 
 (0.073) (0.082) (0.074) (0.081) 
Per-capita GDP growth   2.097* 2.190* 
   (1.183) (1.191) 
Trade openness   –0.134 –0.117 
   (0.316) (0.315) 
Government orientation   –0.021 –0.018 
   (0.016) (0.015) 
Labor market programs   –0.065 –0.073 
   (0.053) (0.053) 
Fraction union members   –0.001 –0.003 
   (0.015) (0.015) 
Constant 0.918*** 0.964*** 0.211 0.238 
 (0.304) (0.295) (1.024) (1.021) 
I, Y, and C FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 193,587 193,587 178,810 178,810 
Adjusted R-squared 0.261 0.258 0.259 0.256 
 
 
   
140 
 
Table 11: Tobin’s Q and employment protection by employer friendly vs. inventor friendly regimes 
The table investigates the relation between employment protection and Tobin’s Q depending on intellectual property rights.  
Firms operating in countries whose employers own an above (below) median fraction of patents are classified into the Employer 
(Inventor) subsample.  Patent ownership fractions are from OECD (2008).  The regression specification is that of column (4) in 
Table 10.  The age proxy, ln(Age), is demeaned. bOldfirm is the binary measure of firm age (equal to 1 if the firm’s IPO age is 
above the sample median in a given country and year, and equal to 0 otherwise).  All estimations include industry (I) (Fama and 
French (1997) 48 industry grouping), year (Y), and country (C) fixed effects (FE) and robust standard errors clustered at the 
country level, which are given in parentheses.  Variable definitions are in Table 16 at the end of the paper.  All firm-level 
variables (except for the binary variables and indices) are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled distribution 
at the country level. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance in two-sided tests with confidence 0.99, 0.95, and 
0.90, respectively.  Difference indicates the difference between the coefficients of the interaction terms EPL index * bOldfirm in 
the two subsamples.  Statistical significance in that test refers to a one-sided t-test.  The sample period is 1985 – 2010. 
 Patent ownership 
 Employer Inventor 
 (1) (2) 
bOldfirm –0.158*** –0.171*** 
 (0.016) (0.035) 
EPL index * bOldfirm 0.084*** 0.048 
 (0.023) (0.033) 
EPL index –0.476 –0.499* 
 (0.292) (0.279) 
Difference 0.036 
 (0.040) 
Controls Included Included 
I, Y, and C FE Yes Yes 
Observations 125'918 52'892 
Adjusted R2 0.266 0.253 
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Table 12: Employment protection and Q: alternative indices and nonlinearities 
The table investigates the relation between employment protection and Tobin’s Q for alternative indices. As proxies for 
employment protection we use the Deakin index in regression 1 and the component of the EPL index for regular contracts (EPLR) 
in regression 2 and for temporary contracts (EPLT) in regression 3. Regression 4 uses EPL index.  All indices are demeaned and 
we include an interaction term of the index with firm age.  In addition, in regression 4, we add the squared EPL index and an 
interaction term of the squared index with firm age.  The specification is that of column (4) in Table 10.  bOldfirm is the binary 
measure of firm age (equal to 1 if the firm’s IPO age is above the sample median in a given country and year, and equal to 0 
otherwise).  All estimations include industry (I) (Fama and French's (1997) 48 industry grouping), year (Y), and country (C) fixed 
effects (FE) and robust standard errors clustered at the country-level, which are given in parentheses. Variable definitions are in 
Table 16 at the end of the paper. All firm-level variables (except for the binary variables and the indices) are winsorized at the 1st 
and the 99th percentile of their pooled distribution at the country-level. Panel A presents regression estimates.  The symbols ***, 
**, and * indicate statistical significance in two-sided tests with confidence 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively. Difference indicates 
the difference between the interaction terms of age with EPLR and age with EPLT. Statistical significance in that test refers to a 
one-sided t-test. Panel B uses the index-related regression coefficients to plot the relation between EPL and Q. The sample period 
is 1985 – 2010. 
Panel A: Regression estimates 
 Deakin index EPLR EPLT EPL index 
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
bOldfirm –0.201*** –0.165*** –0.165*** –0.165*** 
 (0.032) (0.016) (0.014) (0.020) 
Index * bOldfirm 0.136 0.071*** 0.048** 0.204*** 
 (0.191) (0.017) (0.022) (0.061) 
Index –1.076* –0.487** –0.062 –1.038*** 
 (0.597) (0.238) (0.070) (0.345) 
Index2 * bOldfirm    –0.049*** 
    (0.018) 
Index2    0.202*** 
    (0.073) 
Difference  0.023
  (0.028) 
Controls Included Included Included Included 
I, Y, and C FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 75'050 178'810 178'810 178'810 
Adjusted R2 0.249 0.256 0.256 0.256 
 
Panel B: Q-ratios and employment protection ADD AVERAGE CONTROLS 
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Table 13: Instrumental variable regression 
The table uses the financial flexibility index proposed by Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2009) to instrument R&D expenses in our Q 
regressions.  The EPL index is demeaned and we include an interaction term of the index with firm age.  All estimations include 
industry (I) (Fama and French (1997) 48 industry grouping), year (Y), and country (C) fixed effects (FE), as well as robust 
standard errors clustered at the country level, which are given in parentheses.  Variable definitions are in Table 16 at the end of 
the paper.  All firm-level variables (except for the binary variables and indices) are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile of 
their pooled distribution at the country level.  The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance in two-sided tests with 
confidence 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively.  The sample period is 1985 – 2010. 
 Panel regression 2SLS 
  first stage second stage 
 Tobin’s Q R&D-to-sales Tobin’s Q 
 (1) (2) (3) 
R&D-to-sales 0.002**  
 (0.001)   
FF-index (Instrument)  1.271***  
  (0.104)  
R&D-to-sales (Instrumented)   –0.004 
   (0.003) 
ln(Age) –0.147*** –2.810*** –0.163*** 
 (0.010) (0.126) (0.011) 
EPL index * ln(Age) 0.046*** 2.275*** 0.059*** 
 (0.018) (0.118) (0.009) 
EPL index –0.202 3.476*** –0.183*** 
 (0.139) (0.557) (0.028) 
ROA –0.013*** –0.311*** –0.015*** 
 (0.001) (0.011) (0.001) 
Capex 0.001 –0.013 0.001 
 (0.007) (0.018) (0.001) 
bADR –0.052 1.237** –0.045** 
 (0.049) (0.630) (0.019) 
bFocus 0.049*** –0.257 0.048*** 
 (0.017) (0.232) (0.009) 
Leverage –2.776*** –10.865*** –2.846*** 
 (0.795) (0.458) (0.046) 
Size, 1 year lag 0.137*** 0.360*** 0.139*** 
 (0.018) (0.056) (0.003) 
Volatility 0.710*** 4.091*** 0.731*** 
 (0.081) (0.642) (0.031) 
Per-capita GDP growth 2.107* –6.918 2.067*** 
 (1.160) (8.554) (0.349) 
Trade openness –0.136 2.967** –0.119** 
 (0.308) (1.301) (0.053) 
Government orientation –0.021 –0.219*** –0.022*** 
 (0.015) (0.078) (0.003) 
Labor market programs –0.066 0.707** –0.062*** 
 (0.053) (0.299) (0.011) 
Fraction union members –0.002 0.363*** 0.000 
 (0.014) (0.051) (0.002) 
Constant 1.027 –7.912* 0.645*** 
 (2.035) (4.340) (0.178) 
I, Y, and C FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 178'810 178'810 178'810 
Adjusted R-squared 0.261   
F-test  81.97*** 366.95*** 
Centered R2  0.187 0.244 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-2   2.817* 
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Table 14: Employment protection, product market regulation, and Q 
The table investigates the relation between employment protection, product market regulation, and Q.  The specification is that of 
column (4) in Table 10.  All estimations include industry (I) (Fama and French's (1997) 48 industry grouping), year (Y), and 
country (C) fixed effects (FE) and robust standard errors clustered at the country level, which are given in parentheses.  Variable 
definitions are in Table 16 at the end of the paper.  All firm-level variables (except for the binary variables and indices) are 
winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled distribution at the country level.  The symbols ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance in two-sided tests with confidence 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively.  Statistical significance in that test 
refers to a one-sided t-test.  The sample period is 1985 – 2010. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ln(Age) –0.122*** –0.123*** –0.137*** –0.136*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) 
Index * ln(Age) 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.040** 0.040** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) 
Index 0.409 0.261 –0.698 –0.749* 
 (0.519) (0.558) (0.429) (0.405) 
     
Product market regulation  0.678**  0.364* 
  (0.325)  (0.203) 
     
Controls Included Included Included Included 
I, Y, and C FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 29'298 29'298 136'111 136'111 
Adjusted R2 0.245 0.245 0.267 0.267 
Sample years 1998, 2003, 2008 1998, 2003, 2008 1998–2010 1998–2010
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Table 15: Employment protection and alternative firm performance measures 
The table investigates the relation between employment protection and alternative performance measures. The specification is that 
of column (4) in Table 10.  bOldfirm is the binary measure of firm age (equal to 1 if the firm’s IPO age is above the sample 
median in a given country and year, and equal to 0 otherwise). All variables (except for the binary variables and indices) are 
winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled distribution at the country level.  Variable definitions are in Table 16 at 
the end of the paper.  All estimations include industry (I) (Fama and French's (1997) 48 industry grouping), year (Y), and country 
(C) fixed effects (FE) and robust standard errors clustered at the country level, which are given in parentheses.  The symbols ***, 
**, and * indicate statistical significance in two-sided tests with confidence 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively.  The sample period 
is 1985 – 2010. 
 Sales Growth ROA SGA-to-Sales 
bOldfirm –8.125*** –0.849 –0.092***
 (1.227) (0.755) (0.030) 
EPL index * bOldfirm 2.718*** –2.235*** 0.197*** 
 (1.053) (0.715) (0.045) 
EPL index –3.280 –9.054** 0.616** 
 (3.725) (3.397) (0.244) 
    
Controls Included Included Included 
I, Y, and C FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 175'464 193'597 159'771 
Adjusted R-squared 0.053 0.223 0.078 
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Table 16: Variable definitions 
Variable (Coverage) Definition 
Panel A: Employment protection 
bHigh EPL 
(99.93) 
Binary variable equal to 1 if the country’s employment protection (EPL index) is above the sample 
median in any given year, and equal to 0 otherwise. 
Deakin index 
(39.38) 
Index composed by Deakin, Lele, and Siems (2007) for France, Germany, United Kingdom, United 
States, and India. The index contains five sub-indices: alternative employment contracts, work time 
regulation, dismissal regulation, employee representation, and industrial action. We use the sub-index 
measuring dismissal regulation. 
Source: http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk 
EPL index 
(99.93) 
OECD indicators of employment protection for 34 OECD countries and 9 emerging economies. We 
use version 1 of the employment protection summary indicator as described in Venn (2009), Table 
A2,  with the updated data from OECD (2013). 
Source: http://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotection.htm  
EPLR 
(99.93) 
OECD indicators of employment protection (EPL index) level 2 sub-index for regular contracts as 
described in Venn (2009), Table A2, with the updated data from OECD (2013). 
Source: http://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotection.htm 
EPLT 
(99.93) 
OECD indicators of employment protection (EPL index) level 2 sub-index for temporary contracts as 
described in Venn (2009), Table A2, with the updated data from OECD (2013). 
Source: http://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotection.htm 
Procedural inconvenience 
(99.93) 
OECD indicators of employment protection (EPL index) level 3 sub-index for procedural 
inconveniences as described in Venn (2009), Table A2, with the updated data from OECD (2013). 
Source: http://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotection.htm 
Notice and severance pay 
(99.93) 
OECD indicators of employment protection (EPL index) level 3 sub-index for notice and severance 
pay for non-fault individual dismissals as described in Venn (2009), Table A2, with the updated data 
from OECD (2013). 
Source: http://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotection.htm 
Difficulty of dismissal 
(99.93) 
OECD indicators of employment protection (EPL index) level 3 sub-index for difficulty of dismissal 
as described in Venn (2009), Table A2, with the updated data from OECD (2013). 
Source: http://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotection.htm 
Fixed-term contracts 
(99.93) 
OECD indicators of employment protection (EPL index) level 3 sub-index for fixed-term contracts as 
described in Venn (2009), Table A2, with the updated data from OECD (2013). 
Source: http://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotection.htm 
Temporary work agency 
(99.93) 
OECD indicators of employment protection (EPL index) level 3 sub-index for temporary work 
agency employment as described in Venn (2009), Table A2, with the updated data from OECD 
(2013). 
Source: http://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotection.htm 
Panel B: Firm age 
Age 
(88.10) 
IPO age, computed as one plus the difference between the year under investigation and the firm’s 
IPO year. The IPO year is computed as (a), for the US, the minimum value of: (1) the first year the 
firm appears on the CRSP tapes; (2) the first year the firm appears on the COMPUSTAT tapes; and 
(3) the first year for which we find a link between the CRSP and the COMPUSTAT tapes, (b) 
WorldScope item 00000; the footnote contains information about “the date when the company 
became publicly held”, (c) Compustat, (d) Osiris from Bureau van Djik, (e) SDC Platinum, (f) 
Zephyr from Bureau van Djik, (f) CRSP, (g) official websites from stock exchanges, (h) personal 
email to Investor Relations Manager, (i) corporate websites, (j) Thomson Reuters, and (k) online 
encyclopedias, filled up in this order. 
bOldfirm 
(88.10) 
Binary variable equal to 1 if the firm’s IPO age (Age) is above the sample median in a given country 
and year, and equal to 0 otherwise. 
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Variable (Coverage) Definition 
Panel C: Performance and innovation measures 
Gross margin 
(91.98) 
The gross profit margin, defined as net sales (WorldScope item 01001) minus cost of goods sold 
(WorldScope item 01051) divided by net sales, multiplied by 100. 
Number of patents 
(91.98) 
Country-level annual number of patents. Data are from the OECD Science and Technology Indicators 
database. We use the triadic patent family: i.e. patents which are simultaneously filed at the European 
Patent Office (EPO), the Japan Patent Office (JPO) and granted by the US Patent & Trademark 
Office (USPTO). Source: http://stats.oecd.org 
Number of patents per 
million population (89.56) 
Number of patents (Number of patents) scaled by one million population. 
Source: http://stats.oecd.org 
R&D expenditures 
(100.00) 
The firm’s R&D expenditures (WorldScope item 01201) divided by the market value of the firm’s 
assets (Size), multiplied by 100. Undisclosed values are set to zero and we use non-disclosure 
indicators to control for the undisclosed values.  
Sales growth 
(89.56) 
The firm’s change in net sales (WorldScope item 01001, expressed in USD) in relation to the 
previous year, multiplied by 100. 
Tobin’s Q 
(98.73) 
Tobin’s Q, computed as the market value of the firm’s assets (Size) divided by the book value of the 
firm’s assets (WorldScope item 02999) 
Panel D: Firm-level control variables 
bFocus 
(100.00) 
Borrowing from Mitton (2002), a binary variable equal to 1 if the number of two-digit SIC level 
industries in which a firm operates is less than the median in a given country and year, using the 
higher number of reported industries in WorldScope items 07021 to 07028 and 19506 to 19596, 
respectively, and 0 otherwise 
Capex 
(83.48) 
The firm’s capital expenditures (WorldScope item 04601) net of depreciation and amortization 
(WorldScope item 01151), divided by the lagged market value of the firm’s assets (Size) 
FF-index 
(99.93) 
The financial flexibility index proposed by Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2009). It is a count variable 
that adds one point for a firm with above median cash (WorldScope item 02001), one point for above 
median dividend payments (WorldScope item 04551 divided by WorldScope item 18198), and one 
point for below median capital expenditures (Capex) in a given country, industry (Fama and French's 
(1997) 48 industry grouping), and year. 
Leverage 
(98.67) 
The firm’s leverage, calculated as the firm’s total debt (WorldScope item 03255) divided by the 
market value of the firm’s assets (Size) 
MTB-equity 
(98.72) 
The firm’s market-to-book ratio, calculated as the market value of the firm’s equity (WorldScope 
item 08001) divided by the book value of the firm’s equity (WorldScope item 03501) 
ROA 
(88.84) 
The firm’s return on assets, calculated as the ratio of the firm’s earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization (WorldScope item 18198) divided by the lagged book value of the 
firm’s assets (WorldScope item 02999) multiplied by 100 
R&D expenditures 
(100.00) 
The firm’s R&D expenditures (WorldScope item 01201) divided by the firm’s net sales (WorldScope 
item 01001). Undisclosed values are set to zero and we use non-disclosure indicators to control for 
the undisclosed values. 
Size 
(89.82) 
The firm’s size is the log of the market value of the firm’s assets, calculated as the book value of the 
firm’s assets (WorldScope item 02999) minus the book value of the firm’s equity (WorldScope item 
03501) plus the market value of the firm’s equity (WorldScope item 08001) minus deferred taxes 
(WorldScope item 03263) 
Equity volatility 
(88.13) 
The volatility of the firm’s monthly stock return, calculated over a two-year window and including all 
firm-years with at least 12 monthly returns. The returns are continuously compounded and all padded 
zero-return records at the end of each stock’s time series are removed, as defined in Ince and Porter 
(2006) 
Asset volatility Weighted average of debt and equity volatility. Debt volatility is assumed to equal 5% + 0.25 * 
equity volatility. The weights are given by the book capital structure of the firm.   
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Variable (Coverage) Definition 
Panel E: Country-level control variables 
Creditor rights 
(57.36) 
Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer’s (2007) index aggregating creditor rights. The index ranges from 0 
(weak creditor rights) to 4 (strong creditor rights). 
Source: http://scholar.harvard.edu/shleifer/publications?page=1 
Fraction union members 
(100.00) 
Net union membership as a proportion of wage and salary earners in employment. The data is from 
Comparative political data set we 1960-2010 (item ud) from Armingeon et al. (2012). 
Source: http://www.ipw.unibe.ch 
Government orientation 
(94.83) 
Cabinet composition index ranging from 1 (hegemony of right-wing (and center) parties) to 5 
(hegemony of social-democratic and other left parties). The data is from Comparative political data 
set I 1960-2010 (item govparty) from Armingeon et al. (2012). 
Source: http://www.ipw.unibe.ch 
Labor market programs 
(95.80) 
Grubb and Puymoyen’s (2008) annual public expenditure on labor market programs as a percentage 
of GDP. 
Source: http://stats.oecd.org 
Per-capita GDP growth 
(100.00) 
The country’s change in per-capita gross domestic product (GDP) relative to the previous year. GDP 
is expressed in constant national currency per person. Data are derived by dividing constant price 
GDP by total population. The data is from World Economic Outlook database. 
Source: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/02/weodata/download.aspx 
Stock market in % GDP 
(93.21) 
The country’s ratio of stock market capitalization to gross domestic product in percent. The data is 
from Financial Development and Structure Dataset (item stmktcap) from Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Levine (2010). 
Source: http://econ.worldbank.org 
Tertiary enrolment 
(87.44) 
Total number of students enrolled at public and private tertiary education institutions. Data is from 
the UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 
Source: http://stats.uis.unesco.org 
Trade openness 
(94.87) 
Openness of the economy, measured as total trade (sum of import and export) as a percentage of 
GDP. The data is from Comparative political data set I 1960-2010 (item openc) from Armingeon et 
al. (2012). 
Source: http://www.ipw.unibe.ch 
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